# Pacta by Fractal Neurons — full agent reference (llms-full.txt) Disambiguation: Pacta by Fractal Neurons (https://pacta.wtf, pacta.base.eth, io.github.Fractal-Neurons/pacta) is the EVM DeFi control-plane, Safe multisig, and timelock verification registry — unrelated to pactaprotocol.org (commercial escrow) or RMI PACTA (climate assessment). > Pacta by Fractal Neurons (https://pacta.wtf · pacta.base.eth): block-pinned DeFi control-plane observations for AI agents: who can change a protocol's rules (proxy admins, timelocks, Safe quorums, roles), what the docs say, and what is queued. All feeds are free, real-time and read-only; every value replays against any archive node with the given cast command. Generated deterministically from the feeds below (data as of 2026-11-20T20:00:23Z). 37 sprints · 309 indexed records · 12 queued-operation groups · 10 governance proposals · 5 onboarding briefs. ## Feeds (all free, no key, no paywall) - https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/index.json: Block-pinned control-plane index (every record: target, call, block, block hash, classification, Base EAS UID) - https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/lookup.json: Protocol / token lookup catalog: 316 protocols + 17 briefs with slug, aliases, checksummed contracts, evidence basis and preflightArgs - https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/protocols.json: Every published protocol: badge tier + URLs, evidence basis (189 EAS-attested / 127 RPC-observed), Sprint ids, EAS UIDs, controller, pinned surfaces - https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/onboarding.json: Onboarding verification scans: every check with call, calldata, raw result, decoded value; role maps - https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/proposals.json: Live governance proposals (Aave, Euler, Morpho, Sky) mapped to block-pinned observations - https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/radar.json: Queued timelock operations with on-chain ETAs at a finalized block - https://pacta.wtf/llms.txt: Short index for language models - https://pacta.wtf/llms-full.txt: This file: the complete agent reference - https://pacta.wtf/.well-known/agent.json: A2A Agent Card - https://pacta.wtf/.well-known/mcp.json: MCP discovery manifest - https://pacta.wtf/SKILL.md: Portable agent skill ## How to verify any value 1. Take the record's target, call signature and arguments, block number and block hash. 2. Run the listed `cast call … --block N` (or eth_call with EIP-1898 {blockHash, requireCanonical: true}) on any archive node. 3. Run `cast block N --field hash` and compare with the recorded block hash. ## MCP server - Name: io.github.Fractal-Neurons/pacta · package @pacta/mcp-server v0.1.5 · transport stdio. - Status: publication_pending: @pacta/mcp-server is not yet published to npm or the MCP registry. Use the remote MCP server now (no install): https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp. The stdio server runs from a clone of the repository: node packages/mcp-server/bin/pacta-mcp.mjs. - Remote MCP (primary, zero install, Streamable HTTP): https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp · Claude Code: `claude mcp add --transport http pacta https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp` · MCP client config: {"mcpServers": {"pacta": {"url": "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp"}}} · remote tools (7 read-only inspection tools + 1 opt-in coverage/feature request tool (pacta_submit_request)): pacta_lookup_protocol, pacta_check_preflight, pacta_scan_wallet_exposure, pacta_scan_control_plane, pacta_scan_timelock_op, pacta_scan_proposal_diff, pacta_get_live_timelocks, pacta_submit_request. - Local stdio server (from a clone; npm publication pending): `node packages/mcp-server/bin/pacta-mcp.mjs`. OpenAPI 3.1: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/openapi.json. - Free MCP tier: tools/call takes three OPTIONAL, non-personal attribution fields: caller_agent (a lowercase slug naming the calling agent, IDE or framework, e.g. claude-code, cursor, coinbase-agentkit; never a name, e-mail, IP, URL, address or secret), requester_role (autonomous_agent | defi_developer | risk_curator_analyst | security_researcher | protocol_team | institutional_allocator | individual_user) and caller_purpose (pre_trade_safety | collateral_due_diligence | yield_allocation | security_audit | governance_monitoring | integration_testing | general_research). Omitted, blank or invalid attribution fields never block a call (invalid values are silently dropped and never stored; unattributed MCP calls infer a known client slug from X-MCP-Client-Name / User-Agent or count as unspecified). Over REST they are optional query or body parameters. Location is never asked: only the Cloudflare edge country is counted; no IP is stored. - One call: `curl -s -A "my-agent/1.0" "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum&address=0x..."`. HTTP clients: curl and python-requests work with their default User-Agent. For the Python standard library, send any User-Agent header (urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "my-agent/1.0"})) or read the static JSON on pacta.wtf. Every response carries `assessment` (coverage indexed_verified | unindexed_bytecode_heuristic, confidence high | medium | low, method, limits) next to the 0-100 `riskScore`, plus `catalogMatch` (slug, classification, Base EAS UIDs, pinned block, whatDiffers) when the address is an indexed protocol contract; if live RPC is unavailable for an indexed address, the answer is the pinned catalog record (`source: pinned_catalog_fallback`) instead of a 502. - 316 indexed protocols: 189 Base-EAS-attested protocols (309 Sprint records across 37 Sprints) + 127 RPC-pinned protocols (not EAS-attested). - Name lookup first: if you only have a protocol or token name (e.g. Aave, Ethena, USDe, Moonwell, kUSD), call pacta_lookup_protocol (or GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/protocols/lookup?q=) to resolve its verified record: canonical slug and page URL, checksummed primary contract and controller, classification with its evidence basis (eas_attested: Base-EAS-attested, documentation compared; rpc_observed: on-chain control plane pinned over JSON-RPC, documentationComparison not_assessed; briefs), and preflightArgs {chain, address} for pacta_check_preflight. 316 protocols + 17 briefs, answered in memory with no RPC; free in every pricing mode; an empty query lists the catalog. Catalog: https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/lookup.json. - Opt-in demand intake: when a result carries coverage_gap_hint (lookup miss, unindexed or unclassified pre-flight target, unsupported chain), ask the user, then call pacta_submit_request (or POST https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/requests) with request_type (missing_protocol | unsupported_chain | missing_check_surface | doc_or_data_discrepancy | mcp_or_api_feature), target_subject, requested_capability and urgency_track (community_queue_free | active_due_diligence | issuer_24h_clearance_5k | api_high_volume_sla), plus optional caller_agent / requester_role / caller_purpose. It returns request_id (REQ-2026-xxxxxxxx), status (queued | upvoted_existing), demand_votes and fast_track_url; an identical request upvotes the existing one. Free in every pricing mode, 5 per hour; never opens a GitHub issue. contact_handle only when the user explicitly asks for follow-up or an invoice: it is stored privately and never published. - Bounties ($100): Pacta Chain-Feed Mismatch Challenge, 4 × $25 USDC = $100 USDC hard cap, 7-day sprint Nov 15 – Nov 22, 2026: a verified on-chain control-plane parameter_delta on an unindexed protocol, or live drift on an indexed one, submitted as a PR to Fractal-Neurons/pacta. Paid in USDC on Base Mainnet after maintainer merge (not pre-escrowed): https://pacta.wtf/bounties/ - Bounties Wave 3 (OPEN): Wave 3 — 3-Year Protocol Trajectory & Integrity Dossier ($20.00 USDC / Protocol on Base) (2 × $20.00 USDC = $40.00 USDC open; $40.00 USDC (2 slots) confirmed unencumbered on-chain now in 0xcA4E2ff22B69A7284210c47BdeE21Aac1269da09); protocols >= $10M TVL across 7 EVM chains (ethereum, base, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bnb, avalanche), INCLUDING all pre-indexed rpc_observed (easAttested: false) protocols in /api/v1/protocols.json; mandatory 3-part human-researcher dossier (historical_transitions 2023-2026, docs_and_governance_forensics with MTTR, repo_audit + >= 400-char executive_risk_memo) submitted at bounties/wave-3/-.json: https://pacta.wtf/bounties/#wave-3 - Bounties Wave 2 (Completed & Retired Archive): 1,000-Gap Perpetual Open-Discovery Program ($1.00 USDC / Merged Net-New Gap on Base), retired after Epoch 1 (30 × $1.00 USDC = $30.00 USDC settled on Base; active human-researcher bounties moved to Wave 3): https://pacta.wtf/bounties/#wave-2 - Hunter leaderboard & verified researcher credentials: verified catches, protocols covered, Base EAS attestations, settled Base USDC per hunter and agent framework, and permanent shareable credentials at /leaderboard/# + /badges/hunters/.svg: https://pacta.wtf/leaderboard/ - Community hub (GitHub Discussions): announcements and builder / bounty Q&A at https://github.com/Fractal-Neurons/pacta/discussions; questions about targets, dossiers or the MCP tools go to the Q&A thread https://github.com/Fractal-Neurons/pacta/discussions/44. Historical Wave 2 issue: https://github.com/Fractal-Neurons/pacta/issues/41 - Vault factories and curators: https://pacta.wtf/integrations/vault-factories/ (Control-Plane & Role Map tab from https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/protocols.json, status badges https://pacta.wtf/badges/.svg and https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/.svg, and PactaSentinelGuard.sol: refuses cap increases without a healthy Pacta attestation, never blocks a decrease). - Stdio tools (11 read-only inspection tools + 1 opt-in request tool): - pacta_lookup_protocol (free): Resolve a protocol or token name, symbol, slug or 0x address to its verified record and preflightArgs {chain, address} (query, chain, kind, limit; no RPC) - pacta_list_commitments (free): Filter indexed records (protocol, classification, sprint, limit) - pacta_get_anchoring (free): Base EAS anchoring: PactaCommitmentRegistry, schema, sprint attestation UIDs - pacta_list_proposals (free): Governance proposals feed (forum, topic_id, chain, limit, include_repro) - pacta_x402_discover (free): x402 gateway status and discovery manifest (only when PACTA_X402_URL is set) - pacta_check_preflight (x402 $0.01): Pre-execution check of a contract: verdict, 0-100 risk score, proxy / admin / timelock, capabilities (chain, address, block) - pacta_scan_wallet_exposure (x402 $0.01): Read-only Multicall3 Ethereum + Base wallet or Safe exposure summary across indexed DeFi protocols (address, chain; shares 50/day free quota, zero wallet-address logging) - pacta_scan_control_plane (x402 $0.10): Live control-plane scan of a contract (chain, address) - pacta_scan_timelock_op (x402 $0.25): Live TimelockController operation state (timelock, opId) - pacta_live_timelocks (x402 $0.10): Live state of tracked queued timelock operations - pacta_scan_proposal_diff (x402 $0.15): Re-run a tracked governance proposal's pinned reads live, pinned-vs-live diffs (forum, topicId) - pacta_submit_request (free): Opt-in (the only tool that writes): queue or upvote a coverage / feature request after a coverage_gap_hint, with the user's consent; forwards to POST /v1/requests (only when PACTA_X402_URL is set) - Paid tools are disabled unless PACTA_X402_URL is set (opt-in: PACTA_X402_URL=https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev); the client refuses any 402 challenge (v1 body or v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header) whose payTo, asset or network differ from the values below, or whose amount exceeds $1.00 by default. Pay with xPaymentHeader (x402 v1) or paymentSignatureHeader (x402 v2). ## x402 micropayments (optional; only for live scans of unindexed contracts) - Network: Base (chain id 8453) · scheme exact · asset USDC 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 · payTo 0xcA4E2ff22B69A7284210c47BdeE21Aac1269da09 (attester EOA, pacta.base.eth). - Pacta Treasury: 0x4348DF1BEFAffcbA248B5118B1b782B1B2bdEd14 (an externally owned account; the PactaCommitmentRegistry treasury slot). Pacta treasury (direct settlement EOA): Option B direct on-chain USDC settlement of commercial issuer clearance (Option A is a formal commercial invoice). An externally owned account, not a smart-contract wallet; not the x402 payTo. - Live gateway: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev (Cloudflare Worker; pricingMode free_launch; x402Versions [1, 2]; PayAI facilitator; maxTimeoutSeconds 60). - Free launch: every route answers HTTP 200 at $0 with no API key and no wallet (60 requests / minute per caller). The x402 prices below apply only if the operator switches pricingMode to x402_paid. - x402 v1: network base · amount field maxAmountRequired · challenge in the 402 JSON body · pay with X-PAYMENT · receipt X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE. - x402 v2: network eip155:8453 · amount field amount · challenge in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (base64 JSON) · pay with PAYMENT-SIGNATURE · receipt PAYMENT-RESPONSE · extensions.bazaar carries a JSON Schema draft 2020-12 schema (https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema). - Bare probe: A bare GET (no query) or zero-byte POST with no payment header on any paid URL returns HTTP 402 at once: the v1 JSON body (x402Version 1, network base, maxAmountRequired) plus the v2 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (x402Version 2, network eip155:8453, amount, extensions.bazaar with a JSON Schema draft 2020-12 schema). - Settlement: A settled call returns 200 with both PAYMENT-RESPONSE and X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE (base64 {success, transaction, network, payer}). That receipt is the facilitator's settlement assertion bound to the payer; the MCP client checks it against the signed authorization but does not look the transaction up on Base (onchainReceiptVerified: false). - Gateway settlement guard: In x402_paid mode the gateway verifies every settlement on Base before releasing the product: eth_getTransactionReceipt must show status 0x1 and canonical USDC Transfer(payer -> payTo 0xcA4E2ff22B69A7284210c47BdeE21Aac1269da09) logs summing to at least the route price, and replays are rejected on a best-effort basis (402 replay_settlement_tx) via synchronous same-isolate state and non-atomic eventually-consistent KV used_tx:; concurrent cross-isolate races are not globally atomic without Durable Objects. Otherwise the product is withheld: 402 unconfirmed_or_reverted_settlement_tx / insufficient_onchain_usdc_transfer, or 502 settlement_rpc_unavailable when no Base RPC answers. - Paid routes (GET query or POST JSON body with the same names): - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum|base&address=0x…: 10000 atomic USDC ($0.01) - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/wallet-exposure?address=0x…&chain=ethereum|base|all: 10000 atomic USDC ($0.01) - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/scan/control-plane?chain=ethereum|base&address=0x…: 100000 atomic USDC ($0.10) - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/scan/timelock-op?chain=ethereum|base&timelock=0x…&opId=0x…: 250000 atomic USDC ($0.25) - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/scan/proposal-diff?forum=aave|euler|morpho|sky&topicId=: 150000 atomic USDC ($0.15) - GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/briefs/live-timelocks: 100000 atomic USDC ($0.10) - Free: GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/health, GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/.well-known/x402, GET https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/sample/control-plane (/.well-known/x402 is the Bazaar discovery manifest, discoverable: true). ## On-chain anchoring (Base, chain id 8453) - PactaCommitmentRegistry 0x35D21Bb4Df6586FE7759b5e57263ffeB3e1fd872 (Sourcify verified); attester pacta.base.eth 0xcA4E2ff22B69A7284210c47BdeE21Aac1269da09. - EAS schema 0x7ff485bc1159dff3c70eefcb9dff2d65be990301760c2d53799e5a45e3badf83: uint16 sprintId,uint64 chainId,uint64 blockNumber,bytes32 blockHash,uint8 verifiedCount,uint8 driftCount,bytes32 summarySha256,string prURI (as registered on Base). - Sprint 1 attestation UID 0x34049a2c64fe3355f8e325481234754c8422a48bb4784fed1d028fa40eb93058 - Sprint 2 attestation UID 0xca4b525bf5142d8e88433cbed2a1aa87bb06a97d1353cb77621ec41a51ce8101 - Sprint 3 attestation UID 0x291e513f3d697eea41b20bd57bf53acdb085b5566e499dd655ff46d7cd9d95a8 - Sprint 4 attestation UID 0xa26f81b0e68248c7f286527286b3d2e6b299502d53f4dfbc4397df7d22262986 - Sprint 5 attestation UID 0x804289d4357b0a8d5a360911ec450c13ca36c4422d1e811c4c7040ef7d2628e5 - Sprint 6 attestation UID 0x749d96e1a3d214a4ab66c528ca12c84dce085fa138dc370dd0eb817d890f09fa - Sprint 7 attestation UID 0x3e0e0e1b62de65b277b1399f9833cd70baf627e5ba69e17f1f4f76be30008779 - Sprint 8 attestation UID 0xfd7ce0f2b980da6606c8cd755da45d99f9ae4826e6df1321ff52c2b0f8e6a6c2 - Sprint 9 attestation UID 0x0e017bc4399101f9fef3d98a434dd9f2829b6e386e7733408dfd4b626d186eea - Sprint 10 attestation UID 0xfdd83c8091ef6e8ffe67e8a55a78892fcfbb1092683b21ff2d85f8cc09750e6c - Sprint 11 attestation UID 0x754edd7612258b755ff2e56903243d1f8867bad53c29ce3febb5ed9114005e42 - Sprint 12 attestation UID 0x7caae9c22c86ae171392def07dce83fa5da6fbf904b1ba9b5ff66a5021b16de9 - Sprint 13 attestation UID 0x6afd266541ea1643b680ce6ec15d218874356598820987c6b3eaf16342cd075c - Sprint 14 attestation UID 0x8965ae6e51a78132a77eb14c0ac1c6cd1be357d6f261253efff28869478ae5b8 - Sprint 15 attestation UID 0x967a4935786194575835d5a46e3e39b1d553225deb6a96c7ff4acf52a34dff22 - Sprint 16 attestation UID 0x217d213de3cd9ef094670ff69d258af35adf132406caa547f729f487dc9d7e58 - Sprint 17 attestation UID 0xbeb412dfc350f879f816a5cb001b53257a3ee03c12cf1d8e2c15a070141ed8c7 - Sprint 18 attestation UID 0x105ea2849a5cd9ef601ae565e6b0adf288884771c8ac82c1c3d0a87aa789eb4f - Sprint 19 attestation UID 0xa04d9c98873fce6fffb60fe535510092f22284f3afeeb78e36e4a0c25d5ea928 - Sprint 20 attestation UID 0xe712dd31d79ab492e2e64eb5847396651dee81daa9f895ead45548e97f1a2eb7 - Sprint 21 attestation UID 0xaddd478e0a488405a28720e11fed8d1942853dbb36fc75bb5a0725b83a460ad6 - Sprint 22 attestation UID 0x50058ab09e446a72e880df68ce0e0ef96bb891ccd689a99ad2cbfc7b469ae9f5 - Sprint 23 attestation UID 0x435a5212e2490cd6024859f474dbbd897752b24985480413301d7573cb195801 - Sprint 24 attestation UID 0x61c2970c176b85ab604e6b565c5f050a7176b62e725d449e8d27d700365283d6 - Sprint 25 attestation UID 0x1c379ef9f845a2affa9c42715ba2b1b4b2f750b71b4edf9c50d0e1ae739e11ff - Sprint 26 attestation UID 0x6692c36731ecd514fb7a92fe3de0a6770b67f68f55eece26faa669c2c84b3a08 - Sprint 27 attestation UID 0x5c12867816bee7d00c13412cf7ec67c00b7d42f3020643ab2a2ca577a28de424 - Sprint 28 attestation UID 0x541dcd6767b83d7e01b7ffe6843d486d6abce09ef00801c39bf287c6d14a5768 - Sprint 29 attestation UID 0x32400a47c56a0522d26e7e83a45b0743a5b67c1e756672f875f09db0d93dec13 - Sprint 30 attestation UID 0x06edec4488a7b0389c63bd8551cb47e18600bb67d14decd9b1a56e69198cca1c - Sprint 31 attestation UID 0x63d29eafa88f7e52cc6a596668ae3f03c8132704108794092dc25710fa8bde77 - Sprint 32 attestation UID 0x0968566bba6498e9ef4ced90a4d787a44198eb5fde427b39b794d1959064bddc - Sprint 33 attestation UID 0x897aa17688d627e9d4fdd7a49c8f4c3a9d4b1943e24e03d7c744563895d9d03c - Sprint 34 attestation UID 0xc281741a4fb297a9ccb30b5485ca6ef2bcfb69be10236c056e7208301e30d992 - Sprint 35 attestation UID 0xce8821d521758614be8860ac6476e1cec01ae000d81a660644e7bf1260d8cdfd - Sprint 36 attestation UID 0xe16008e972c9b16353100f32e3a2d4ae61152f26d34e600ca205723c77602edf - Sprint 37 attestation UID 0xa20a0fa97ac80abb3d3f9d4de615018ff3a07f42eb4f124375dc26a216f896a5 ## Sentinel (Phase 2) - PactaSentinelTripwire.sol: an ownerless, immutable contract granted Morpho Vault V2 isSentinel. Vault owners register rules (predicate module + config, cap id, adapter, liquidity reader). trigger(ruleId) is permissionless but re-checks the broken invariant on-chain in the same transaction, then sets the absolute cap to 0 (committed even if deallocate or the EAS receipt revert), deallocates min(allocation, liquid assets), and sweepRemaining(ruleId) drains the rest as liquidity returns. Zero custody. Predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, OracleGovernanceSwapPredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate. Status: built and tested (Foundry, 107 tests incl. invariants and fork tests); not audited, not deployed. ## Governance proposals (from /api/v1/proposals.json) ### aave-25128: [ARFC] Onboard cirBTC on Aave v3 Core and Aave V4 Core - https://governance.aave.com/t/25128 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard - ethereum block 26408330 (0x8efc8256deb932e65b5117f040db264dc8200850636d90eecd5daccb99979f4d) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json circle-cirbtc-eth · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/circle-cirbtc-eth/ - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate - Upgrade authority: proxy admin() = 0xC9cE…a9BD, EOA (no contract code); 0 transactions sent. Implementation 0x4350…02dd; version() = “2”. - Operational roles: owner() 0xd501…5182 (EOA (no contract code); 0 transactions sent); pauser() 0xabde…A222 (EOA (no contract code); 0 transactions sent); blacklister() 0xb5BE…1D79 (EOA (no contract code); 495 transactions sent); masterMinter() 0xC0Cc…87A2 (contract (5,346 bytes of code), owner() 0x5183…2256: EOA (no contract code); 9 transactions sent). - None of these roles sits behind an on-chain TimelockController or multisig contract at the pinned block: upgrade, pause, blacklist and minter configuration take effect in the transaction that calls them. Key custody (HSM / MPC) is off-chain and not observable here. ### aave-25499: [ARFC] Onboard PAXGy to Aave V4 Global Dollar Hub - https://governance.aave.com/t/25499 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard - ethereum block 26408330 (0x8efc8256deb932e65b5117f040db264dc8200850636d90eecd5daccb99979f4d) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json paxos-paxgy-eth · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/paxos-paxgy-eth/ - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate - owner() of the vault, accountant, teller and manager is the TimelockController 0x0DcC…df08 (getMinDelay() = 86,400s). The RolesAuthority 0xC444…99DD is also owned by it. Owner-only changes (including setManageRoot, which no role holds) therefore wait at least 24 hours. - Timelock roles (9 events replayed): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 0x0DcC…df08; PROPOSER_ROLE: 0x0000…3f2F; EXECUTOR_ROLE: 0x0000…3f2F, 0x1D60…9312, 0x317e…A024, 0x4143…652C, 0x6Be5…526E, 0xFBf7…1A5e; CANCELLER_ROLE: 0x0000…3f2F. - Capabilities granted through the RolesAuthority execute with no delay. updateExchangeRate is held by the 3-of-5 Safe 0x0000…3f2F and by 0x1755…4B56 (EOA (no contract code); 8,269 transactions sent). The accountant bounds each update: upper 10004 bps, lower 10000 bps of the current rate, at least 3,600s apart (current rate 1.004425 PAXG per PAXGy; platform / performance fee 0 / 0 bps). In the upstream Veda AccountantWithRateProviders source, an update outside these bounds or sooner than the minimum delay stores the new rate and pauses the accountant instead of reverting (the deployed bytecode was not compared with that source here). - Full role, capability and holder map below, replayed from 68 RolesAuthority events (blocks 25,740,680–26,408,330). Selectors without a public signature are shown as raw 4-byte values. - Teller 0x41AB…A6f7: isPaused() = false, shareLockPeriod() = 0s. The previous teller 0x5C43…fe72 is paused (isPaused() = true). ### aave-25721: [ARFC] Onboard syrupUSDC to Aave V4 on Arc - https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-onboard-syrupusdc-to-aave-v4-on-arc/25721 · issuer_control_plane: the proposed collateral's issuer permission layer - ethereum block 26401540 (0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641) · source /api/v1/index.json maple-v2-syrup-ppm-admin - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, OracleGovernanceSwapPredicate - Maple Finance V2 / Syrup — EIP-1967 Proxy Admin Slot vs. GovernorTimelock [parameter_delta, Sprint 6, block 26401540]: EIP-1967 admin slot holds 4-of-7 Maple DAO Safe (0xd6d4Bcde6c816F17889f1Dd3000aF0261B03a196); Globals.governor() (0x804a6F5F667170F545Bf14e5DDB48C70B788390C) points to GovernorTimelock (0x2eFFf88747EB5a3FF00d4d8d0f0800E306C0426b, getMinDelay = 259200s / 3d); syrupUSDC (0x80ac24aA929eaF5013f6436cdA2a7ba190f5Cc0b) totalAssets = 898,551,580.57 units (6 dec). Documented: Governor admin actions documentation describes GovernorTimelock (3-day delay) governance path. ### aave-25902: [Direct-To-AIP] Onboard PT-sUSDe-28JAN2027 to Aave V3 Plasma Instance - https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-onboard-pt-susde-28jan2027-to-aave-v3-plasma-instance/25902 · issuer_control_plane: queued Ethena minting-collateral changes underlying sUSDe - ethereum block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · source /api/v1/index.json ethena-minting-rlusd-usat-onboarding-ops · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/ethena-ops-0x0ca0-0x1fe5/ - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate - Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) — EthenaTimelockController 1d delay — queued RLUSD & USAT collateral onboarding [parameter_delta, Sprint 14, block 26406106]: getMinDelay() = 86400s (1d). Operations 0x1fe5e3e892708310bbfcf50efc03a1b8e21e0d0042035d7e8315e0cd5f26d85b (ETA 1794651635, 2026-11-14 10:20:35 UTC) and 0x0ca0fcc4856b87f3df9a74532bd60db58d1310c27c17e7d9bfa8a56846f57a90 (ETA 1794651743, 2026-11-14 10:22:23 UTC) are pending. Both call EthenaMinting (0xe3490297a08d6fC8Da46Edb7B6142E4F461b62D3).addSupportedAsset (0x7cfbc42f) for RLUSD and USAT as STABLE with 200M / 20M USDe-per-block mint / redeem caps, the same as the USDC / USDT configuration. EthenaMinting.stablesDeltaLimit() = 0. Documented: key-trust-assumptions.md lists 7-day time-locks (see the Sprint 7 record); public brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/ethena-ops-0x0ca0-0x1fe5/. ### aave-25927: Tether America USD (USAT) on Aave Avalanche Assessments - https://governance.aave.com/t/25927 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard - ethereum block 26408330 (0x8efc8256deb932e65b5117f040db264dc8200850636d90eecd5daccb99979f4d) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json tether-usat-eth · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/tether-usat-eth/ - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate - USAT 0x0704…8b68 is an EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x8B98…4d0e, ProxyAdmin 0x3e4C…d9C7 whose owner() is 0x62b3…c5Cb. USAT.owner() is the same address. - That controller is a legacy MultiSigWallet (submit / confirm / execute; 5,705 bytes), required() = 3 of 5 owners. It is not a TimelockController: an upgrade or owner action executes as soon as the third confirmation lands. - Linked queue: Ethena timelock 0xE8Dc…7c94 (86,400s delay) holds two pending operations (isOperationPending = true / true) that add RLUSD and USAT to EthenaMinting; the USAT operation becomes executable at 2026-11-14 10:22:23 UTC. See the Ethena pre-execution brief. - The forum thread assesses the bridged USAT on Avalanche; this brief covers the canonical Ethereum token whose redemption and credit exposure that bridged asset inherits. ### aave-26304: [Direct-to-AIP] Ethena E-Mode Consolidation on Aave V3 - https://governance.aave.com/t/direct-to-aip-ethena-e-mode-consolidation-on-aave-v3/26304 · issuer_control_plane: Ethena admin timelock and operating Safe - ethereum block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · source /api/v1/index.json ethena-admin-timelock-and-dev-safe - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate - Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) — TimelockController MinDelay & Dev Multisig Quorum [parameter_delta, Sprint 7, block 26401638]: getMinDelay() = 86400s (1 day); Dev Multisig (0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862) getThreshold() = 5, getOwners().length = 10 (5-of-10 Gnosis Safe). Documented: key-trust-assumptions.md lists 7-day time-locks and 7 signatures (key-addresses.md lists 5/11); Risk Committee forum topic 810 (Jul 2026) notes 1-day delay. ### euler-1850: efixDI/USDC on Base — tokenized Brazilian DI fund, D+0 NAV redemption (governedPerspective whitelist) - https://forum.euler.finance/t/1850 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard - base block 57050397 (0xd6d02efb420f81b3f0e095d78453362c4488afb9adc0f8e1c411bb265beb88a7) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json efix-efixdi-base · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/efix-efixdi-base/ - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, OracleGovernanceSwapPredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate - One 2-of-3 Safe, 0x9040…EeD4 (getThreshold() = 2), is governorAdmin() of the USDC vault, governor() of the EulerRouter (= 0x9040…EeD4) and holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on efixDI+. No TimelockController sits between that Safe and these contracts, so the router's oracle configuration, LTVs and caps can be changed by one executed 2-of-3 Safe transaction, with no enforced on-chain delay. - The router prices efixDI+ through the custom adapter 0x9CD2…7788 (name() = “efixDI/USDC par x ChainlinkBRLUSD”). Borrow / liquidation LTV 70% / 77%, interest fee 15%. - Supply cap 3,440.00 USDC, borrow cap 23,000.00 USDC; total assets 3,480.37 USDC, borrows 3,135.58 USDC (90.1% utilization). - MINTER_ROLE on efixDI+ is held directly by 0x8f8C…CCb1, an account with no contract code (0 bytes) and 1,159 transactions sent, which is also one of the three signers of the governor Safe. Calls gated only by MINTER_ROLE need no second signature and no delay. - efixDI+ AccessControl role history (19 events, blocks 41,724,585–57,050,397): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 0x9040…EeD4 (2-of-3 Safe); PAUSER_ROLE: 0x9040…EeD4 (2-of-3 Safe); MINTER_ROLE: 0x8f8C…CCb1 (EOA, 1,159 txs, signer of 0x9040…EeD4). - EFIX.owner() = 0x7C54…7537: an EOA carrying an EIP-7702 delegation designator to 0xdf02…8792, 156 transactions sent. It is not a Safe or a timelock. ### euler-1862: kUSD/USDC isolated market on Euler Base: deployed, ungoverned, and an underwriting packet for curators - https://forum.euler.finance/t/1862 · direct_target: the asset or market this proposal asks to onboard - base block 57050397 (0xd6d02efb420f81b3f0e095d78453362c4488afb9adc0f8e1c411bb265beb88a7) · source /api/v1/onboarding.json kerne-kusd-base · brief https://pacta.wtf/briefs/kerne-kusd-base/ - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, OracleGovernanceSwapPredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate - The market layer has no governor: governorAdmin() returns 0x0000…0000 on the USDC vault and 0x0000…0000 on the kUSD escrow vault, and EulerRouter.governor() returns 0x0000…0000. Oracle, LTVs and caps cannot be changed by anyone. - Caps are unset and cannot be set: supply cap none (AmountCap 0), borrow cap none (AmountCap 0). Exposure limits exist only in the curator vault that allocates to this market. - kUSD is priced at a fixed rate: getQuote(1e18 kUSD, USDC) = 1.00 USDC from 0x8f27…D2D3. Borrow / liquidation LTV 60.00% / 65.00%. No market price feeds liquidations, so lender recovery depends on kUSD redemption and its backing. - kUSD implements AccessControl (supportsInterface(0x7965db0b) = true). DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on kUSD is held by the TimelockController 0x36A1…0D72 (hasRole = true; getMinDelay() = 172,800s, 48h). The 2-of-3 Safe 0x52d3…4877 is its proposer, executor and canceller (true / true / true) and does not hold DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on kUSD itself. - MINTER_ROLE is held by 0xaBDE…9803 (kUSD() = 0x5C2E…0AA3, paused() = false), whose DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is the same timelock (true). Role changes on kUSD and on the minter pass a 48-hour public queue. - kUSD AccessControl role history (16 events, blocks 44,448,090–57,050,397): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 0x36A1…0D72 (contract, 6,536 bytes); MINTER_ROLE: 0xaBDE…9803 (contract, 11,376 bytes). - kUSD admin TimelockController role history (4 events, blocks 49,495,127–57,050,397): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 0x36A1…0D72 (contract, 6,536 bytes); PROPOSER_ROLE: 0x52d3…4877 (2-of-3 Safe); EXECUTOR_ROLE: 0x52d3…4877 (2-of-3 Safe); CANCELLER_ROLE: 0x52d3…4877 (2-of-3 Safe). - kUSD minter contract role history (11 events, blocks 48,469,020–57,050,397): DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 0x36A1…0D72 (contract, 6,536 bytes); MANAGER_ROLE: 0x36A1…0D72 (contract, 6,536 bytes), 0xC47a…Cc8E (contract, 1,012 bytes). ### morpho-2301: [RFC] A User-centric DeFi Collateral Transparency Framework - Phase 1 - https://forum.morpho.org/t/rfc-a-user-centric-defi-collateral-transparency-framework-phase-1/2301 · framework_reference: block-pinned Morpho Blue and MetaMorpho control-plane observations the framework discusses - ethereum block 26401405 (0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510) · source /api/v1/index.json morpho-blue-singleton-owner, metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate, CapSupplyViolationPredicate - Morpho Blue Core — Sampled Singleton Owner & Fee/LLTV Bounds [aligned_baseline, Sprint 3, block 26401070]: Morpho Blue owner() = 0xcBa28b38103307Ec8dA98377ffF9816C164f9AFa and sampled fee/LLTV bounds match documentation at block 26401070. Documented: Morpho Blue core singleton ownership and immutable fee/LLTV bound specification. - MetaMorpho (Re7 WETH vs. Re7 USDT) — Sampled MetaMorpho Vault Guardian Configuration [parameter_delta, Sprint 5, block 26401405]: Re7 WETH owner() = 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, pendingGuardian() = (0x0, 0); peer Re7 USDT (0x95EeF579155cd2C5510F312c8fA39208c3Be01a8) sets guardian() = 0x2F80ba89362f86a9acC71BFfE5EcF4997F52BDd4 (Aragon Guardian). Documented: Peer Re7 curated vault architecture and Aragon guardian integration. ### sky-28390: [November 19, 2026] Proposed Changes to Spark for Upcoming Spell - https://forum.skyeco.com/t/november-19-2026-proposed-changes-to-spark-for-upcoming-spell/28390 · governance_path: the GSM pause delay every Spark spell passes through - ethereum block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · source /api/v1/index.json spark-sky-gsm-pause-delay - Sentinel predicates: AdminUpgradePredicate, PausePrivilegeEscalationPredicate - Spark / Sky — Sampled PoolAddressesProvider Owner & GSM Delay [aligned_baseline, Sprint 7, block 26401638]: GSM_PAUSE_PROXY.delay() = 172800s (48 hours); Spark PoolAddressesProvider (0x02C3eA4e34C0cBd694D2adFa2c690EECbC1793eE) owner() = 0x3300f198988e4C9C63F75dF86De36421f06af8c4 (SPARK_PROXY). Documented: Sky 48-hour Governance Security Module (GSM) delay and Spark SubDAO proxy ownership. ## Queued timelock operations (from /api/v1/radar.json) Refreshed at finalized block 26457377 (2026-11-20 16:03 UTC); Base items at Base finalized block 59999187 (2026-11-20 15:56 UTC). - ether.fi: ether.fi — LayerZero V2 delegate moved behind the 10-day timelock · timelock 0x9f26d4C958fD811A1F59B01B86Be7dFFc9d20761 (864000s) · 0x244e3f6c3df722246c471cee58804dd34c7703fce9cee1eadc1c5a85f171359f pending=true eta=1795193651 - Compound V3: Compound V3 — all 25.94 WETH of reserves on Linea's cWETHv3 withdrawn and bridged to the Ethereum Timelock · timelock 0x6d903f6003cca6255D85CcA4D3B5E5146dC33925 (172800s) · 0x86b41fd84764a2e73ccd29c1e33c93497a70d7e84b7445804752980fa039fee0 pending=true eta=1795201103 - Yearn V3: Yearn V3 — 8 new strategies added to 6 vaults with max-debt caps · timelock 0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336B7090767F367BF73 (604800s) · 0x2a14e386ce3da63615778466602757ea8dc25e8157aaee660213827a15efb5cf pending=true eta=1795451951 - Treehouse: Treehouse TREE — UUPS upgrade adding Blacklistable · timelock 0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e (432000s) · 0x2f11dcc36860f09b9ef94585589ced1798cef603d133efecd017ce7e544c451f pending=false eta=None - Lombard: Lombard — AssetRouter, BTC.b and LBTC upgrades adding a fixed deposit fee · timelock 0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59 (86400s) · 0xceeeff86865f11b6de2c57d4901d3ec3313edf08be6ea664989d386cb1ab18eb pending=false eta=None; 0x2f2a342465e4d964eb240db7c573dff2f57e35b9bd3ea3798987aa327c02dd81 pending=false eta=None; 0x6404e599d016a5a5d60957a22db6919eb7409f28d7d3880cf78ac1313f167fff pending=false eta=None - Beefy Finance (Base): Beefy CLM USDC-VVV on Aerodrome — calm-check tolerance widened from 9 to 25 ticks · Base (chain id 8453) · timelock 0x3B60F7f25b09E71356cdFFC6475c222A466a2AC9 (21600s) · 0x3302750e18a4bff9508c6e93386a406df9aa8d36992188e76a08ecc76bfce208 pending=false eta=None - Ethena: Ethena USDe — mint caps cut to 50M per block, USDm delisted, a custodian added · timelock 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 (86400s) · 0xb0289f92009409e09b8b87150e10486ab753b7c13d049702caca3221a622d81a pending=false eta=None; 0xca0563b0bebee6c971db36df24ef8c5802ad4007f7fb42bff2f553141c8ed835 pending=false eta=None; 0x108ea49a961a00e8992ad4aed2e1faea43b0a47982e0c62d63f9db03ddb4d0f4 pending=false eta=None; 0x070a0ab4df4b4d69e23ed817c62481d267dae887ed7f7b5fbc7cffa5ff64228d pending=false eta=None - Ethena: Ethena USDe — RLUSD & USAT collateral onboarding · timelock 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 (86400s) · 0x1fe5e3e892708310bbfcf50efc03a1b8e21e0d0042035d7e8315e0cd5f26d85b pending=false eta=None; 0x0ca0fcc4856b87f3df9a74532bd60db58d1310c27c17e7d9bfa8a56846f57a90 pending=false eta=None - ether.fi Liquid: ether.fi Liquid — strategist Merkle roots rotated on liquidUSD, liquidETH and liquidBTC · timelock 0xD829F278016b90FEc735F9A12Bf8b75E06102C89 (86400s) · 0xf0fbfdb07f06c3a429b032811930fbb9b314ed8adc343b4d9ef3a60fe2975eea pending=false eta=None - Cap: Cap — EigenLayer service-manager upgrade: slashes paid out only after EigenLayer's resolution delay · timelock 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab (86400s) · 0x3397c542581a354278c3bfd01e0b9e853ec74e6c7a6ea1ec36e1d6e6cf7ab94a pending=false eta=None - Lombard: Lombard — LBTC and BTC.b deposit fees set to 2,000 sats; minimum request doubled · timelock 0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59 (86400s) · 0xd07fa5ecca21af2317c073b5e59ecddce3968f694270409f76771727ea02e50a pending=false eta=None - Lista Lending: Lista Lending — four liquidator upgrades add an emergency pause; PAUSER to a 1-of-15 Safe and the EmergencySwitchHub · timelock 0xa18ae79AEDA3e711E0CD64cfe1Cd06402d400D61 (86400s) · 0x21dffafc9876aca6c919e6897271e72805f3a4a986b3b7ac22d71950c7da7ebd pending=false eta=None ## Indexed records (from /api/v1/index.json) - anvil-timelock-7-day-as-documented-s37 [aligned_baseline] Anvil — AnvilTimelock: getMinDelay() = 604,800 s (7 days), as documented; owns the documented contracts · Sprint 37 · block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x4eeB7c5BB75Fc0DBEa4826BF568FD577f62cad21 · AnvilTimelock 0x4eeB7c5BB75Fc0DBEa4826BF568FD577f62cad21 (Ethereum; the core-contracts table lists it as the contract that 'Owns the CollateralVault, LetterOfCredit, and PythPriceOracle contracts'): an OpenZeppelin v5 TimelockController (verified source: updateDelay only by the timelock itself, schedule only by PROPOSER_ROLE and never below getMinDelay()), getMinDelay() = 604,800 s. owner() = the timelock on CollateralVault 0x5d2725fdE4d7Aa3388DA4519ac0449Cc031d675f, on the LetterOfCredit proxy 0x14db9a91933aD9433E1A0dB04D08e5D9EF7c4808 (whose EIP-1967 admin is ProxyAdmin 0x12225bB169b38EF8849DD4F5Cc466ae5996e341D, owner() = the timelock), on PythPriceOracle 0xC6f3405c861Fa0dca04EC4BA59Bc189D1d56Ee05 and on the TimeBasedCollateralPool beacon 0x1f00D6f7C18a8edf4f8Bb4Ead8a898aBDd9c9E14. The AnvilGovernorDelegator 0x00e83d0698FAf01BD080A4Dd2927e6aB7C4874c9 has the timelock as its EIP-1967 admin and timelock(); it holds PROPOSER_ROLE (hasRole = true) and the timelock holds its own DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. Role holders cannot be enumerated without event logs; no holder can schedule below the minimum delay. The published primary contract (the ANVL token) has no owner or admin function. - bitfi-bfbtc-multisig-manager-is-a-safe-s37 [aligned_baseline] BitFi Basis — bfBTC multisig manager: multisig() = a 2-of-3 Safe, as documented; owner() a key · Sprint 37 · block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xCdFb58c8C859Cb3F62ebe9Cf2767F9e036C7fb15 · bfBTC 0xCdFb58c8C859Cb3F62ebe9Cf2767F9e036C7fb15 (Ethereum; the deployed-contracts page lists it): ERC-1967 proxy, implementation slot = 0x4ca67a794051e036eefB5Aa4b34fE2bd836069F0, admin slot empty (UUPS); implementation Bfbtc (verified source). multisig() = 0x1Eb14eC5fc6D596C041F4DEA2Bf0F2cb6EF0dD03, a Safe: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 3; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module; its owners have no code. In the verified source depositNative, approveWithdraw, nativeWithdraw and updateEpoch are onlyMultisig (msg.sender == multisig), the functions the docs assign to the multisig manager. Not documented, and stated here: owner() = 0xd931401B37c3A368505E7AE6dE700f2b0ad14ac6, an account with no code at this pin, and the owner functions include setMultisig (replacing the multisig manager), _authorizeUpgrade (the UUPS upgrade), setPause, setBlacklisted, setFee and setFeeReceiver, with no timelock in the path. The docs say nothing about the owner role, so this record compares only the documented multisig manager. This record does not allege any misuse of these powers. - katana-admin-multisig-3-of-5-s37 [aligned_baseline] Katana — Katana Admin multisig (Ethereum): 3-of-5 Safe (docs: 3-of-5) · Sprint 37 · block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xd512543315c95506E4209805b888414EEF15C8C4 · Katana Admin 0xd512543315c95506E4209805b888414EEF15C8C4 (Ethereum; the governance page names it as the Admin multisig address, next to the 3-of-5 statement): a Safe, getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 5; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. The same page says upgrades proposed by the Admin enter a 10-day timelock; that timelock is not identified here (no Katana-specific timelock is readable without event logs), so this record compares only the documented quorum. - mev-capital-weth-metamorpho-timelock-within-bounds-s37 [aligned_baseline] MEV Capital wETH (MetaMorpho) — MCwETH: timelock() = 259,200 s (3 days), within Morpho V1's documented 1 day - 2 weeks; guardian set · Sprint 37 · block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x9a8bC3B04b7f3D87cfC09ba407dCED575f2d61D8 · MCwETH 0x9a8bC3B04b7f3D87cfC09ba407dCED575f2d61D8 (Ethereum): a MetaMorpho vault (isMetaMorpho = true on the MetaMorpho factory 0xA9c3D3a366466Fa809d1Ae982Fb2c46E5fC41101; verified source MetaMorpho, ConstantsLib MIN_TIMELOCK = 1 days and MAX_TIMELOCK = 2 weeks, enforced by _checkTimelockBounds), asset() = WETH, fee() = 10%. timelock() = 259,200 s, within the bounds Morpho documents for Vaults V1; guardian() = 0x777498D046d593F747Fd5884A73B3b9964479711 (a contract; it can revoke pending timelocked actions). owner() = 0x38afC3aA2c76b4cA1F8e1DabA68e998e1F4782DB, a Safe: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 5; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module; in the verified source setCurator, setIsAllocator, setFee, setFeeRecipient, setSkimRecipient, submitTimelock and submitGuardian are onlyOwner (timelock decreases and guardian changes wait for the timelock). The same Safe owns MEV Capital's sibling vaults, read at this pin: MC.eUSDC 0x1265a81d42d513Df40d0031f8f2e1346954d665a: timelock() = 86,400 s, guardian() = the zero address (no guardian); USUALUSDC+ 0xd63070114470f685b75B74D60EEc7c1113d33a3D: timelock() = 259,200 s, guardian() = 0x6e9d65eC80D69b1f508560Bc7aeA5003db1f7FB7. - odyssey-finance-governor-safe-2-of-4-vs-3-of-5-s37 [parameter_delta] Odyssey Finance — Upgrade governor: docs state a 3/5 multisig; every ProxyAdmin owner is one Safe, 2-of-4 (Ethereum and Base) · Sprint 37 · block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x3F6da0A118B3A0ddfdbaB4690cC96b2cF73B488D · PositionRegistry 0xeE156D8ea7b96a5524CcC3CF9283ab85E80E9534 (Ethereum; the contracts page lists it as PositionRegistry_Proxy for Mainnet and Base): TransparentUpgradeableProxy whose EIP-1967 admin slot = 0x3F6da0A118B3A0ddfdbaB4690cC96b2cF73B488D, the PositionRegistry_ProxyAdmin the page lists (OZ 5 ProxyAdmin, verified on Sourcify, exact match; upgradeAndCall onlyOwner). owner() of that ProxyAdmin and of the five other *_ProxyAdmin contracts the page lists (ApyTieredFeePolicy_1000_5_5_ProxyAdmin, ApyTieredFeePolicy_600_5_5_ProxyAdmin, PerformanceFeePolicy_1000_5_5_ProxyAdmin, PerformanceFeePolicy_600_5_5_ProxyAdmin, ProtocolTieredFeePolicy_5_5_ProxyAdmin) = 0xd44A3e93A256c445F17a12f35A0ffEf975ec6817; PositionRegistry's own owner() = the same Safe (its verified source makes addStrategy, addKeeper, removeKeeper, updateFeePolicy, updateImplementation, updateIsActive, updateFeeCollector, updateSwapAggregator, addCalldataToWhitelist and removeCalldataFromWhitelist onlyOwner; updateIsActive is the documented emergency restriction). Every upgrade and emergency controller read for this record is that one Safe: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 4; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module; its owners have no code (keys). On Base, at the Sprint Base pin, the same addresses read the same way: the registry's admin slot is the same ProxyAdmin (runtime code identical to the Ethereum one), all six ProxyAdmins and the registry are owned by 0xd44A3e93A256c445F17a12f35A0ffEf975ec6817, a Safe there too: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 4; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. The protocol page names no address; this record binds its statement about the governor to the one Safe all listed controllers resolve to. The docs state the governor is a 3/5 multi-signature wallet; on chain 2 signatures of 4 owners execute an upgrade or an emergency restriction, with no timelock in the path. This record does not allege any misuse of these powers. - aura-protocol-multisig-4-of-7-s36 [aligned_baseline] Aura — AuraLocker owner = Protocol Multisig, 4-of-7 (docs: 4/7); 2 vetted keeper modules · Sprint 36 · block 26455787 (0x4fa7e0b166d674666a68121cfde1ecd9d61d03f101c4fe20f2081610e9f91316) · target 0x3Fa73f1E5d8A792C80F426fc8F84FBF7Ce9bBCAC · AuraLocker 0x3Fa73f1E5d8A792C80F426fc8F84FBF7Ce9bBCAC (Ethereum, not a proxy; the multisig-rights page links it as a contract the Protocol Multisig administers): owner() = 0x5feA4413E3Cc5Cf3A29a49dB41ac0c24850417a0, a Safe: getThreshold() = 4 of getOwners() = 7; guard slot empty. Its two enabled modules (getModulesPaginated: one complete page, next = the sentinel) were vetted from verified source; each has owner() and safeWallet() = the Safe and exposes only onlyKeeper functions that make a zero-value Call to a fixed (immutable) target, without the Safe owners' signatures: GaugeVoterModule 0x2b5Ac82C5e934407514768CE3e399d9c18381621: voteGaugeWeight(address[],uint256[]) (gauge-weight votes, capped at MAX_WEIGHT() = 2500 per gauge) and setDstChainId(address[],uint16[]) (sets gauges' destination chain ids on the GaugeVoter); ExtraRewardStashModule 0x48e529218743E41F6De5B7E8D552E8173707cE81: setStashExtraReward(pid, token) for tokens the Safe authorized (updateAuthorizedTokens is onlyOwner). Keepers and authorized tokens are set by the Safe. Neither module reaches AuraLocker, the Booster's fees, the VoterProxy, shutdown or the Safe's own owner / threshold / module configuration, so that non-delegated authority needs 4 of 7 signatures; the delegated keeper actions (capped gauge votes, gauge destination chain ids, stash rewards for authorized tokens) do not. - sommelier-registry-pricerouter-multisig-timelock-s36 [aligned_baseline] Sommelier — Registry / PriceRouter: Operations Multisig via a 3-day timelock · Sprint 36 · block 26455787 (0x4fa7e0b166d674666a68121cfde1ecd9d61d03f101c4fe20f2081610e9f91316) · target 0x2Cbd27E034FEE53f79b607430dA7771B22050741 · Registry 0x2Cbd27E034FEE53f79b607430dA7771B22050741 and Price Router 0x138a6d8c49428D4c71dD7596571fbd4699C7D3DA (Ethereum, the Cellars V2 infrastructure table): owner() = the Operations Timelock 0xaDa78a5E01325B91Bc7879a63c309F7D54d42950 (OpenZeppelin TimelockController, verified; getMinDelay() = 259,200 s), on which the Operations Multisig 0x7340D1FeCD4B64A4ac34f826B21c945d44d7407F holds PROPOSER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE (hasRole = true). The Multisig is a Safe: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 2; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. - spark-susdc-base-uups-as-documented-s36 [aligned_baseline] Spark / Sky — Base sUSDC: ERC-1967 UUPS proxy (UsdcVaultL2, upgrades by wards), as documented · Sprint 36 · block 59903224 (0xaa2914dfd5a622683bab79cf60de172e5d03b3c572aa19dc567689173d59bbd3) · target 0x3128a0F7f0ea68E7B7c9B00AFa7E41045828e858 · sUSDC 0x3128a0F7f0ea68E7B7c9B00AFa7E41045828e858 (Base, the address the sUSDC page lists): ERC-1967 implementation slot = 0x6ACC02ddd82206a44ff4EC13977E63d1a29C7723, admin slot empty (the UUPS pattern: the implementation carries upgradeToAndCall); the implementation is UsdcVaultL2 (verified, UUPSUpgradeable; _authorizeUpgrade is `auth`, i.e. its wards; ward holders cannot be enumerated without event logs). name() = Spark USDC Vault, symbol() = sUSDC, decimals() = 18 and asset() = 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (USDC on Base), as the page documents. - seamless-community-guardian-safe-2-of-3-s35 [parameter_delta] Seamless Protocol (Base) — Community Guardian Safe: docs state a 3/6 multi-sig; the Safe is 2-of-3 · Sprint 35 · block 59847352 (0x58e5d7f07aaf27ccbf361f122a24120a821b455bb9dae30f4478a7da1381f3e8) · target 0xA1b5f2cc9B407177CD8a4ACF1699fa0b99955A22 · Guardian 0xA1b5f2cc9B407177CD8a4ACF1699fa0b99955A22 (Base Safe, the address the smart-contracts page lists): getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 3; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. It holds CANCELLER_ROLE on the governance timelock the same page lists as Timelock short (0x639d2dD24304aC2e6A691d8c1cFf4a2665925fee; hasRole = true), a Governance Guardian function. The docs state the Community Guardian Multi-Sig is a 3/6 multi-sig; on chain 2 signatures of 3 owners execute. - sushiswap-v3-factory-operations-multisig-s35 [aligned_baseline] SushiSwap V3 — V3 factory owner = V3Manager owned by the Operations Multisig (3-of-5) · Sprint 35 · block 26454861 (0x7bb963434c873374e3a77f428d6998353152af08ccbfd79b556fef43f07ff4ec) · target 0xbACEB8eC6b9355Dfc0269C18bac9d6E2Bdc29C4F · SushiSwap V3 factory 0xbACEB8eC6b9355Dfc0269C18bac9d6E2Bdc29C4F (Ethereum, the clAMM deployments page; not a proxy): owner() = 0xCd03e2e276F6EEdD424d41314437531F665187b9, a V3Manager (verified source: createFeeTier, setFactoryOwner, setProtocolFee, setMaker, doAction and setTrusted are onlyOwner; applyProtocolFee and collectFees are open to owner-set trusted callers) whose owner() = 0x19B3Eb3Af5D93b77a5619b047De0EED7115A19e7, the Ethereum Operations Multisig the official SDK lists. That Safe: getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 5; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module: at least three signatures, as documented. - aegis-yusd-owner-multisig-s34 [aligned_baseline] Aegis YUSD — YUSD, JUSD, config and oracles owned by the documented Multisig; it is admin of minting and rewards · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x4274cD7277C7bb0806Bd5FE84b9aDAE466a8DA0a · owner() = Multisig 0x4Fe78eF65BD8EDDED480efaB030BA680646503c8 on YUSD 0x4274cD7277C7bb0806Bd5FE84b9aDAE466a8DA0a and on JUSD, AegisConfig, AegisOracle and AegisOracleJUSD (0xc86168d2424d28942EE0866F043c1206bc9E4900, 0x90cCF2C4b3DEe7aeac9AF5950a7C60f89AF1db00, 0x2B4Ad1d479561064cd1C311004Aca93d15041aEc, 0xfA449DC17194Fdaca1dd2237C828938f1917e0E7); hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, Multisig) = true on AegisMinting, AegisMintingJUSD and AegisRewards (0xc4df68e592245ca5202fe8b7c438d2b799820fc2, 0xBB0F32D176590faEdC7bc552b7EAD7A86809b520, 0x8aDCFAf1B64Cc514524B80565bCc732273dDEafD), the addresses owners.csv lists. The Multisig is a Safe: getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 5; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. - angstrom-hook-controller-timelock-s34 [aligned_baseline] Angstrom — Hook controller = documented ControllerV1; its owner = documented Timelock (5-day min delay) · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x0000000aa232009084Bd71A5797d089AA4Edfad4 · Angstrom Hook 0x0000000aa232009084Bd71A5797d089AA4Edfad4 (Ethereum, not a proxy; verified source): storage slot 0 (TopLevelAuth._controller, required by every onlyController configuration and token-pull function) = ControllerV1 0x1746484EA5e11C75e009252c102C8C33e0315fD4, whose ANGSTROM() = the hook and owner() = Timelock 0x60D41d9708BBEfd29000d1486C6406Ef23526c01, an OpenZeppelin TimelockController (verified) with getMinDelay() = 432,000 s that holds its own DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: the three addresses of the deployments page's L1 table, in that control order. - gamma-token-supply-100m-s34 [aligned_baseline] Gamma — GAMMA supply: 100,000,000, no mint function · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x6BeA7CFEF803D1e3d5f7C0103f7ded065644e197 · GAMMA token 0x6BeA7CFEF803D1e3d5f7C0103f7ded065644e197 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 100,000,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). The whole supply is minted in its constructor; the owner can only take snapshots and transfer ownership. - gnosis-bridge-governor-safe-8-of-15-s34 [aligned_baseline] xDAI Stake Bridge — Bridge Governor Safe: 8-of-15, owners = the 15 documented governors · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x42F38ec5A75acCEc50054671233dfAC9C0E7A3F6 · Bridge Governor Multisig 0x42F38ec5A75acCEc50054671233dfAC9C0E7A3F6 (Ethereum Safe, the address the page gives): getThreshold() = 8 of getOwners() = 15; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. Its 15 owners are exactly the 15 Ethereum governor addresses the page lists (none missing, none extra). The xDAI Bridge contract 0x4aa42145Aa6Ebf72e164C9bBC74fbD3788045016 (EternalStorageProxy, implementation 0x257bDD093Cab1Bd39eBF837dCB60f33d031d7d49) returns this Safe for both owner() and upgradeabilityOwner(). - hakka-multisig-undocumented-signer-s34 [parameter_delta] Hakka Finance — Multi-sig: docs name 3 keyholders; the Safe is 2-of-4 with 1 unnamed owner · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0xF2B8f214Dc81b849ed3BDCAEdA6c8c39625c500A · Hakka multi-sig 0xF2B8f214Dc81b849ed3BDCAEdA6c8c39625c500A (Ethereum Safe, the address the page gives): getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 4; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. Owners: 0x9033c3677E6C63FC252E9546AD5b5E7d66Fc0926, 0x1D075f1F543bB09Df4530F44ed21CA50303A65B2, 0xF9aCeFD1A4e4360eE3A534Cb3485Bce36F5F05A4, 0x784e010430a923Ce2a3Ff9846C4010694Bb7BEfb, all accounts with no code; the three documented keyholders are owners, and 0x9033c3677E6C63FC252E9546AD5b5E7d66Fc0926 is an owner the page does not name. With a threshold of 2, that key and any one documented keyholder can execute. HAKKA token 0x0E29e5AbbB5FD88e28b2d355774e73BD47dE3bcd owner() = this Safe. - hop-l1-eth-bridge-governance-2-of-3-safe-s34 [parameter_delta] Hop Protocol — L1 ETH Bridge governance: 24h Timelock whose admin is a 2-of-3 key Safe · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0xb8901acB165ed027E32754E0FFe830802919727f · Hop L1_ETH_Bridge 0xb8901acB165ed027E32754E0FFe830802919727f (Ethereum, not a proxy; verified source; the SDK's Ethereum ETH l1Bridge): addBonder(), removeBonder(), setGovernance(), setChallengePeriod(), setChainIdDepositsPaused() and rescueTransferRoot() are onlyGovernance, and governance() = 0x22e3F828b3f47dAcFACd875D20bd5cc0879C96e7, a Compound-style Timelock (verified) with delay() = 86,400 s, pendingAdmin() empty and admin() = Safe 0x1ec078551A5ac8F0f51fAc57Ffc48Ea7d9A86E9d: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 3; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module; all 3 owners are accounts with no code. Neither the DAO Governor 0xed8Bdb5895B8B7f9Fdb3C087628FD8410E853D48 nor the DAO Timelock 0xeeA8422a08258e73c139Fc32a25e10410c14bd7a (both on the governance links page) is in this path: 2 keys queue and execute any onlyGovernance call after 24 hours. - lusd-chickenbonds-no-upgrade-no-admin-s34 [aligned_baseline] LUSD ChickenBonds — ChickenBondManager not a proxy, no owner; bLUSD and BondNFT owners renounced · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0xB9D7DdDca9a4AC480991865EfEf82E01273F79C3 · ChickenBondManager 0x57619FE9C539f890b19c61812226F9703ce37137 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation and admin slots empty; verified source): no owner() (the call reverts), no delegatecall or selfdestruct, and no upgrade path. Two functions are restricted to yearnGovernanceAddress() = 0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52 while migration is inactive: activateMigration(), the documented one-time wind-down (migration() = false at this pin), and sendFeeShare(uint256), which transfers LUSD from Yearn governance to the manager and deposits it to B.Protocol (a fee-share donation); no function is restricted to the Liquity team. bLUSD 0xB9D7DdDca9a4AC480991865EfEf82E01273F79C3 (not a proxy): owner() is the zero address (setAddresses already used, ownership renounced) and mint / burn require msg.sender == chickenBondManagerAddress() = the ChickenBondManager. BondNFT 0xa8384862219188a8f03c144953Cf21fc124029Ee: owner() is the zero address, chickenBondManager() = the ChickenBondManager. - piku-token-supply-500m-s34 [aligned_baseline] Piku Finance — PIKU supply: 500,000,000, no mint function · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x2E4039E8E31475d65DC00293C366FDBfBBC02DC3 · PIKU token 0x2E4039E8E31475d65DC00293C366FDBfBBC02DC3 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 500,000,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). The whole supply is minted to the admin in its constructor; no function creates tokens. - sofa-rch-supply-capped-37m-s34 [aligned_baseline] SOFA.org — RCH: mint capped at MAX_SUPPLY = 37,000,000 (totalMinted) · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x57B96D4aF698605563A4653D882635da59Bf11AF · RCH token 0x57B96D4aF698605563A4653D882635da59Bf11AF (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 27,709,422.00. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). MAX_SUPPLY() = 37,000,000 and totalMinted() = 30,647,695 (burns lower totalSupply, not totalMinted); mint() is onlyOwner and requires totalMinted + amount <= MAX_SUPPLY; owner() = 0x5a8cDDa6CA37B284b32eF8D513Ef71Ddac553270, a MerkleAirdrop contract. - stakestone-sto-max-supply-1b-s34 [aligned_baseline] StakeStone STONE — STO (Ethereum) supply: 1,000,000,000, no mint function · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x1D88713b483A8E45cfF0e5CD7c2e15E5Fab4534d · STO token 0x1D88713b483A8E45cfF0e5CD7c2e15E5Fab4534d (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 1,000,000,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). Its only mint is the internal one at construction. - taiko-dao-emergency-multisig-4-of-5-s34 [parameter_delta] Taiko Bridge — Emergency Multisig: minApprovals 4 of 5 signers (docs: 6); standard 3 (docs: 5) · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x2AffADEb2ef5e1F2a7F58964ee191F1e88317ECd · Taiko DAO 0x9CDf589C941ee81D75F34d3755671d614f7cf261 (owner of controller.taiko.eth in the taiko-mono deployment log): hasPermission() grants EXECUTE_PERMISSION on the DAO to the OptimisticTokenVoting plugin 0x989E348275b659d36f8751ea1c10D146211650BE (and not to either council plugin), and PROPOSER_PERMISSION on that plugin to the Emergency Multisig 0x2AffADEb2ef5e1F2a7F58964ee191F1e88317ECd and the Multisig 0xD7dA1C25E915438720692bC55eb3a7170cA90321; all three return dao() = the DAO (EIP-1967 proxies, implementations 0x437E450452E8Bc142bd5317199296EcB187c514b, 0x8510d389236d7213eE9B9C38CAaBc0aD24853C25, 0x5B0Da2FB08754a5dDf32e28887D2F5437485f085, verified). EmergencyMultisig multisigSettings() = (onlyListed true, minApprovals 4, signerList 0x0F95E6968EC1B28c794CF1aD99609431de5179c2, proposalExpirationPeriod 1,209,600 s); the SignerList addresslistLength() = 5. Its execute() needs approvals >= minApprovals and calls createProposal(..., duration 0) on the destination plugin, which executes the actions on the DAO immediately when the duration is 0 (governanceSettings() minDuration = 0): 4 of the 5 listed signers make an emergency proposal executable. Multisig (standard) multisigSettings() = (onlyListed true, minApprovals 3, destinationProposalDuration 864,000 s, same signerList, proposalExpirationPeriod 1,209,600 s): 3 approvals move a standard proposal to the public veto stage (timelockPeriod 604,800 s, as documented). - tangent-admin-safe-owns-core-s34 [aligned_baseline] Tangent Finance — Core contracts' owner() = the documented Admin (3-of-5 Safe) · Sprint 34 · block 26453551 (0x51e9967ffd6a84012d0dad44204d523b8ac43928e69de2801d2e72dbf8767129) · target 0x214C8A1023B30032a2Eded109146658C6D6F2781 · owner() = Admin 0x461B62CB3A7e9Df8f800aE058AE92F855F2c27Ca on Control Tower 0xf3f7669dceed2f985815011c19ed68f667267215, USG 0xb1c2db5d6ca03fce73dbd304d320bf76c55ae1b1, IR Calculator 0xB4e1d3bBd2843263d58B4D648C599512cea6e88b, Rewards Accumulator 0x1461D76aA1C9c523398301D9174098c6D53ce639, Markets Creator 0x214C8A1023B30032a2Eded109146658C6D6F2781, Pauser Proxy 0x10b1f36452e27f08b0b5747f577ff816b0e6b5fa (core contracts on the contracts page). The Admin is a Safe: getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 5; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. - cbridge-liquidity-bridge-owner-resets-signers-s33 [parameter_delta] cBridge — Pool Bridge signers: owner can resetSigners after 7-day notice; owner = 3-of-5 EOA governance · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820 · cBridge Bridge 0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820 (Ethereum, not a proxy; verified source): withdraw() and relay() accept a message signed by the stored signer set, and resetSigners(signers, powers) replaces that set onlyOwner, gated only by block.timestamp > resetTime (notifyResetSigners() sets it to now + noticePeriod()); noticePeriod() = 604,800 s, resetTime() = unset (max) at this pin. owner() = 0xF380166F8490F24AF32Bf47D1aA217FBA62B6575, a SimpleGovernance (verified source): 6 voters, all accounts with no code, powers 10000, 10000, 10000, 10000, 10000, 1; QuorumThreshold params(1) = 60% and FastPassThreshold params(2) = 40% of total power, so 3 of the 5 full-power voters pass a proposal it executes. delayPeriod() = 21,600 s (large-transfer delay). This record does not allege any misuse. - cvault-core-no-new-tokens-s33 [aligned_baseline] cVault Finance — CORE supply: 10,000, no mint function · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x62359Ed7505Efc61FF1D56fEF82158CcaffA23D7 · CORE token 0x62359Ed7505Efc61FF1D56fEF82158CcaffA23D7 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 10,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). Its only mint is the internal one at construction. The owner (an externally owned account) can still set the transfer checker and fee distributor; supply is not among its powers. - debridge-signature-verifier-min-8-of-12-s33 [aligned_baseline] deBridge — SignatureVerifier: at least 8 of 12 oracle signatures required (2/3) · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x949b3B3c098348b879C9e4F15cecc8046d9C8A8c · deBridge SignatureVerifier 0x949b3B3c098348b879C9e4F15cecc8046d9C8A8c (Ethereum; EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0xfE7De3c1e1BD252C67667B56347cABFC6df08dF4, verified): DeBridgeGate 0x43dE2d77BF8027e25dBD179B491e8d64f38398aA signatureVerifier() identifies this proxy. Its submit(bytes32,bytes,uint8) requires at least minConfirmations() = 8 distinct valid signatures from the 12 oracle addresses (array length word at storage slot 152; entry 0 = 0x4bC16662A2cE381E7bb54Dc577c05619C5E67526); requiredOraclesCount() = 0. The caller-supplied _excessConfirmations argument, and the separate stored excessConfirmations() = 3 check that applies only when submissionsInBlock exceeds confirmationThreshold, can only raise, never lower, that requirement: at least 8 of 12 is the documented 2/3 minimum. - index-coop-index-max-supply-10m-s33 [aligned_baseline] Index Coop — INDEX supply: 10,000,000, no mint function · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x0954906da0Bf32d5479e25f46056d22f08464cab · INDEX token 0x0954906da0Bf32d5479e25f46056d22f08464cab (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 10,000,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). The whole supply is assigned in its constructor; no function creates tokens. - orderly-order-max-supply-1b-s33 [aligned_baseline] Orderly Bridge — ORDER supply: 1,000,000,000, no mint function · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0xABD4C63d2616A5201454168269031355f4764337 · ORDER token 0xABD4C63d2616A5201454168269031355f4764337 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 1,000,000,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). Its only mint is the internal one at construction. - parallel-prl-no-mint-s33 [aligned_baseline] Parallel Protocol V3 — PRL: 1,000,000,000, no mint function · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x6c0aeceeDc55c9d55d8B99216a670D85330941c3 · PRL token 0x6c0aeceeDc55c9d55d8B99216a670D85330941c3 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 1,000,000,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). Its only mint is the internal one at construction (burns to 0x…dEaD do not reduce totalSupply). - peapods-peas-no-mint-ethereum-s33 [aligned_baseline] Peapods Finance — PEAS (Ethereum): 9,936,639.21, no mint function · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x02f92800F57BCD74066F5709F1Daa1A4302Df875 · PEAS token 0x02f92800F57BCD74066F5709F1Daa1A4302Df875 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 9,936,639.21. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). Its only mint is the internal one at construction; supply is below the initial 10,000,000 through burns. - pooltogether-pool-supply-10m-no-minter-s33 [aligned_baseline] PoolTogether V3 — POOL supply: 10,000,000; minter() is the zero address · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x0cEC1A9154Ff802e7934Fc916Ed7Ca50bDE6844e · POOL token 0x0cEC1A9154Ff802e7934Fc916Ed7Ca50bDE6844e (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 10,000,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). mint() and setMinter() both require msg.sender == minter(), and minter() is the zero address, so no further POOL can be minted and no minter can be set. - sosovalue-soso-base-canonical-bridge-mint-s33 [aligned_baseline] SoSoValue Basis — Base SOSO: mint/burn only by the canonical L2StandardBridge · Sprint 33 · block 59699598 (0x2f1913093955cab789adde23d44cae9905a757de878fbe6e589477a88e66cb0f) · target 0x624e2e7fDc8903165F64891672267AB0FCB98831 · SOSO token (Base) 0x624e2e7fDc8903165F64891672267AB0FCB98831 (Base; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 73,536,304.93. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). OptimismMintableERC20: BRIDGE() = 0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010 (Base's canonical L2StandardBridge) and REMOTE_TOKEN() = 0x76A0e27618462bDAC7a29104bdcfFf4E6BFCea2D, the Ethereum SOSO the page lists; mint and burn are onlyBridge, so Base supply moves only through the canonical bridge. - synfutures-f-max-supply-10b-s33 [aligned_baseline] SynFutures V3 — $F supply: 10,000,000,000, no mint function · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x6e15A54B5EcAc17e58daDedDbe8506a7560252F9 · SynFutures $F token 0x6e15A54B5EcAc17e58daDedDbe8506a7560252F9 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 10,000,000,000. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). Its only mint is the internal one at construction. - the-idols-virtue-non-mintable-s33 [aligned_baseline] The Idols — VIRTUE: 99,989,832.94, no mint function · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x9416bA76e88D873050A06e5956A3EBF10386b863 · VIRTUE token 0x9416bA76e88D873050A06e5956A3EBF10386b863 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 99,989,832.94. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(address,uint256), mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). Its only mint is the internal one at construction (100,000,000); supply is lower through burns. - yield-basis-yb-renounced-reserve-1b-s33 [aligned_baseline] Yield Basis — YB: owner() zero; reserve + supply = 1,000,000,000 · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0x01791F726B4103694969820be083196cC7c045fF · YB token 0x01791F726B4103694969820be083196cC7c045fF (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 760,625,378.82. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). reserve() = 239,374,621.18, and reserve() + totalSupply() = 1,000,000,000 exactly. owner() is the zero address; set_minter and transfer_ownership are owner-only and renounce_ownership() removed the deployer's minter role, so no minter can be added (existing minter memberships are not enumerable). - zama-token-not-upgradeable-s33 [aligned_baseline] Zama — ZAMA token: not a proxy, no upgrade function · Sprint 33 · block 26452373 (0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d) · target 0xA12CC123ba206d4031D1c7f6223D1C2Ec249f4f3 · ZAMA token 0xA12CC123ba206d4031D1c7f6223D1C2Ec249f4f3 (Ethereum; not a proxy: EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source): totalSupply() = 11,391,483,307.90. The runtime code holds no selector of mint(uint256), upgradeTo(address), upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes). This record checks the upgrade claim only: minting is role-gated in the token (documented as staking rewards). - benddao-timelock-7d-reads-1d-s32 [parameter_delta] BendDAO APE Staking — BEND ProxyAdmin owner: BendDAO Timelock 7D, getMinDelay() 86,400 s · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x4e4C314E2391A58775be6a15d7A05419ba7D2B6e · BEND token 0x0d02755a5700414B26FF040e1dE35D337DF56218 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0x02863C14603C3b157379999F567DDECE151e9153, admin slot = ProxyAdmin 0x859f6e05410893fe64BC84d92BdA773fF798cf66 (the docs' 'Incentive' Proxy Admin). ProxyAdmin owner() = 0x4e4C314E2391A58775be6a15d7A05419ba7D2B6e, the docs' 'BendDAO Timelock 7D', an OpenZeppelin TimelockController (verified source): getMinDelay() = 86,400 s at this pin; the security page lists it at 7 days. - bio-token-mint-role-safe-no-new-contract-s32 [parameter_delta] Bio Protocol — BIO mint(): MINTER_ROLE held by a 5-of-11 Safe and a bridge manager; no cap · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0xcb1592591996765Ec0eFc1f92599A19767ee5ffA · BIO token 0xcb1592591996765Ec0eFc1f92599A19767ee5ffA (Ethereum, not a proxy; BioToken, verified source): mint(to, amount) is onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE) and the token has no supply cap. getRoleMemberCount(MINTER_ROLE) = 2: 0xd9C6Ee1547Fd6d48F8872dD866473893Bbe8A1Ab, a 5-of-11 Safe, and 0x1783E7d1F498321D7E15044d769621E1beDc7F4C, an ERC-1967 proxy to a Wormhole NttManager (implementation 0x2bBaCb406d043D93997344F28a74A25069f3e9E3) that mints for inbound bridge transfers. The same Safe is the only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member, the admin of MINTER_ROLE. totalSupply() = 2,914,432,394 BIO. The page says new BIO requires deploying a new token contract; the current contract can mint. - cap-timelock-op-0x740e-executed-s32 [aligned_baseline] Cap — Timelock operation 0x740e26ef: executed since #26,425,374; getMinDelay() still 86,400 s · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab · Cap TimelockController 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab (Ethereum): isOperationDone(0x740e26ef00f5ac693593d62327a7b40ea59d2a88711c151fcc835bc0190b20ea) = true and isOperationPending = false at this pin; pending at Pacta's published pin #26,425,374 (record cap-1d-timelock-min-delay-s20). getMinDelay() = 86,400 s at both pins. - chainlink-ccip-rbactimelock-op-0x67cd-executed-s32 [aligned_baseline] Chainlink CCIP — RBACTimelock operation 0x67cdd78a: scheduled and executed since #26,433,001 · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449 · Chainlink CCIP RBACTimelock 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449 (Ethereum): isOperationDone(0x67cdd78af74492609eb87e0b8b8c6afb4e4fe86d95b4c11ec5c0d4116350d829) = true at this pin; isOperation = false at Pacta's published pin #26,433,001 (record chainlink-ccip-timelock-proposers-s24). ERC20LockBox 0xEd3fc513F5888BD65E868ba77D25E8799FfFa18e (no code at #26,433,001) owner() = 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449 at this pin. getMinDelay() = 10,800 s at both pins. - circle-gateway-wallet-eoa-owner-and-pauser-s32 [parameter_delta] Circle Gateway — GatewayWallet: EOA owner (UUPS upgrade, withdrawal delay) and EOA pauser over withdrawals · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x77777777Dcc4d5A8B6E418Fd04D8997ef11000eE · Circle GatewayWallet 0x77777777Dcc4d5A8B6E418Fd04D8997ef11000eE (Ethereum; the address the Gateway contract-addresses page lists): UUPS EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0xF7a6D9D7Df917c072ac8987A820c58aA27A0e798 (GatewayWallet, verified source). owner() = 0x2A6A86466F181721ec8ff946967b56f1AA4758c5 and pauser() = 0x9812d5F0a0832d9A0a78a1ba728fACd87bC35b19, both accounts with no code (externally owned) at this pin; denylister() = 0x7359fD9aA258992eb4B6d9572c6f6c74Cf719a94, also without code. In the verified source _authorizeUpgrade, updateWithdrawalDelay and updatePauser are onlyOwner, pause() is onlyPauser, and both initiateWithdrawal() and withdraw() are whenNotPaused; no timelock sits in either path. withdrawalDelay() = 50,400 blocks; paused() = false. This record does not allege any misuse of these powers. - dydx-ethdydx-owner-short-timelock-2d-s32 [aligned_baseline] dYdX V3 — ethDYDX owner: the Short Timelock Executor, getDelay() 172,800 s · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x64c7d40c07EFAbec2AafdC243bF59eaF2195c6dc · ethDYDX 0x92D6C1e31e14520e676a687F0a93788B716BEff5 (Ethereum) owner() = 0x64c7d40c07EFAbec2AafdC243bF59eaF2195c6dc, an Executor (verified source): getDelay() = 172,800 s, MINIMUM_DELAY() = 86,400 s, MAXIMUM_DELAY() = 604,800 s, GRACE_PERIOD() = 604,800 s, the documented Short Timelock Executor column (the Long Timelock column is 7 / 5 / 21 days). - ekubo-core-immutable-starknet-owner-s32 [aligned_baseline] Ekubo — Core: not a proxy; owner() is the StarknetOwnerProxy driven by the Starknet Governor · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0xe0e0e08A6A4b9Dc7bD67BCB7aadE5cF48157d444 · Ekubo Core 0xe0e0e08A6A4b9Dc7bD67BCB7aadE5cF48157d444 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation, admin and beacon slots all empty; verified source (runtime exact match) has no delegatecall and no upgrade function, and its only onlyOwner functions are withdrawProtocolFees and the ownership transfers. owner() = 0x1E0EF4162e42C9bF820c307218c4E41cCcA6E9CC, StarknetOwnerProxy: immutable l2Owner() = 0x053499f7aa2706395060fe72d00388803fb2dcc111429891ad7b2d9dcea29acd (the Ekubo DAO Governor on Starknet), l2MessageBridge() = 0xc662c410C0ECf747543f5bA90660f6ABeBD9C8c4; it executes only calls consumed as L2 messages from that Governor. The docs mark the V2 EVM deployment deprecated. - hashport-diamond-cut-owner-safe-s32 [aligned_baseline] Hashport — Diamond (EIP-2535): diamondCut owner-only; owner is a 5-of-9 Safe · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x367e59b559283C8506207d75B0c5D8C66c4Cd4B7 · Hashport Router diamond 0x367e59b559283C8506207d75B0c5D8C66c4Cd4B7 (Ethereum, EIP-2535): facetAddress(diamondCut 0x1f931c1c) = 0xe79c9Bb508f00ab7B03cf3043929639e86626EF9, the DiamondCutFacet of Deployment.md; in its verified source diamondCut() calls LibDiamond.enforceIsContractOwner() before adding, replacing or removing facets. owner() = 0x10AB2d9C085c816f43ccB0FB1b27d024224E36f1, a 5-of-9 Safe. - inception-vault-upgrades-timelock-3d-s32 [aligned_baseline] InceptionLRT (Isolated Restaking) — Vault upgrades: ProxyAdmins owned by InceptionTimeLock, getMinDelay() 259,200 s · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x650bD9Dee50E3eE15cbb49749ff6ABcf55A8FB1e · InceptionTimeLock 0x650bD9Dee50E3eE15cbb49749ff6ABcf55A8FB1e (Ethereum), a TimelockController: getMinDelay() = 259,200 s. InstEthVault 0x814CC6B8fd2555845541FB843f37418b05977d8d (implementation 0x9Bb0F64c5A5e9120f55cde6B15683FF11Abc0eD4): ProxyAdmin 0xB81e55e7Ee6B286aF6abFEa4eFad83f7BA4D1f1e, owner() = the timelock; inLBTCVault_S 0xD496417a50DB34279631e0aF459493Cf9685F529 (implementation 0xb83ad67814BeD3478BB4239a5961391d836fCe4d): ProxyAdmin 0x177bFf0AD93B8132012F05081A10a0e574fa5F97, owner() = the timelock. The README lists InstEthVault under deprecated LSTs. Both vaults' own owner() is 0x8e6C8799B542E507bfDDCA1a424867e885D96e79, a 3-of-5 Safe, acting without the timelock on owner-only vault settings. - kelp-rseth-oft-adapter-owner-safe-s32 [aligned_baseline] Kelp DAO (rsETH) — RSETH_OFTAdapter owner(): a 6-of-11 Safe; another address at #26,406,106 · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x85d456B2DfF1fd8245387C0BfB64Dfb700e98Ef3 · Kelp RSETH_OFTAdapter 0x85d456B2DfF1fd8245387C0BfB64Dfb700e98Ef3 (Ethereum): owner() = 0xb3696a817D01C8623E66D156B6798291fa10a46d, a 6-of-11 Safe, at this pin and at Pacta's Sprint 30 pin #26,449,594; owner() = 0xCbcdd778AA25476F203814214dD3E9b9c46829A1 at the Sprint 14 pin #26,406,106 (record kelp-rseth-proxyadmin-10d-timelock-s14): the transfer falls between #26,406,106 and #26,449,594, not after #26,449,594. - lista-moolah-upgrade-admin-timelock-s32 [aligned_baseline] Lista Lending — Moolah upgrade authority: sole DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member is the Admin TimeLock, 86,400 s · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0xf820fB4680712CD7263a0D3D024D5b5aEA82Fd70 · Lista Moolah 0xf820fB4680712CD7263a0D3D024D5b5aEA82Fd70 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0xD7C983093065E0169e955c44ab8370110231D3cf; in its verified source _authorizeUpgrade is onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE). getRoleMemberCount(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) = 1 and its member is 0xa18ae79AEDA3e711E0CD64cfe1Cd06402d400D61, the 'Admin TimeLock' of the Ethereum contract table: a TimelockController (verified source) with getMinDelay() = 86,400 s. - metric-factory-protocol-fee-no-timelock-s32 [aligned_baseline] Metric V1 — Protocol fee share: setPoolProtocolFee by the owner, a 3-of-5 Safe, with no delay · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x2a53833cc95548cf52c7b159110e22D3a9018f32 · MetricOmmPoolFactory 0x2a53833cc95548cf52c7b159110e22D3a9018f32 (Ethereum, not a proxy; verified source): setPoolProtocolFee and setPoolProtocolFeeBatch are requiresAuth, and Auth.isAuthorized admits owner() unconditionally (or a caller the authority 0x032a22958EE9277eCce675E04e8302B85224a1B0 allows); the new fee applies in the same call. owner() = 0xa082C768B1C40f5e980b75959D85cF245AFF0FAE, a 3-of-5 Safe. - morpheus-ethereum-safe-5of9-s32 [aligned_baseline] MorpheusAI — Ethereum multisig: 5-of-9, owner of the DepositPool · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0x1FE04BC15Cf2c5A2d41a0b3a96725596676eBa1E · Morpheus Ethereum Safe 0x1FE04BC15Cf2c5A2d41a0b3a96725596676eBa1E (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 5 of 9 owners. DepositPool 0x47176B2Af9885dC6C4575d4eFd63895f7Aaa4790 (EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0xdB10dAEF167eA2233Ba6811457dD24D676FbD670) owner() = this Safe. - pickle-masterchef-owner-safe-no-timelock-s32 [parameter_delta] Pickle — MasterChef admin: owner is a 2-of-6 Safe, the documented 24 h timelock is not in the path · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0xbD17B1ce622d73bD438b9E658acA5996dc394b0d · Pickle MasterChef 0xbD17B1ce622d73bD438b9E658acA5996dc394b0d (Ethereum, not a proxy): its verified source makes add, set, setPicklePerBlock, setBonusEndBlock, setDevFundDivRate and the PICKLE mint path onlyOwner; MasterChef is owner() of the PICKLE token 0x429881672B9AE42b8EbA0E26cD9C73711b891Ca5. MasterChef owner() = 0x9d074E37d408542FD38be78848e8814AFB38db17, a 2-of-6 Safe (the page calls it a 2/5 multisig). The 24-hour Timelock the page links, 0x0040E05CE9A5fc9C0aBF89889f7b60c2fC278416 (delay() = 86,400 s, admin() = the same Safe), does not own MasterChef. - superform-base-manager-change-timelock-7d-s32 [aligned_baseline] Superform Core v2 (Base) — Primary manager change: 7-day timelock (604,800 s); interval changes 3 days · Sprint 32 · block 59653624 (0x984d5efdee77a9e8ab0d5b8eb5bba2a230cdcadc268f35f6c77f4a629b13a305) · target 0x10AC0b33e1C4501CF3ec1cB1AE51ebfdbd2d4698 · Superform SuperVaultAggregator 0x10AC0b33e1C4501CF3ec1cB1AE51ebfdbd2d4698 (Base, not a proxy; Sourcify-verified, runtime match): the primary-manager change proposal sets effectiveTime = block.timestamp + _MANAGER_CHANGE_TIMELOCK (7 days) and the min-update-interval proposal + _PARAMETER_CHANGE_TIMELOCK (3 days); the runtime code read at this pin holds the 604,800 s and 259,200 s constants once each. UPKEEP_WITHDRAWAL_TIMELOCK() = 86,400 s (the page's 24-hour upkeep withdrawal). SuperGovernor 0xB5396ef2bF8CA360cEB4166b77AFb2bed20e74d4 (same deployment page) holds its own 7-day TIMELOCK on fee changes. - tori-trusd-timelock-admin-undocumented-timelock-s32 [parameter_delta] Tori Finance — trUSD TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE: a second ToriTimelock, not the documented timelock · Sprint 32 · block 26451608 (0x0266af5bcad519d93b3be78e41b76a62985e22fbe4feef043ac3225f6f217a17) · target 0xd0580192E98eA6CEB9c7b6191Ed2E27560911697 · Tori trUSD 0xd0580192E98eA6CEB9c7b6191Ed2E27560911697 (Ethereum, EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0xb1d133fE29255EB4Ac9B05d647d49cd7F05ff631): hasRole(TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE 0x5f58e3a2316349923ce3780f8d587db2d72378aed66a8261c916544fa6846ca5, 0xcd3c66e73abF927EAAF1238aEB5F251b4f2f667b) = true and hasRole(TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE, 0xA952453E39F77108Ee37C1b92de593F1C59A6ef4) = false at this pin; the reverse at Pacta's published pin #26,448,221 (record tori-finance-control-plane). 0xA952453E39F77108Ee37C1b92de593F1C59A6ef4 is the timelock the roles page names; 0xcd3c66e73abF927EAAF1238aEB5F251b4f2f667b is a second ToriTimelock (verified source; renounceRole disabled). Both have getMinDelay() = 86,400 s and the 3-of-5 Safe 0x0C6Bbfd2d5666d44bf28580eDEec0263692C8316 holds PROPOSER_ROLE on both: the delay is unchanged, but trUSD upgrades are now queued on a timelock the documentation does not name. - alchemix-v3-safe-threshold-f56d66-s31 [aligned_baseline] Alchemix V3 — Alchemix V3 multisig: 3-of-7 Safe, as documented · Sprint 31 · block 26450616 (0xd2df7ccb74a6772b51a5597c8f144f5cfae362efeabf193ecfc7c80f8ff37c35) · target 0xF56D660138815fC5d7a06cd0E1630225E788293D · Alchemix V3 Safe 0xF56D660138815fC5d7a06cd0E1630225E788293D (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 7 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - bancor-v3-safe-threshold-7e3692-s31 [aligned_baseline] Bancor V3 — MSIG: 5-of-7 Safe, as documented · Sprint 31 · block 26450616 (0xd2df7ccb74a6772b51a5597c8f144f5cfae362efeabf193ecfc7c80f8ff37c35) · target 0x7E3692A6D8c34a762079Fa9057AeD87be7e67cb8 · MSIG Safe 0x7E3692A6D8c34a762079Fa9057AeD87be7e67cb8 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 5 of getOwners() = 7 owners (Safe v1.1.1). - cian-yield-layer-allocation-no-timelock-s31 [parameter_delta] CIAN Yield Layer — Fund allocation setters: owner is a 3-of-4 Safe, the documented TimeLock is not in the path · Sprint 31 · block 26450616 (0xd2df7ccb74a6772b51a5597c8f144f5cfae362efeabf193ecfc7c80f8ff37c35) · target 0xB13aa2d0345b0439b064f26B82D8dCf3f508775d · CIAN stETH Yield Layer vault 0xB13aa2d0345b0439b064f26B82D8dCf3f508775d (Ethereum): EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0xA1Dc0B6A02AB091580DC57bDd5Fe8a9E577E0842; in its verified source the strategy position limits, market capacity, fee rates, rebalancer and fee receiver setters are onlyOwner. owner() = 0x261090afE1E7305474F4e3eEFCAca9964eBffFf5, a 3-of-4 Safe; the vault's ProxyAdmin 0xf24955E9D0a05222373d4555f8831f7A05e83F62 is owned by the same Safe. The TimeLock its contract table lists, 0x0CBee811C47C3A5cb4637f1E58d98B0Abbb4c54f (delay() = 86,400 s, admin() = 0x261090afE1E7305474F4e3eEFCAca9964eBffFf5), owns neither. - decentralized-euro-leadrate-timelock-7d-s31 [aligned_baseline] Decentralized Euro — Leadrate change delay: proposeChange() schedules 7 days ahead (604,800 s) · Sprint 31 · block 26450616 (0xd2df7ccb74a6772b51a5597c8f144f5cfae362efeabf193ecfc7c80f8ff37c35) · target 0x760233b90e45d186A9A98E911B115F7F4B90d3D9 · dEURO Savings V3 0x760233b90e45d186A9A98E911B115F7F4B90d3D9 (Ethereum, not a proxy): in its verified source (Leadrate) proposeChange() sets nextChange = block.timestamp + 7 days and applyChange() reverts before nextChange; the runtime code read at this pin holds the 604,800 s constant once. currentRatePPM() = 70,000. - dolomite-safe-threshold-a75c21-s31 [aligned_baseline] Dolomite — Dolomite multisig: 2-of-3 Safe, as documented · Sprint 31 · block 26450616 (0xd2df7ccb74a6772b51a5597c8f144f5cfae362efeabf193ecfc7c80f8ff37c35) · target 0xa75c21C5BE284122a87A37a76cc6C4DD3E55a1D4 · Dolomite Safe 0xa75c21C5BE284122a87A37a76cc6C4DD3E55a1D4 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 3 owners (Safe v1.4.1). - idle-governance-timelock-2d-s31 [aligned_baseline] Idle — Governance Timelock: delay() 172,800 s · Sprint 31 · block 26450616 (0xd2df7ccb74a6772b51a5597c8f144f5cfae362efeabf193ecfc7c80f8ff37c35) · target 0xD6dABBc2b275114a2366555d6C481EF08FDC2556 · Idle governance Timelock 0xD6dABBc2b275114a2366555d6C481EF08FDC2556 (Ethereum): delay() = 172,800 s; Governor Bravo 0x3D5Fc645320be0A085A32885F078F7121e5E5375 timelock() = this Timelock. The Timelock's admin() (who may queue and execute) is 0xFb3bD022D5DAcF95eE28a6B07825D4Ff9C5b3814. - noon-usn-upgrade-timelock-48h-s31 [aligned_baseline] Noon — USN upgrade path: ProxyAdmin owned by the Upgrade Timelock, delay() 172,800 s · Sprint 31 · block 26450616 (0xd2df7ccb74a6772b51a5597c8f144f5cfae362efeabf193ecfc7c80f8ff37c35) · target 0xE5e412C212B4FBbF550A94e7BD5e83dB0B315A7F · Noon USN 0xdA67B4284609d2d48e5d10cfAc411572727dc1eD (Ethereum): EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0x79FD7FE2a8EbcAE47798321b2AC97107dF3de229, admin slot = ProxyAdmin 0x55f39512cb43111A13E8440ee3e3602e72628239. ProxyAdmin owner() = 0xE5e412C212B4FBbF550A94e7BD5e83dB0B315A7F, Noon's Upgrade Timelock: delay() = 172,800 s (MIN_DELAY 86,400 s); its verified source lets the owner reach ProxyAdmin.upgradeAndCall only through scheduleUpgrade, then executeUpgrade after the delay. Timelock owner() = 0x1ea169EcCcf7714E7ba04900e1a3357cCA77327f, a 3-of-5 Safe. - origin-superoeth-base-admin-safe-5of8-s31 [aligned_baseline] Origin Protocol (SuperOETHb Base) — Base Admin Safe: 5-of-8, proposer on the vault's timelock · Sprint 31 · block 59594105 (0x7646bbc83a9f0d26a48a94274cd6003a3f10bc4747a20d817b8e536618e28496) · target 0x92A19381444A001d62cE67BaFF066fA1111d7202 · Origin Base Admin Safe 0x92A19381444A001d62cE67BaFF066fA1111d7202 (Base): getThreshold() = 5 of 8 owners. SuperOETHb VaultProxy 0xDBFeFD2e8460a6Ee4955A68582F85708BAEA60A3 (implementation 0xCcd483cE093682D7D9a41e645EEb710AFaa88249) admin() = 0xf817cb3092179083c48c014688D98B72fB61464f, a TimelockController (getMinDelay() = 172,800 s) on which the Safe holds PROPOSER_ROLE. - sonic-gateway-fail-safe-200-days-s31 [parameter_delta] Sonic Gateway — Fail-safe recovery: bridge declared dead after 200 days offline (docs: 14 days, immutable) · Sprint 31 · block 26450616 (0xd2df7ccb74a6772b51a5597c8f144f5cfae362efeabf193ecfc7c80f8ff37c35) · target 0xa1E2481a9CD0Cb0447EeB1cbc26F1b3fff3bec20 · Sonic Gateway TokenDeposit 0xa1E2481a9CD0Cb0447EeB1cbc26F1b3fff3bec20 (Ethereum): UUPS proxy, implementation 0xAdE2eF0101278fe11490F2EE2aaD7915a094ADe9. In its verified source, fetchDeadStatus() marks the bridge dead (unlocking withdrawals and deposit cancels while dead) only once the StateOracle's lastUpdateTime is older than TIME_UNTIL_DEAD = 200 days; the runtime code read at this pin holds that constant (17,280,000 s) and no 14-day constant. exitAdministrator() = 0x7390251Bf35AA7eA7C196fc4750bd5d6c5918329 (the mechanism is off while it is zero; the owner sets it). _authorizeUpgrade is onlyOwner, and owner() = 0x9Fe65a5418850015a9D8ad3Ca50d6a0B9769FbE0, a 3-of-4 Safe, so the period can be changed by an upgrade. Not dead at this pin (deadState zero; StateOracle 0xB7e8CC3F5FeA12443136f0cc13D81F109B2dEd7f lastUpdateTime 1795109183). - trueo-upgradeability-8175b0-s31 [aligned_baseline] Trueo — Trueo contract: upgradeable (UUPS), as documented · Sprint 31 · block 59594105 (0x7646bbc83a9f0d26a48a94274cd6003a3f10bc4747a20d817b8e536618e28496) · target 0x8175b0A1e803aC4205aE35F614315Ba801275baA · Trueo contract 0x8175b0A1e803aC4205aE35F614315Ba801275baA (Base): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0xfF21c2c73784d35578f497e2D6975D8a430d7B9a; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation exposing upgradeTo/upgradeToAndCall (UUPS)). - abracadabra-spell-safe-threshold-s30 [parameter_delta] Abracadabra Spell — Abracadabra Spell multisig: docs state 5-of-10, the Safe is 5-of-11 · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x5f0DeE98360d8200b20812e174d139A1a633EDd2 · Abracadabra Spell Safe 0x5f0DeE98360d8200b20812e174d139A1a633EDd2 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 5 of getOwners() = 11 owners (Safe v1.3.0); it controls MagicInternetMoneyV1 0x99D8a9C45b2ecA8864373A26D1459e3Dff1e17F3. - arrakis-modular-upgrade-timelock-48h-s30 [aligned_baseline] Arrakis Modular — Manager proxy and module beacons: timelock admin, getMinDelay() 172,800 s · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0xAf6f9640092cB1236E5DB6E517576355b6C40b7f · ArrakisMetaVaultFactory 0x820FB8127a689327C863de8433278d6181123982 (Ethereum): manager() = 0x2e6E879648293e939aA68bA4c6c129A1Be733bDA, whose EIP-1967 admin slot holds 0xAf6f9640092cB1236E5DB6E517576355b6C40b7f, a TimelockController with getMinDelay() = 172,800 s. The 5 module beacons whitelisted by the public and private module registries (0xE973Cf1e347EcF26232A95dBCc862AA488b0351b, 0xFf0474792DEe71935a0CeF1306D93fC1DCF47BD9, 0xdf4975A3515168f8c446aD4a2E974B89c64b6A38, 0x022a0C7dc85Fc3fF81f9f8Ef65Ae2813A062F556, 0x1436877899273D748eb433eFd6C437e37D627255) all have owner() = 0xAf6f9640092cB1236E5DB6E517576355b6C40b7f. - bedrock-unibtc-secure-mint-precondition-s30 [parameter_delta] Bedrock (uniBTC) — Secure Mint precondition: adequacyRatio() 900 (existing supply x 0.9 vs reserves) · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da · Bedrock VaultWithoutNative 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da (Ethereum): adequacyRatio() = 900, so checkReserve() evaluates existing supply * 900 / 1000 <= reserves before minting (feeders: reserve 0xc590D9fb8eE78a0909dFF341ccf717000b7b7fF2, supply 0xE542919E4b281f10b437F947c8Ba224DdfaBc716). The incoming mint amount is absent from this inequality, so ~111.1% is not a post-mint ceiling; separate per-asset caps and collateral-transfer checks in _mint() still apply, and uniBTC.mint() (0x004E9C3EF86bc1ca1f0bB5C7662861Ee93350568) performs no PoR check of its own. MANAGER_ROLE (setAdequacyRatio / setPoRFeeder) and PAUSER_ROLE are held by 0x9251fd3D79522bB2243a58FFf1dB43E25A495aaB, an account carrying 23-byte EIP-7702 delegation code. The vault and uniBTC share ProxyAdmin 0x029E4FbDAa31DE075dD74B2238222A08233978f6, owned by the 3-of-5 Safe 0xC9dA980fFABbE2bbe15d4734FDae5761B86b5Fc3, which also holds uniBTC's DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. This record does not assert a reserve deficit. - exactly-auditor-timelock-24h-s30 [aligned_baseline] Exactly — Auditor upgrade path: ProxyAdmin owned by a timelock, getMinDelay() 86,400 s · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x92024C4bDa9DA602b711B9AbB610d072018eb58b · Exactly Auditor 0x310A2694521f75C7B2b64b5937C16CE65C3EFE01 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin 0x3866eA62494597A5EDeA4A97f9429f82b9d7Ca34; ProxyAdmin owner() = 0x92024C4bDa9DA602b711B9AbB610d072018eb58b, a TimelockController with getMinDelay() = 86,400 s. The access-control page lists the Auditor among the contracts the TimelockController can upgrade. - flying-tulip-treasury-safe-3of5-s30 [aligned_baseline] Flying Tulip Lend — Treasury Safe (FT owner): 3-of-5 · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x1118e1c057211306a40A4d7006C040dbfE1370Cb · Flying Tulip treasury Safe 0x1118e1c057211306a40A4d7006C040dbfE1370Cb (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of 5 owners. It is owner() of the FT token 0x5DD1A7A369e8273371d2DBf9d83356057088082c. - goldfinch-safe-threshold-s30 [parameter_delta] Goldfinch — Goldfinch multisig: docs state 6-of-10, the Safe is 6-of-12 · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0xBEb28978B2c755155f20fd3d09Cb37e300A6981f · Goldfinch Safe 0xBEb28978B2c755155f20fd3d09Cb37e300A6981f (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 6 of getOwners() = 12 owners (Safe v1.1.1). - iaero-protocol-safe-threshold-44d817-s30 [aligned_baseline] iAero Protocol — iAero Protocol multisig: 3-of-4 Safe, as documented · Sprint 30 · block 59532664 (0xff515cb7dd2fd4e2de0f326c6c78aaaf038978e80baf47e5711377db3c07c025) · target 0x1039CB48254a3150fC604d4B9ea08F66f4739D37 · iAero Protocol Safe 0x1039CB48254a3150fC604d4B9ea08F66f4739D37 (Base): getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 4 owners (Safe v1.4.1); it controls StakedIAERO 0x44D8172b95a208082327f58c5b42269d48a34847. - infinifi-core-governance-token-roles-rotated-s30 [aligned_baseline] infiniFi — InfiniFiCore GOVERNANCE_TOKEN_* roles: membership moved to a new holder since #26,425,374 · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490 · InfiniFiCore 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490 (Ethereum): for GOVERNANCE_TOKEN_ADMIN, GOVERNANCE_TOKEN_MINTER and GOVERNANCE_TOKEN_BURNER, hasRole(0xee529A21Cea25EFDF527e85BB4c597603E14CcfC) = true and hasRole(0x579B18E60d0245c0F66Fa9463610b15E226Ae8FD) = false at this pin, the reverse at Pacta's published pin #26,425,374 (record infinifi-pause-role-admin-minor-roles-s20); getRoleAdmin of each is GOVERNANCE_TOKEN_ADMIN. The new holder is a contract (6,774 bytes of code). This record states the Core role membership and administration only: no token mint / burn route and no delay is inferred. - inverse-firm-policy-safe-3of6-s30 [parameter_delta] Inverse Finance (FiRM) — Policy Committee Safe: 3-of-6 (docs: 5 of 9); 4-of-7 at #26,399,876 · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 · Inverse Finance Policy Committee Safe 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of 6 owners at this pin. It was 4-of-7 at Pacta's surface pin #26,399,876 (record inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe) and already 3-of-6 at #26,406,106 and at the protocol's latest pin #26,441,165: the change falls between #26,399,876 and #26,406,106, not after #26,441,165. - jpy-defi-timelock-delay-s30 [aligned_baseline] JPY DeFi — JPY DeFi timelock: 12-hour minimum delay, as documented · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0xf27de84F11E089B838769EDFcFf9872BC45c84Fe · JPY DeFi TimelockController 0xf27de84F11E089B838769EDFcFf9872BC45c84Fe (Ethereum): getMinDelay() = 43200s (12 h). - kelp-lrtconfig-operator-revoked-s30 [aligned_baseline] Kelp DAO (rsETH) — LRTConfig OPERATOR_ROLE: one operator account revoked since #26,406,106 · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x947Cb49334e6571ccBFEF1f1f1178d8469D65ec7 · Kelp LRTConfig 0x947Cb49334e6571ccBFEF1f1f1178d8469D65ec7 (Ethereum): hasRole(OPERATOR_ROLE 0x97667070c54ef182b0f5858b034beac1b6f3089aa2d3188bb1e8929f4fa9b929, 0x7AAd74b7f0d60D5867B59dbD377a71783425af47) = false at this pin; true at Pacta's published pin #26,406,106 (record kelp-rseth-proxyadmin-10d-timelock-s14). The documented LRTConfig address is the contract read. - kpk-security-council-safe-5of8-s30 [aligned_baseline] KPK — Security Council Safe (vault owner and sentinel): 5-of-8 · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x8b884f80B3B839F52b6cE168f133e7a5D1f0A537 · KPK Security Council Safe 0x8b884f80B3B839F52b6cE168f133e7a5D1f0A537 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 5 of 8 owners. The documentation names it the owner and sentinel of the KPK vaults (legacy v1 vaults excepted). - makina-upgrade-role-dao-delay-2d-s30 [aligned_baseline] Makina — Upgrade role (6): DAO multisig execution delay 172,800 s · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x0fCEfa3f1047F35521A49cD8B06faBd588665d7F · Makina AccessManager 0x0fCEfa3f1047F35521A49cD8B06faBd588665d7F (Ethereum): getAccess(6, DAO multisig 0x62244C74e1d09b3D86EF7342d354b5D7770bDE10) = member since 1779354899, execution delay 172,800 s; getRoleGuardian(6) = 7. The HubCoreFactory 0x8d28A69328561eF9F171c58996fEcB9F494e070c's EIP-1967 admin is ProxyAdmin 0xEb78836D3aa3A0518A96fd7C9c549d0FFB7D6dA9, whose owner() is the AccessManager. - meta-pool-eth-proxy-admin-dao-safe-s30 [aligned_baseline] Meta Pool ETH — spETH upgrade admin: the documented ProxyAdmin, owned by the DAO Admin Safe (3-of-6) · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x806F870ee04A2CC8bf2aD053BAa5ed9999A1f182 · Meta Pool spETH 0xD06f6a56c5f599cB375B616DF306f32B7F6f4A0E (Ethereum): EIP-1967 proxy (implementation 0xD3dB79D2D00A6B82531D8Ccf65C376d9eE9513aC), admin slot = ProxyAdmin 0x806F870ee04A2CC8bf2aD053BAa5ed9999A1f182. The same ProxyAdmin administers the published target (MetaPoolETH 0x48AFbBd342F64EF8a9Ab1C143719b63C2AD81710) and the documented Liquid Unstake Pool 0xdF261F967E87B2aa44e18a22f4aCE5d7f74f03Cc. ProxyAdmin owner() = 0x24D9664Ba8384D94499d6698ab285b69E879D971, a 3-of-6 Safe: the contract list names both addresses (Proxy Admin; SAFE Multisig (DAO Admin)). - nuva-router-timelock-48h-s30 [aligned_baseline] NUVA — DedicatedVaultRouter upgrade authority: timelock, getMinDelay() 172,800 s · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0xDEa75A312b2F99b5A7558c4636897b39C195E241 · NUVA DedicatedVaultRouter 0x50AE1e4A612A4623b747aEeFb30aFBA82804e12c (Ethereum) is an EIP-1967 proxy (implementation 0x027207E16E2BB920dc89AA9FeF7826e23091588a, admin slot zero: upgrades are authorized by owner()); owner() = 0xDEa75A312b2F99b5A7558c4636897b39C195E241, a TimelockController with getMinDelay() = 172,800 s. - panoptic-v2-upgradeability-s30 [aligned_baseline] Panoptic V2 — Panoptic V2 RiskEngineProxy: upgradeable (proxy admin), as documented · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x000000000000ffE5eFdB5AE76b9200263C58b4c0 · Panoptic V2 RiskEngineProxy 0x000000000000ffE5eFdB5AE76b9200263C58b4c0 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x000000000000f69c150aFEa8Cc4f8fC4462AdBB4, admin slot = 0x22BD5EC2Ee6685C373781420E12c1426dd7776F2; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation + admin slot (transparent proxy)). - polygon-bridge-mapping-safe-4of13-s30 [parameter_delta] Polygon Bridge — Custom ChildERC20 mapping Safe: 4-of-13 (docs: 4/8) · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x424bDE99FCfB68c5a1218fd3215caFfD031f19C4 · Polygon custom ChildERC20 mapping Safe 0x424bDE99FCfB68c5a1218fd3215caFfD031f19C4 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of 13 owners; the multisig page lists it as a 4/8 Multisig. - polygon-bridge-rootchainmanager-zero-delay-upgrade-s30 [parameter_delta] Polygon Bridge — RootChainManager + predicates: upgrades via a 0 s timelock run by the 5-of-9 Safe · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0xA0c68C638235ee32657e8f720a23ceC1bFc77C77 · Polygon RootChainManagerProxy 0xA0c68C638235ee32657e8f720a23ceC1bFc77C77, ERC20PredicateProxy 0x40ec5B33f54e0E8A33A975908C5BA1c14e5BbbDf and EtherPredicateProxy 0x8484Ef722627bf18ca5Ae6BcF031c23E6e922B30 (Ethereum): proxyOwner() = TimelockController 0xCaf0aa768A3AE1297DF20072419Db8Bb8b5C8cEf on all three; its getMinDelay() = 0 at this pin and already 0 at Pacta's Sprint 26 pin #26,438,867 (record polygon-bridge-safe-threshold-s26): not a change since that pin. The 5-of-9 Safe 0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c holds PROPOSER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE on that timelock and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE directly on the three bridge contracts. The documentation does disclose that multisigs control contract upgrades; no censorship incident is alleged. - resolv-usr-counter-service-role-revoked-s30 [aligned_baseline] Resolv (USR / RLP) — USR Counter SERVICE_ROLE: one service account revoked since #26,403,523 · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0xa27a69Ae180e202fDe5D38189a3F24Fe24E55861 · Resolv USR Counter 0xa27a69Ae180e202fDe5D38189a3F24Fe24E55861 (Ethereum): hasRole(SERVICE_ROLE 0xd8a7a79547af723ee3e12b59a480111268d8969c634e1a34a144d2c8b91d635b, 0x15CAd41e6BdCaDc7121ce65080489C92CF6de398) = false at this pin; true at Pacta's published pin #26,403,523 (record resolv-usr-default-admin-delay-and-safe). - shift-defi-safe-threshold-4cc8d4-s30 [aligned_baseline] Shift DeFi — Shift DeFi multisig: 2-of-6 Safe, as documented · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x4cC8D45644eCCD8cA77DBF3A8E3eE2dBf4596983 · Shift DeFi Safe 0x4cC8D45644eCCD8cA77DBF3A8E3eE2dBf4596983 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 6 owners (Safe v1.4.1). - spectra-metavaults-upgradeability-16b282-s30 [aligned_baseline] Spectra MetaVaults — Spectra MetaVaults TransparentUpgradeableProxy: upgradeable (proxy admin), as documented · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x16b28223b607B4D90e2eC628fdC1a0AD9Ee1f6B8 · Spectra MetaVaults TransparentUpgradeableProxy 0x16b28223b607B4D90e2eC628fdC1a0AD9Ee1f6B8 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x47a9B7E7E1bf368D2e0f3053Dde9270DD8E48eEA, admin slot = 0xf300d5032D7F607f1C5a54BA70b93bAA62172f20; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation + admin slot (transparent proxy)). - threshold-tbtc-walletregistry-op-0xb667-executed-s30 [aligned_baseline] Threshold Network (tBTC) — Timelock operation 0xb6671bbb: executed since #26,407,707; getMinDelay() still 86,400 s · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0x92f2d8b72a7F6a551Be60b9aa4194248E9B4913D · Threshold tBTC TimelockController 0x92f2d8b72a7F6a551Be60b9aa4194248E9B4913D (Ethereum): isOperationDone(0xb6671bbbedf818d7232a4006d4a85b21e3f3055d17244188f244c1da8263e0c7) = true and isOperationPending = false at this pin; pending at Pacta's published pin #26,407,707 (record threshold-tbtc-timelock-1d-walletregistry-op-0xb667). getMinDelay() = 86,400 s at both pins. - vetro-upgradeability-dad503-s30 [aligned_baseline] VETRO — VETRO contract: upgradeable (proxy admin), as documented · Sprint 30 · block 26449594 (0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287) · target 0xDaD503f8B9d42bb7af3AfC588358D30163e4416F · VETRO contract 0xDaD503f8B9d42bb7af3AfC588358D30163e4416F (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x07Ee70DFd5a74d4a038Ff6AAE1d31Ca2C71F4DF1, admin slot = 0x83B2435d9A30b7463B3Ba997ba47a14B73149e2A; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation + admin slot (transparent proxy)). - base-bridge-l1-proxyadmin-owner-s29 [parameter_delta] Base Bridge — L1 ProxyAdmin owner: docs name 0x5a0A…3d2A; owner() is another 2-of-2 Safe · Sprint 29 · block 26448221 (0xa7818c0e1b8807aac0c999c2dc9aeeea40b91b4f19b1b76a62ad02d8d17607c8) · target 0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E · Base L1 ProxyAdmin 0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E (Ethereum): owner() = Safe 0x7bB41C3008B3f03FE483B28b8DB90e19Cf07595c with getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 2 owners: 0x9855054731540A48b28990B63DcF4f33d8AE46A1 (3-of-6 Safe), 0x20AcF55A3DCfe07fC4cecaCFa1628F788EC8A4Dd (8-of-11 Safe). The address the configuration page names as L1 ProxyAdmin Owner, 0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A, is a 2-of-2 Safe, not one of those owners. - f-x-protocol-v2-router-owner-safe-s29 [parameter_delta] f(x) Protocol v2 — V2 Router (Diamond) owner: docs put every transaction behind a 3-day timelock; owner() is the 6-of-9 Safe · Sprint 29 · block 26448221 (0xa7818c0e1b8807aac0c999c2dc9aeeea40b91b4f19b1b76a62ad02d8d17607c8) · target 0x33636D49FbefBE798e15e7F356E8DBef543CC708 · f(x) V2 Router 0x33636D49FbefBE798e15e7F356E8DBef543CC708 (Ethereum, an EIP-2535 Diamond): owner() = Safe 0x26B2ec4E02ebe2F54583af25b647b1D619e67BbF with getThreshold() = 6 of getOwners() = 9 owners (Safe v1.3.0), no Safe guard; facetAddress(diamondCut 0x1f931c1c) = 0x221ffB180AD01213FF882ab7DE9c75E23F9efA63. The timelock the docs name, 0x68863fb8855b04509a835082478D6E3D0bE4E61a, reads getMinDelay() = 259,200 s and is not the Router's owner. - flaunch-timelock-delay-s29 [aligned_baseline] flaunch — flaunch timelock: 2-day minimum delay, as documented · Sprint 29 · block 26448221 (0xa7818c0e1b8807aac0c999c2dc9aeeea40b91b4f19b1b76a62ad02d8d17607c8) · target 0x6c4c0CD7E0E5eeFfbd77AAfe1820d3b9B1ef27b0 · flaunch TimelockController 0x6c4c0CD7E0E5eeFfbd77AAfe1820d3b9B1ef27b0 (Ethereum): getMinDelay() = 172800s (2 d). - lagoon-vault-beacon-upgrade-delay-s29 [parameter_delta] Lagoon — cbBTC vault upgrades: docs require a 24 h to 30 day wait; the vault's beacon owner is a 3-of-6 Safe with no delay · Sprint 29 · block 26448221 (0xa7818c0e1b8807aac0c999c2dc9aeeea40b91b4f19b1b76a62ad02d8d17607c8) · target 0x707D622cdA4b5459e7DcEe8Ba8E429F154f96A27 · Lagoon cbBTC vault 0xB09F761Cb13baCa8eC087Ac476647361b6314F98 (Ethereum) is an EIP-1967 BeaconProxy: beacon slot = UpgradeableBeacon 0x707D622cdA4b5459e7DcEe8Ba8E429F154f96A27 (implementation() = 0x6C77c47FB8168E22976C3B0338CB1769c952249f), admin slot empty. The beacon's owner() = Safe 0x6D46e28aB34622d9A39d0F306a37a8dC270951aF with getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 6 owners (Safe v1.3.0), no Safe guard; the beacon exposes no delay(). An upgrade of the beacon applies to the vault at once. - lido-dual-governance-emergency-activation-safe-s29 [aligned_baseline] Lido (stETH / Dual Governance) — 4-of-7 Safe: holds the one-off, time-limited right to activate emergency mode; signers as listed, one replaced since #26,403,121 · Sprint 29 · block 26448221 (0xa7818c0e1b8807aac0c999c2dc9aeeea40b91b4f19b1b76a62ad02d8d17607c8) · target 0x8B7854488Fde088d686Ea672B6ba1A5242515f45 · Lido Emergency Activation Committee Safe 0x8B7854488Fde088d686Ea672B6ba1A5242515f45 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of getOwners() = 7 owners (Safe v1.4.1); the owner set equals the signer list of the committees page. At Pacta's published pin #26,403,121 (record lido-dual-governance-emergency-timelock) the Safe was 4-of-7; since then 0x237Cddf3aA765260cf6b60E064065Da7c3Aa1559 was replaced by 0x3554630ec64e7756007dF4137abf7c5881C533D0. - lido-dual-governance-emergency-execution-safe-s29 [aligned_baseline] Lido (stETH / Dual Governance) — 5-of-7 Safe: executes scheduled proposals while emergency mode is active; the activation committee's signers, with a stricter quorum · Sprint 29 · block 26448221 (0xa7818c0e1b8807aac0c999c2dc9aeeea40b91b4f19b1b76a62ad02d8d17607c8) · target 0xC7792b3F2B399bB0EdF53fECDceCeB97FBEB18AF · Lido Emergency Execution Committee Safe 0xC7792b3F2B399bB0EdF53fECDceCeB97FBEB18AF (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 5 of getOwners() = 7 owners (Safe v1.4.1); the owner set equals the signer list of the committees page. At Pacta's published pin #26,403,121 (record lido-dual-governance-emergency-timelock) the Safe was 5-of-7; since then 0x237Cddf3aA765260cf6b60E064065Da7c3Aa1559 was replaced by 0x3554630ec64e7756007dF4137abf7c5881C533D0. - renzo-ezeth-deposit-queue-fee-s29 [parameter_delta] Renzo Protocol (ezETH) — DepositQueue fee: docs state 10% of restaking rewards; feeBasisPoints() reads 10,000 (100%), 1,500 at #26,433,001 · Sprint 29 · block 26448221 (0xa7818c0e1b8807aac0c999c2dc9aeeea40b91b4f19b1b76a62ad02d8d17607c8) · target 0xf2F305D14DCD8aaef887E0428B3c9534795D0d60 · Renzo DepositQueue 0xf2F305D14DCD8aaef887E0428B3c9534795D0d60 (Ethereum): feeBasisPoints() = 10,000 (100% in basis points) at this pin; 1,500 at Pacta's published pins #26,401,725 and #26,433,001 (record renzo-ezeth-deposit-queue-fee). feeAddress() = 0x10586b9b7Ff0F842913a57539f8167CE143C3011 and the EIP-1967 implementation 0x24Aa958C90b7973DC16c63C9992f69E1767377Ae are the same at both pins. - 40-acres-base-upgradeability-s28 [parameter_delta] 40 Acres (Base) — Lending vault proxy: docs call the contracts immutable, but it is an upgradeable proxy · Sprint 28 · block 59025642 (0x8fc618f8e02aa1fd1c3bcf1300fd25e40291a0fcde351bd39ad8cb61781d5e12) · target 0x87f18b377e625b62c708D5f6EA96EC193558EFD0 · 40 Acres proxy 0x87f18b377e625b62c708D5f6EA96EC193558EFD0 (Base): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0xb43b30c405c61BC330227968635d130994450735; the implementation's proxiableUUID() = the EIP-1967 slot (UUPS), UPGRADE_INTERFACE_VERSION() = '5.0.0'; owner() = 0xfF16fd3D147220E6CC002a8e4a1f942ac41DBD23, a Safe 2-of-3. - apy-finance-upgradeability-e18b03-s28 [aligned_baseline] APY Finance — APY Finance APYPoolTokenProxy: upgradeable (proxy admin), as documented · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0xe18b0365D5D09F394f84eE56ed29DD2d8D6Fba5f · APY Finance APYPoolTokenProxy 0xe18b0365D5D09F394f84eE56ed29DD2d8D6Fba5f (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0xDD0fC21319C4cA133A758f9893028Aac834e8493, admin slot = 0x7965283631253DfCb71Db63a60C656DEDF76234f; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation + admin slot (transparent proxy)). - asymmetry-finance-upgradeability-000000-s28 [aligned_baseline] Asymmetry Finance — Asymmetry Finance SimpleProxy: upgradeable (UUPS), as documented · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0x00000069aBbB0B1Ad6975bcF753eEe15D318A0BF · Asymmetry Finance SimpleProxy 0x00000069aBbB0B1Ad6975bcF753eEe15D318A0BF (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0xb628B1fdbE8C01777aEa2bF3bd386df4Af84e8d3; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation exposing upgradeToAndCall (UUPS)). - defi-saver-adminvault-owner-safe-s28 [parameter_delta] DeFi Saver — AdminVault Owner multisig: docs state 3/5, the Safe is 3-of-6 · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0xBc841B0dE0b93205e912CFBBd1D0c160A1ec6F00 · DFSRegistry 0x287778F121F134C66212FB16c9b53eC991D32f5b adminVault() = AdminVault 0xCCf3d848e08b94478Ed8f46fFead3008faF581fD; AdminVault.owner() = Safe 0xBc841B0dE0b93205e912CFBBd1D0c160A1ec6F00 (Ethereum) with getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 6 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - diem-relay-safe-threshold-s28 [aligned_baseline] DIEM Relay — DIEM Relay multisig: 2-of-2 Safe, as documented · Sprint 28 · block 59025642 (0x8fc618f8e02aa1fd1c3bcf1300fd25e40291a0fcde351bd39ad8cb61781d5e12) · target 0x01Ea790410D9863A57771D992D2A72ea326DD7C9 · DIEM Relay Safe 0x01Ea790410D9863A57771D992D2A72ea326DD7C9 (Base): getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 2 owners (Safe v1.4.1). - inverse-finance-firm-borrowcontroller-staleness-s28 [protective_delta] Inverse Finance (FiRM) — BorrowController stalenessThreshold (sDOLA market): 86,500 s at the Sprint pin, 0 (check off) at the #26,406,106 pin · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 · FiRM BorrowController 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 (Ethereum): stalenessThreshold(sDOLA market 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d) = 86500s (24.03 h) at this pin. At Pacta's prior pin #26,406,106 (record inverse-firm-borrowcontroller-staleness-sentinel) it read 0, which switches the oracle staleness check off; the value read now equals the 86,500 s change that record observed queued. The docs describe a typical 1-24 hour range, not a hard maximum. - kyberswap-classic-upgradeability-s28 [aligned_baseline] KyberSwap Classic — KyberSwap Classic KyberNetworkTokenV2 proxy: upgradeable (proxy admin), as documented · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0xdeFA4e8a7bcBA345F687a2f1456F5Edd9CE97202 · KyberSwap Classic KyberNetworkTokenV2 proxy 0xdeFA4e8a7bcBA345F687a2f1456F5Edd9CE97202 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0xe5E8E834086F1a964f9A089eB6Ae11796862e4CE, admin slot = 0x500180A94cB854e98770872AF4E4BB1dD67Af559; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation + admin slot (transparent proxy)). - mcdex-safe-threshold-s28 [aligned_baseline] MCDEX — DAO: 4-of-8 Safe, as documented · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0x38ca50c6E3391A5bf73c2504bd9Cd9c0b9D89053 · DAO Safe 0x38ca50c6E3391A5bf73c2504bd9Cd9c0b9D89053 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of getOwners() = 8 owners (Safe v1.1.1); it controls AdminUpgradeabilityProxy 0x4e352cF164E64ADCBad318C3a1e222E9EBa4Ce42. - steakhouse-prime-usdc-base-guardian-s28 [aligned_baseline] Steakhouse Prime USDC (Base) — Steakhouse Prime USDC (Base) MetaMorphoV1_1: a guardian is configured, as documented · Sprint 28 · block 59025642 (0x8fc618f8e02aa1fd1c3bcf1300fd25e40291a0fcde351bd39ad8cb61781d5e12) · target 0xBEEFE94c8aD530842bfE7d8B397938fFc1cb83b2 · Steakhouse Prime USDC (Base) MetaMorphoV1_1 0xBEEFE94c8aD530842bfE7d8B397938fFc1cb83b2 (Base): guardian() = 0x894d59017Ed0F8dcd8f2B6e89a3C26eF76876D33 (a contract). - steakhouse-prime-usdc-base-timelock-delay-s28 [aligned_baseline] Steakhouse Prime USDC (Base) — Steakhouse Prime USDC (Base) timelock: 7-day minimum delay, as documented · Sprint 28 · block 59025642 (0x8fc618f8e02aa1fd1c3bcf1300fd25e40291a0fcde351bd39ad8cb61781d5e12) · target 0xBEEFE94c8aD530842bfE7d8B397938fFc1cb83b2 · Steakhouse Prime USDC (Base) MetaMorphoV1_1 0xBEEFE94c8aD530842bfE7d8B397938fFc1cb83b2 (Base): timelock() = 604800s (7 d). - strata-markets-safe-threshold-s28 [aligned_baseline] Strata Markets — Strata Markets multisig: 2-of-3 Safe, as documented · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0x4be3749a0F6557b8fd98F3967e859DbD7C694eF4 · Strata Markets Safe 0x4be3749a0F6557b8fd98F3967e859DbD7C694eF4 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 3 owners (Safe v1.4.1). - upshift-proxyadmin-safe-s28 [parameter_delta] Upshift — Vault ProxyAdmin multisig: docs state generally 4 of 6, the Safe is 2-of-3 · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0x4107557d726933f0BcA591A4218Afc92978457F7 · Upshift vault 0xE9B725010A9E419412ed67d0fA5f3A5f40159D32 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin 0xB5fBf201A35327Ddd89986FfA60CF5A675B2bDbc, whose owner() = Safe 0x4107557d726933f0BcA591A4218Afc92978457F7 with getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 3 owners; the vault's owner() is a separate Safe 0x17ab7568Cd5386DF6C8E4552438E32794D057cC1 (2-of-3). - vesper-v1-governor-safe-s28 [parameter_delta] Vesper V1 — Pool governor multisig: docs state 3 of 5 signers, the Safe is 3-of-6 · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0x9520b477Aa81180E6DdC006Fc09Fb6d3eb4e807A · Vesper governor Safe 0x9520b477Aa81180E6DdC006Fc09Fb6d3eb4e807A (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 6 owners (Safe v1.3.0); governor() of the Vesper pools 0xd1C117319B3595fbc39b471AB1fd485629eb05F2, 0x3aEd4dd0b5ba616156Fa352274670c18D2Ec2A81, 0x025a05f1967521806BB4c8a10Ba4b8c00A794F65 is this Safe, which is also the published controller of the VSP token record. - whales-market-upgradeability-s28 [parameter_delta] Whales Market — Whales Market TransparentUpgradeableProxy: docs describe it as immutable, but it is an upgradeable proxy · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0x1eCdB32e59e948C010a189a0798C674a2d0c6603 · Whales Market TransparentUpgradeableProxy 0x1eCdB32e59e948C010a189a0798C674a2d0c6603 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x623620b3Eff4e1A30e9f1154f88198Ab26952EeB, admin slot = 0xeB5E772919661F455619A4cABd9B2b64715505E6; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation + admin slot (transparent proxy)). - wintermute-confidential-wbtc-ethereum-safe-threshold-3d5ecc-s28 [aligned_baseline] Wintermute Confidential WBTC (Ethereum) — Wintermute Confidential WBTC (Ethereum) multisig: 3-of-6 Safe, as documented · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0x4687E45bB5518a995913a24BB2816fe2031d74D8 · Wintermute Confidential WBTC (Ethereum) Safe 0x4687E45bB5518a995913a24BB2816fe2031d74D8 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 6 owners (Safe v1.4.1); it controls VaultV2 0x3d5EcCb62974178236A768A7ef14D3ce468Fbe91. - yearn-v3-ychad-safe-signers-s28 [parameter_delta] Yearn V3 — yChad governance Safe: documented signer 0x6F2A…eAD6 is no longer an owner · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52 · yChad Safe 0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 6 of getOwners() = 9 owners; 0x6F2A8Ee9452ba7d336b3fba03caC27f7818AeAD6 is not among getOwners(). - zircuit-staking-safe-threshold-s28 [parameter_delta] Zircuit Staking — Zircuit Staking multisig: docs state 6-of-8, the Safe is 4-of-6 · Sprint 28 · block 26441165 (0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9) · target 0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38 · Zircuit Staking Safe 0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of getOwners() = 6 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - eclipse-bridge-safe-threshold-s27 [aligned_baseline] Eclipse Bridge — Eclipse Bridge multisig: 3-of-5 Safe, as documented · Sprint 27 · block 26440048 (0x2c6e70ac6ce978ce5c457208ea6d953e60e92ebf2151578f46cbdd070baa54c6) · target 0x7B2c1CbB33c53c3C6a695e36096AD2cfCE1c0efC · Eclipse Bridge Safe 0x7B2c1CbB33c53c3C6a695e36096AD2cfCE1c0efC (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 5 owners (Safe v1.3.0); it controls ERC1967Proxy 0x6055Dc6Ff1077eebe5e6D2BA1a1f53d7Ef8430dE. - equilibria-timelock-delay-s27 [aligned_baseline] Equilibria — Equilibria timelock: 24-hour minimum delay, as documented · Sprint 27 · block 26440048 (0x2c6e70ac6ce978ce5c457208ea6d953e60e92ebf2151578f46cbdd070baa54c6) · target 0xe2A63438747D2c71E14BdC2Cc222be89B1C11D03 · Equilibria TimelockController 0xe2A63438747D2c71E14BdC2Cc222be89B1C11D03 (Ethereum): getMinDelay() = 86400s (1 d). - eth-strategy-safe-threshold-s27 [aligned_baseline] ETH Strategy — ETH Strategy multisig: 3-of-5 Safe, as documented · Sprint 27 · block 26440048 (0x2c6e70ac6ce978ce5c457208ea6d953e60e92ebf2151578f46cbdd070baa54c6) · target 0xC53CCed6332D06972A7eaEDc64FDF6d4aF5220b8 · ETH Strategy Safe 0xC53CCed6332D06972A7eaEDc64FDF6d4aF5220b8 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 5 owners (Safe v1.4.1). - gravity-by-galxe-bridge-safe-threshold-s27 [aligned_baseline] Gravity by Galxe Bridge — Gravity by Galxe Bridge multisig: 3-of-6 Safe, as documented · Sprint 27 · block 26440048 (0x2c6e70ac6ce978ce5c457208ea6d953e60e92ebf2151578f46cbdd070baa54c6) · target 0xbD6e434dB90FD8AD4E28d85C133AD34cA6fbfB6D · Gravity by Galxe Bridge Safe 0xbD6e434dB90FD8AD4E28d85C133AD34cA6fbfB6D (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 6 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - kuma-protocol-safe-threshold-s27 [aligned_baseline] KUMA Protocol — KUMA Protocol multisig: 4-of-7 Safe, as documented · Sprint 27 · block 26440048 (0x2c6e70ac6ce978ce5c457208ea6d953e60e92ebf2151578f46cbdd070baa54c6) · target 0xB5502747AABDCa21E832951b4caaF739dA33f450 · KUMA Protocol Safe 0xB5502747AABDCa21E832951b4caaF739dA33f450 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of getOwners() = 7 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - privacy-pools-v1-upgradeability-s27 [aligned_baseline] Privacy Pools V1 — Privacy Pools V1 PoolVault proxy: upgradeable (UUPS), as documented · Sprint 27 · block 26440048 (0x2c6e70ac6ce978ce5c457208ea6d953e60e92ebf2151578f46cbdd070baa54c6) · target 0x0Eb42804BF897662aF851370eaeAdcDBEC1b97ed · Privacy Pools V1 PoolVault proxy 0x0Eb42804BF897662aF851370eaeAdcDBEC1b97ed (Ethereum): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x5F89cD5c3610c2AD870B1b33126d209fECdb69c7; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation exposing upgradeToAndCall (UUPS)). - treehouse-tree-teth-tree-blacklister-safe-s27 [parameter_delta] Treehouse (TREE / tETH) — TREE token: a 5-of-7 Safe can blacklist holders with no delay; docs state a 5-day timelock on every contract · Sprint 27 · block 26440048 (0x2c6e70ac6ce978ce5c457208ea6d953e60e92ebf2151578f46cbdd070baa54c6) · target 0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3 · TREE 0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3 (Ethereum): EIP-1967 proxy, implementation 0x0fedcbfEBc293Ad8048726B0F887e6C1126EffA6 since the timelock operation 0x2f11dcc3… executed at #26,439,293; blacklister() = 0x22261B4D6F629D8cF946C3524df86bF7222901F6, a Safe with getThreshold() = 5 of getOwners() = 7 owners and no delay of its own (0 s), so blacklisting needs no timelock; owner() = timelock 0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e with getMinDelay() = 432000s (5 days). - umia-timelock-delay-s27 [aligned_baseline] Umia — Umia timelock: 2-day minimum delay, as documented · Sprint 27 · block 58956515 (0x82af637fd7a689f4ea41c0ecd1a84a407ea93f2622b8e9c06184327d957129d0) · target 0xD0193fFAF565B6E530C1a6bbBb2FB13243f29177 · Umia timelock 0xD0193fFAF565B6E530C1a6bbBb2FB13243f29177 (Base): getMinDelay() = 172800s (2 d). - umia-upgradeability-s27 [aligned_baseline] Umia — UmiaMarketCore proxy: upgradeable (UUPS), as documented · Sprint 27 · block 58956515 (0x82af637fd7a689f4ea41c0ecd1a84a407ea93f2622b8e9c06184327d957129d0) · target 0x55975E430Cc54C63dff03B1E6d27Be574Ce229F6 · UmiaMarketCore proxy 0x55975E430Cc54C63dff03B1E6d27Be574Ce229F6 (Base): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0xBc35cB6cCc4BE46AA491960EBf5281cD5310c653; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation exposing upgradeToAndCall (UUPS)). - 3jane-lending-timelock-delay-s26 [aligned_baseline] 3Jane Lending — 3Jane Lending Upgrades admin: 7-day minimum delay, as documented · Sprint 26 · block 26438867 (0x6c477521320837df8611249a255cb7142052874937cddb9fe568f685763458ff) · target 0x3D3C41419Ab401cd25055E8f9421D7D96d887885 · Upgrades admin timelock 0x3D3C41419Ab401cd25055E8f9421D7D96d887885 (Ethereum): getMinDelay() = 604800s (7 d). - beefy-finance-base-clm-deviation-executed-s26 [aligned_baseline] Beefy Finance (Base) — CLM USDC-VVV strategy: the queued setDeviation(25) executed through the 6-hour timelock · Sprint 26 · block 58885628 (0x732b5472c93d5c4bf65f39440097e2b0143d5875cfec028646f7f06123a20094) · target 0x03f6AFbcbf398E2362c93DDC846619f1b1b860d2 · Strategy 0x03f6AFbcbf398E2362c93DDC846619f1b1b860d2 (Base): maxTickDeviation() = 25 (was 9 when op 0x3302750e… was queued); owner() = strategyOwner timelock 0x3B60F7f25b09E71356cdFFC6475c222A466a2AC9 with getMinDelay() = 21600s (6 hours); isOperationDone(op) = true and isOperationPending(op) = false, both first read at Base #58,854,880 and again at the Sprint 26 pin. - cooler-loans-safe-threshold-s26 [aligned_baseline] Cooler Loans — Cooler Loans multisig: 4-of-8 Safe, as documented · Sprint 26 · block 26438867 (0x6c477521320837df8611249a255cb7142052874937cddb9fe568f685763458ff) · target 0x245cc372C84B3645Bf0Ffe6538620B04a217988B · Cooler Loans Safe 0x245cc372C84B3645Bf0Ffe6538620B04a217988B (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of getOwners() = 8 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - curve-dex-ethereum-safe-threshold-s26 [aligned_baseline] Curve DEX (Ethereum) — Curve DEX (Ethereum) multisig: 5-of-9 Safe, as documented · Sprint 26 · block 26438867 (0x6c477521320837df8611249a255cb7142052874937cddb9fe568f685763458ff) · target 0x467947EE34aF926cF1DCac093870f613C96B1E0c · Curve DEX (Ethereum) Safe 0x467947EE34aF926cF1DCac093870f613C96B1E0c (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 5 of getOwners() = 9 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - ipor-fusion-upgradeability-s26 [aligned_baseline] IPOR Fusion — IPOR Fusion ERC1967Proxy: upgradeable (UUPS), as documented · Sprint 26 · block 58885628 (0x732b5472c93d5c4bf65f39440097e2b0143d5875cfec028646f7f06123a20094) · target 0x1455717668fA96534f675856347A973fA907e922 · IPOR Fusion ERC1967Proxy 0x1455717668fA96534f675856347A973fA907e922 (Base): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x378fEb2E96082FB965E2BB922AEE484d07c14014; upgradeable (EIP-1967 implementation exposing upgradeToAndCall (UUPS)). - polygon-bridge-safe-threshold-s26 [aligned_baseline] Polygon Bridge — Polygon Bridge multisig: 5-of-9 Safe, as documented · Sprint 26 · block 26438867 (0x6c477521320837df8611249a255cb7142052874937cddb9fe568f685763458ff) · target 0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c · Polygon Bridge Safe 0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 5 of getOwners() = 9 owners (Safe v1.4.1). - stakewise-v3-oseth-safe-threshold-s26 [aligned_baseline] StakeWise V3 (osETH) — StakeWise V3 (osETH) multisig: 4-of-7 Safe, as documented · Sprint 26 · block 26438867 (0x6c477521320837df8611249a255cb7142052874937cddb9fe568f685763458ff) · target 0x144a98cb1CdBb23610501fE6108858D9B7D24934 · StakeWise V3 (osETH) Safe 0x144a98cb1CdBb23610501fE6108858D9B7D24934 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of getOwners() = 7 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - yieldnest-safe-threshold-df51b7-s26 [parameter_delta] YieldNest — YNDelegator (delegates the eigenpods to the operators): docs state 2-of-3, the Safe is 2-of-4 · Sprint 26 · block 26438867 (0x6c477521320837df8611249a255cb7142052874937cddb9fe568f685763458ff) · target 0xDF51B7843817F76220C0970eF58Ba726630028eF · YNDelegator Safe 0xDF51B7843817F76220C0970eF58Ba726630028eF (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 4 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - yieldnest-safe-threshold-s26 [aligned_baseline] YieldNest — YNSecurityCouncil (contract upgrades, role admin): 3-of-5 Safe, as documented · Sprint 26 · block 26438867 (0x6c477521320837df8611249a255cb7142052874937cddb9fe568f685763458ff) · target 0xfcad670592a3b24869C0b51a6c6FDED4F95D6975 · YNSecurityCouncil Safe 0xfcad670592a3b24869C0b51a6c6FDED4F95D6975 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of getOwners() = 5 owners (Safe v1.3.0). - axelar-network-gateway-auth-module-s25 [parameter_delta] Axelar Network — Gateway implementation and auth module differ from the deployment config · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5 · AxelarGateway 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5: implementation() = 0x16C22cbDD77350b1AC88AdDA344F691c12f41960, authModule() = 0x3d3C73E91B1b0C243f1437F2d8363b1D5B093BD0 (whose owner() is the gateway); the deployment config lists implementation 0x99B5FA03a5ea4315725c43346e55a6A6fbd94098 and auth module 0xE3B83f79Fbf01B25659f8A814945aB82186A8AD0. - axelar-network-gateway-governance-s25 [aligned_baseline] Axelar Network — Gateway governed by Axelar governance (AxelarServiceGovernance) · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5 · AxelarGateway 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5: governance() = AxelarServiceGovernance 0x7Acbae6CBa67d78AAf69e47000884aE00F9B2525 (governanceChain() = 'axelar'). - axelar-network-gateway-mint-limiter-s25 [aligned_baseline] Axelar Network — Mint limits set by a 3-of-6 multisig, as configured · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0xCC940AE49C78F20E3F13F3cF37e996b98Ac3EC68 · AxelarGateway 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5: mintLimiter() = Multisig 0xCC940AE49C78F20E3F13F3cF37e996b98Ac3EC68: signerThreshold() = 3 of 6 signer accounts. - axelar-network-governance-timelock-s25 [aligned_baseline] Axelar Network — Governance timelock: 3 days, plus a documented operator fast path · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x7Acbae6CBa67d78AAf69e47000884aE00F9B2525 · AxelarServiceGovernance 0x7Acbae6CBa67d78AAf69e47000884aE00F9B2525: minimumTimeLockDelay() = 259200s (3 days); operator() = 0xc8a8399c3D1207f4e109673be7047604737c1D56 (no contract code), which can run executeOperatorProposal immediately (no delay) for proposals Axelar governance approved. - axelar-network-its-owner-s25 [aligned_baseline] Axelar Network — Interchain Token Service owned by the Axelar governance contract · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0xB5FB4BE02232B1bBA4dC8f81dc24C26980dE9e3C · InterchainTokenService 0xB5FB4BE02232B1bBA4dC8f81dc24C26980dE9e3C: owner() = AxelarServiceGovernance 0x7Acbae6CBa67d78AAf69e47000884aE00F9B2525; paused() = false. - bedrock-unieth-eigenpod-owner-s25 [aligned_baseline] Bedrock (uniETH) — EigenPod owned by Bedrock's restaking contract · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x926720Ae39114D0e2043b79570A1e08f00D01cCE · EigenPod 0x926720Ae39114D0e2043b79570A1e08f00D01cCE: podOwner() = the restaking proxy 0x3F4eaCeb930b0Edfa78a1DFCbaE5c5494E6e9850; restaking eigenPod() = this pod; getTotalPods() = 50. - bedrock-unieth-restaking-impl-s25 [parameter_delta] Bedrock (uniETH) — Restaking implementation differs from the one the docs list · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x3F4eaCeb930b0Edfa78a1DFCbaE5c5494E6e9850 · Restaking proxy 0x3F4eaCeb930b0Edfa78a1DFCbaE5c5494E6e9850: EIP-1967 implementation = 0x1e4D0A963953e7c08Fc7602B01e683547Fc4E518 (Sourcify match), not the documented 0x9609Af0490b96D7AdD7EEa3554b1a944ee440262; admin = ProxyAdmin 0xa5F2B6AB5B38b88Ba221741b3A189999b4c889C6. - bedrock-unieth-staking-fee-s25 [aligned_baseline] Bedrock (uniETH) — Staking commission: 10% of rewards · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x4beFa2aA9c305238AA3E0b5D17eB20C045269E9d · Staking 0x4beFa2aA9c305238AA3E0b5D17eB20C045269E9d: managerFeeShare() = 100 per mille (10%); the verified source computes fee = rewards * managerFeeShare / 1000; DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by Safe 0xAeE017052DF6Ac002647229D58B786E380B9721A. - bedrock-unieth-upgrade-admin-s25 [aligned_baseline] Bedrock (uniETH) — uniETH upgrade admin: the ProxyAdmin named in Bedrock's deployment list · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0xF1376bceF0f78459C0Ed0ba5ddce976F1ddF51F4 · uniETH 0xF1376bceF0f78459C0Ed0ba5ddce976F1ddF51F4: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0xa5F2B6AB5B38b88Ba221741b3A189999b4c889C6, owner() = Safe 0x3050620423f4dB43E1904815E898C466526387b8 (3-of-5, no guard); uniETH owner() = Safe 0xAeE017052DF6Ac002647229D58B786E380B9721A (3-of-5). - layerzero-v2-endpoint-immutable-s25 [aligned_baseline] LayerZero V2 — EndpointV2: not a proxy; its code cannot be replaced · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c · EndpointV2 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c (Ethereum; Sourcify match): EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x0 (not a proxy); the Base endpoint at the same address is also not a proxy. - layerzero-v2-endpoint-owner-onesig-s25 [aligned_baseline] LayerZero V2 — Endpoint owner: a 5-of-9 LayerZero multisig that sets default libraries · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c · EndpointV2 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fE728c: owner() = OneSig 0xBe010A7e3686FdF65E93344ab664D065A0B02478 (threshold() = 5 of totalSigners() = 9), which registers message libraries and sets default libraries and configurations without a timelock; the Base endpoint owner is OneSig 0xa0392d116D71ED3b75086194aBa6De3CD1e39B7E (5 of 9, the same signers). - layerzero-v2-eth-base-pathway-dvns-s25 [aligned_baseline] LayerZero V2 — Ethereum to Base default pathway: send and receive require the same 4 DVNs · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0xbB2Ea70C9E858123480642Cf96acbcCE1372dCe1 · SendUln302 0xbB2Ea70C9E858123480642Cf96acbcCE1372dCe1 default to Base (eid 30184): 15 confirmations, 4 required DVNs (0x380275805876Ff19055EA900CDb2B46a94ecF20D, 0x589dEDbD617e0CBcB916A9223F4d1300c294236b, 0xa4fE5A5B9A846458a70Cd0748228aED3bF65c2cd, 0xa59BA433ac34D2927232918Ef5B2eaAfcF130BA5), 0 optional; Base ReceiveUln302 0xc70AB6f32772f59fBfc23889Caf4Ba3376C84bAf default from Ethereum (eid 30101) at Base block #58641783: 15 confirmations, 4 required DVNs (0x554833698Ae0FB22ECC90B01222903fD62CA4B47, 0x9e059a54699a285714207b43B055483E78FAac25, 0xa7b5189bcA84Cd304D8553977c7C614329750d99, 0xcd37CA043f8479064e10635020c65FfC005d36f6). - railgun-fees-shield-unshield-s25 [aligned_baseline] RAILGUN — Shield and unshield fees: 0.25% each · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0xFA7093CDD9EE6932B4eb2c9e1cde7CE00B1FA4b9 · RailgunSmartWallet 0xFA7093CDD9EE6932B4eb2c9e1cde7CE00B1FA4b9: shieldFee() = 25 and unshieldFee() = 25 basis points (of 10000); treasury() = 0xE8A8B458BcD1Ececc6b6b58F80929b29cCecFF40. - railgun-governance-owner-s25 [aligned_baseline] RAILGUN — Delegator owner: the documented Protocol Request (voting) contract · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0xB6d513f6222Ee92Fff975E901bd792E2513fB53B · Delegator 0xB6d513f6222Ee92Fff975E901bd792E2513fB53B: owner() = Voting 0xc480F68A3dcC3EdD82134FAB45C14A0FcF1dA3CC (Sourcify exact match). - railgun-sponsor-window-s25 [aligned_baseline] RAILGUN — Protocol requests: a 30-day sponsorship window · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0xc480F68A3dcC3EdD82134FAB45C14A0FcF1dA3CC · Voting 0xc480F68A3dcC3EdD82134FAB45C14A0FcF1dA3CC: SPONSOR_WINDOW() = 2592000s (30 days); EXECUTION_START_OFFSET() = 604800s, EXECUTION_END_OFFSET() = 1209600s; QUORUM() = 2000000000000000000000000. - railgun-upgrade-admin-s25 [aligned_baseline] RAILGUN — Upgrades and pauses: ProxyAdmin owned by the Delegator, owned by the vote · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x4F8E20f55f879beE7Bc010Bd6bD2138B34aC65c8 · RailgunSmartWallet 0xFA7093CDD9EE6932B4eb2c9e1cde7CE00B1FA4b9: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0x4F8E20f55f879beE7Bc010Bd6bD2138B34aC65c8, owner() = Delegator 0xB6d513f6222Ee92Fff975E901bd792E2513fB53B, whose owner() is Voting 0xc480F68A3dcC3EdD82134FAB45C14A0FcF1dA3CC. - safe-singleton-core-proxy-factory-bytecode-s25 [aligned_baseline] Safe Smart Account (v1.4.1 Singleton) — SafeProxyFactory: registry code hash, no proxy and no admin · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67 · SafeProxyFactory 0x4e1DCf7AD4e460CfD30791CCC4F9c8a4f820ec67: EIP-1967 implementation and admin slots = 0x0; keccak256(runtime code) = 0x50c3cdc4…0b3317. - safe-singleton-core-safel2-locked-s25 [aligned_baseline] Safe Smart Account (v1.4.1 Singleton) — SafeL2 singleton: locked, code matches the registry · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x29fcB43b46531BcA003ddC8FCB67FFE91900C762 · SafeL2 0x29fcB43b46531BcA003ddC8FCB67FFE91900C762: getThreshold() = 1 with 0 owners (locked); VERSION() = 1.4.1; keccak256(runtime code) = 0xb1f92697…4f81ff. - safe-singleton-core-singleton-bytecode-s25 [aligned_baseline] Safe Smart Account (v1.4.1 Singleton) — Safe singleton code matches the official registry hash · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a · Safe 0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a: VERSION() = 1.4.1; keccak256(runtime code) = 0x1fe2df85…c5e1c4; EIP-1967 slots 0x0 (not a proxy). - safe-singleton-core-singleton-locked-s25 [aligned_baseline] Safe Smart Account (v1.4.1 Singleton) — Safe singleton locked: threshold 1 with no owners · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a · Safe 0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a: getThreshold() = 1 with 0 owners; setup() requires threshold 0 in the verified source, so the singleton cannot be initialized; Bedrock's Safes 0xAeE017052DF6Ac002647229D58B786E380B9721A and 0x3050620423f4dB43E1904815E898C466526387b8 use it as their singleton. - wormhole-core-ntt-eth-guardian-quorum-s25 [aligned_baseline] Wormhole Core (NTT) — Messages need 13 of the 19 guardians (guardian set 7) · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B · Wormhole core 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B: getCurrentGuardianSetIndex() = 7; getGuardianSet(7) = 19 keys, expirationTime 0; quorum(19) = 13. - wormhole-core-ntt-eth-message-fee-s25 [aligned_baseline] Wormhole Core (NTT) — Message fee: 0 (publishing is free) · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B · Wormhole core 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B: messageFee() = 0 (publishMessage requires msg.value == messageFee(), so 0 means free); TokenBridge sequence 704995. - wormhole-core-ntt-eth-upgrade-governance-s25 [aligned_baseline] Wormhole Core (NTT) — Upgrades: guardian-signed governance messages only, no admin key · Sprint 25 · block 26434786 (0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987) · target 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B · Wormhole core 0x98f3c9e6E3fAce36bAAd05FE09d375Ef1464288B: EIP-1967 implementation = 0x3c3d457f1522D3540AB3325Aa5f1864E34cBA9D0; EIP-1967 admin slot = 0x0 (no proxy admin); governanceChainId() = 1, governanceContract() = 0x04; upgrades only through submitContractUpgrade with a governance message signed by the current guardian set's quorum. - wormhole-core-ntt-guardian-quorum-base-s25 [aligned_baseline] Wormhole Core (NTT) — Base core: the same 13-of-19 guardian quorum and governance · Sprint 25 · block 58641783 (0x897856027b5df4c28b13bbc5d6d13fdd6fe8d51ecf3c23b5f5802c454f09ce58) · target 0xbebdb6C8ddC678FfA9f8748f85C815C556Dd8ac6 · Wormhole core 0xbebdb6C8ddC678FfA9f8748f85C815C556Dd8ac6 (Base, block #58641783): getGuardianSet(7) = 19 keys, expirationTime 0; quorum(19) = 13; governanceChainId() = 1; messageFee() = 0; EIP-1967 implementation 0xFc0D459b8c299095Dee743645caAc8Ed3f9aBc4d, admin slot 0x0. - centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-ops-guardian-s24 [aligned_baseline] Centrifuge V3 Root (Base) — OpsGuardian: not a ward of Root (no pause authority), run by the Ops Safe · Sprint 24 · block 58534152 (0x7b884f4d029427b5d15f71c50b128bd69ac7c6da6962ced946ca87b0b4e6e843) · target 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f · Root 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f (Base, block #58534152): wards(OpsGuardian 0x055589229506Ee89645EF08ebE9B9a863486d0dE) = 0; OpsGuardian (Sourcify match) opsSafe() = Safe 0xd21413291444C5c104F1b5918cA0D2f6EC91Ad16 (2-of-7, v1.4.1), not a ward either. - centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-protocol-guardian-s24 [aligned_baseline] Centrifuge V3 Root (Base) — ProtocolGuardian: a ward of Root, controlled by the Protocol Safe · Sprint 24 · block 58534152 (0x7b884f4d029427b5d15f71c50b128bd69ac7c6da6962ced946ca87b0b4e6e843) · target 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f · Root 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f (Base, block #58534152): wards(ProtocolGuardian 0xCEb7eD5d5B3bAD3088f6A1697738B60d829635c6) = 1; ProtocolGuardian (Sourcify match) root() = Root, safe() = Safe 0x9711730060C73Ee7Fcfe1890e8A0993858a7D225 (4-of-9, v1.4.1); the Safes are not direct wards. - centrifuge-liquidity-pools-base-root-timelock-s24 [aligned_baseline] Centrifuge V3 Root (Base) — Root timelock: 48 hours before a scheduled permission takes effect · Sprint 24 · block 58534152 (0x7b884f4d029427b5d15f71c50b128bd69ac7c6da6962ced946ca87b0b4e6e843) · target 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f · Root 0x7Ed48C31f2fdC40d37407cBaBf0870B2b688368f (Base, block #58534152; Sourcify exact match): delay() = 172800s (48 hours); paused() = false; not a proxy. - chainlink-ccip-config-owner-rbac-timelock-s24 [aligned_baseline] Chainlink CCIP — CCIP configuration owner: an RBACTimelock (Router, RMN proxy, TokenAdminRegistry, CCIPHome) · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x80226fc0Ee2b096224EeAc085Bb9a8cba1146f7D · Router 0x80226fc0Ee2b096224EeAc085Bb9a8cba1146f7D (Router 1.2.0, Sourcify match): owner() = RBACTimelock 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449 (getMinDelay() = 10800s, 3 hours, for scheduled operations), which also owns the RMN proxy 0x411dE17f12D1A34ecC7F45f49844626267c75e81, TokenAdminRegistry 0xb22764f98dD05c789929716D677382Df22C05Cb6 and CCIPHome; BYPASSER_ROLE has 1 member, ManyChainMultiSig 0x117ec8aD107976e1dBCc21717ff78407Bc36aADc, which can execute calls immediately through bypasserExecuteBatch (no schedule, no delay). - chainlink-ccip-rmn-uncurse-owner-s24 [aligned_baseline] Chainlink CCIP — RMN: uncurse is owner-only and the owner is an RBACTimelock; curse also by authorized callers · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x0B047953451A207743fB62541B21199b95190602 · RMN 0x0B047953451A207743fB62541B21199b95190602 (RMN 2.1.0, getARM() of the proxy 0x411dE17f12D1A34ecC7F45f49844626267c75e81; not verified on Sourcify): owner() = RBACTimelock 0x6608920e3F6b591EC3Cf15CA1DDf66fBE117F56A (getMinDelay() = 10800s for scheduled operations, admin = 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449; BYPASSER_ROLE has 1 member, 0x8C00Cc7cC37396e88BbFe66371341a59D1b5771F, which can execute calls immediately through bypasserExecuteBatch, no delay); isCursed() = false; 2 authorized curse callers. - chainlink-ccip-timelock-proposers-s24 [parameter_delta] Chainlink CCIP — Timelock proposers: a 6-of-12 Safe besides the ManyChainMultiSigs (docs: all proposals from an MCMS) · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449 · RBACTimelock 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449: getRoleMemberCount(PROPOSER_ROLE) = 3: ManyChainMultiSig 0xE53289F32c8E690b7173aA33affE9B6B0CB0012F (the MCMS the docs link), GnosisSafeProxy 0xD6597750bf74DCAEC57e0F9aD2ec998D837005bf (Safe v1.3.0, 6-of-12; also a canceller) and ManyChainMultiSig 0xD9757aA52907798d1aF2FDa7A6C0cC733E5aCf7e. - chainlink-ccip-token-admin-registry-owner-s24 [aligned_baseline] Chainlink CCIP — CCIP Directory addresses resolve on-chain; TokenAdminRegistry owned by the RBACTimelock · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0xb22764f98dD05c789929716D677382Df22C05Cb6 · TokenAdminRegistry 0xb22764f98dD05c789929716D677382Df22C05Cb6 (TokenAdminRegistry 1.5.0, Sourcify match): owner() = RBACTimelock 0x44835bBBA9D40DEDa9b64858095EcFB2693c9449; Router 0x80226fc0Ee2b096224EeAc085Bb9a8cba1146f7D.getArmProxy() = 0x411dE17f12D1A34ecC7F45f49844626267c75e81. - obol-network-governance-timelock-delay-s24 [aligned_baseline] Obol Network — Governance timelock: 5 days between a passed proposal and execution · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0xCdBf527842Ab04Da548d33EB09d03DB831381Fb0 · TimelockController 0xCdBf527842Ab04Da548d33EB09d03DB831381Fb0 (Sourcify exact match): getMinDelay() = 432000s (5 days); ObolGovernor 0xcB1622185A0c62A80494bEde05Ba95ef29Fbf85c holds PROPOSER, EXECUTOR and CANCELLER; DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by the timelock itself and by 0x02b5D1Fd67246c0513223D320901474aA20Bf973, not by the Governor. - obol-network-governor-thresholds-s24 [aligned_baseline] Obol Network — Governor: 30,000 OBOL proposal threshold, 0.84% quorum · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0xcB1622185A0c62A80494bEde05Ba95ef29Fbf85c · ObolGovernor 0xcB1622185A0c62A80494bEde05Ba95ef29Fbf85c (Sourcify exact match): proposalThreshold() = 30,000 OBOL; quorumNumerator() / quorumDenominator() = 84 / 10000 (0.84%); votingDelay() = 7200 blocks, votingPeriod() = 36000 blocks; timelock() = 0xCdBf527842Ab04Da548d33EB09d03DB831381Fb0. - obol-network-stobol-withdraw-delay-s24 [aligned_baseline] Obol Network — stOBOL unstaking: no withdrawal delay (WithdrawGate delay 0) · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x4094C8D36e40795Ca25BFe9451f158D30614666A · WithdrawGate 0x4094C8D36e40795Ca25BFe9451f158D30614666A (Sourcify exact match): delay() = 0s (DELAY_MAX() = 2592000s); owner() = Safe 0x7E90E03654732ABedF89Faf87f05BcD03ACEeFdC (1-of-2, v1.4.1). - obol-network-token-supply-cap-s24 [parameter_delta] Obol Network — OBOL supply: documented cap of 500M, no cap on-chain; a 2-of-3 Safe holds MINTER_ROLE · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7 · ObolToken 0x0B010000b7624eb9B3DfBC279673C76E9D29D5F7 (Sourcify exact match): totalSupply() = 500000000000000103303500000 (500,000,000.0000001033035 OBOL); mint() has no supply cap; MINTER_ROLE and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by Safe 0x42D201CC4d9C1e31c032397F54caCE2f48C1FA72 (2-of-3, v1.3.0), not by the timelock. - steakhouse-financial-ethereum-steakusdc-guardian-aragon-s24 [aligned_baseline] Steakhouse Financial (Ethereum) — steakUSDC guardian: its own Aragon DAO (steakusdc-guardian.dao.eth), as announced · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB · steakUSDC 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB (MetaMorpho, Sourcify exact match): guardian() = 0xaa0500198B4425DfC4E272FbE42C8E64E21fc03d, the Aragon DAO that steakusdc-guardian.dao.eth resolves to; no pending guardian; steakUSDT 0xbEef047a543E45807105E51A8BBEFCc5950fcfBa and steakPYUSD 0xbEEF02e5E13584ab96848af90261f0C8Ee04722a have their own guardian DAOs (0xaeC761545Fd135db6d04D27C92BCB3951668c67F, 0xCcFd0E9CEC732fb839fadDeCc72B6154530bC90f). - steakhouse-financial-ethereum-steakusdc-guardian-vote-1d-s24 [aligned_baseline] Steakhouse Financial (Ethereum) — steakUSDC guardian DAO: 1-day voting window; settings, plugin upgrade and root permissions revoked · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x79864900a4d34fb7907De9fe404758de5a4956dE · steakUSDC guardian token-voting plugin 0x79864900a4d34fb7907De9fe404758de5a4956dE: minDuration() = 86400s (1 day), dao() = 0xaa0500198B4425DfC4E272FbE42C8E64E21fc03d; UPDATE_VOTING_SETTINGS, UPGRADE_PLUGIN, ROOT and UPGRADE_DAO permissions read false on the steakUSDC, steakUSDT and steakPYUSD guardian DAOs. - steakhouse-financial-ethereum-steakusdc-timelock-7d-s24 [aligned_baseline] Steakhouse Financial (Ethereum) — Vault timelock: 7 days (steakUSDC, steakUSDT, steakPYUSD) · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB · steakUSDC 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB: timelock() = 604800s (7 days), no pending timelock change; steakUSDT 0xbEef047a543E45807105E51A8BBEFCc5950fcfBa and steakPYUSD 0xbEEF02e5E13584ab96848af90261f0C8Ee04722a: timelock() = 604800s. - steakhouse-financial-ethereum-vaults-owner-safe-5-of-10-s24 [aligned_baseline] Steakhouse Financial (Ethereum) — Vault owner: one Safe with a quorum of five keys (5-of-10) · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x0A0e559bc3b0950a7e448F0d4894db195b9cf8DD · Owner Safe 0x0A0e559bc3b0950a7e448F0d4894db195b9cf8DD: getThreshold() = 5, getOwners() = 10 owners (Safe v1.4.1, no guard); owner() of steakUSDC 0xBEEF01735c132Ada46AA9aA4c54623cAA92A64CB, steakUSDT 0xbEef047a543E45807105E51A8BBEFCc5950fcfBa and steakPYUSD 0xbEEF02e5E13584ab96848af90261f0C8Ee04722a; curator() of all three = Safe 0x827e86072B06674a077f592A531dcE4590aDeCdB (3-of-9). - synthetix-v3-core-account-owner-s24 [aligned_baseline] Synthetix V3 Core — Account NFT (AccountProxy) owner: the CoreProxy, not a key or Safe · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x0E429603D3Cb1DFae4E6F52Add5fE82d96d77Dac · AccountProxy 0x0E429603D3Cb1DFae4E6F52Add5fE82d96d77Dac: owner() = CoreProxy 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847; nominatedOwner() = 0x0. - synthetix-v3-core-oracle-owner-s24 [aligned_baseline] Synthetix V3 Core — Price-oracle manager (OracleManagerProxy) owner: the pDAO 4-of-7 Safe directly · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x0aaF300E148378489a8A471DD3e9E53E30cb42e3 · OracleManagerProxy 0x0aaF300E148378489a8A471DD3e9E53E30cb42e3: owner() = Safe 0xEb3107117FEAd7de89Cd14D463D340A2E6917769 (4-of-7); nominatedOwner() = 0x0. - synthetix-v3-core-owner-s24 [aligned_baseline] Synthetix V3 Core — CoreProxy owner (upgrades and administration): the pDAO Safe, as listed · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847 · CoreProxy 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847 (Sourcify exact match): owner() = Safe 0xEb3107117FEAd7de89Cd14D463D340A2E6917769 (4-of-7, v1.3.0; pDAO); nominatedOwner() = 0x0; implementation 0x58ce7364744e59402B3672D3Cf3Bb415a12441cD. - synthetix-v3-core-usd-owner-s24 [aligned_baseline] Synthetix V3 Core — snxUSD stablecoin (USDProxy) owner: the CoreProxy · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0xb2F30A7C980f052f02563fb518dcc39e6bf38175 · USDProxy 0xb2F30A7C980f052f02563fb518dcc39e6bf38175: owner() = CoreProxy 0xffffffaEff0B96Ea8e4f94b2253f31abdD875847; nominatedOwner() = 0x0. - uniswap-v4-poolmanager-owner-timelock-s24 [aligned_baseline] Uniswap V4 — Owner: the 2-day governance Timelock run by GovernorBravo · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 · PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 (Sourcify match): owner() = Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC: delay() = 172800s (2 days) = MINIMUM_DELAY(), admin() = GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3. - uniswap-v4-poolmanager-protocol-fee-controller-base-s24 [aligned_baseline] Uniswap V4 — Base pools: fees routed to the listed Base V4FeeAdapter (chain 8453) · Sprint 24 · block 58534152 (0x7b884f4d029427b5d15f71c50b128bd69ac7c6da6962ced946ca87b0b4e6e843) · target 0x498581fF718922c3f8e6A244956aF099B2652b2b · PoolManager 0x498581fF718922c3f8e6A244956aF099B2652b2b (Base, block #58534152): protocolFeeController() = V4FeeAdapter 0xc53DD825dedBE7814562528A1A30e8e5BCbB4b55 (POOL_MANAGER() = this PoolManager, TOKEN_JAR() = 0x9bD25e67bF390437C8fAF480AC735a27BcF6168c); owner() of the PoolManager and the adapter = 0x31FAfd4889FA1269F7a13A66eE0fB458f27D72A9, whose stored L1 owner is the Ethereum Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC. - uniswap-v4-poolmanager-protocol-fee-controller-eth-s24 [aligned_baseline] Uniswap V4 — Ethereum pools: fees routed to the listed V4FeeAdapter · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90 · PoolManager 0x000000000004444c5dc75cB358380D2e3dE08A90: protocolFeeController() = V4FeeAdapter 0x89A5D5bF00a27D55c02951E49078a5C5771051dB (Sourcify exact match): POOL_MANAGER() = this PoolManager, TOKEN_JAR() = 0xf38521f130fcCF29dB1961597bc5d2B60F995f85, policy() = 0x1cd822b70a0591420F65E94b9B3A0D0b0fB3a314. - uniswap-v4-v4feeadapter-owner-timelock-s24 [aligned_baseline] Uniswap V4 — Who sets v4 protocol fees: the Timelock as owner and feeSetter · Sprint 24 · block 26433001 (0xa058ec92ccf0024822a76097f183d8e2d344d56e9539038c857e0cdaaa0ee5a7) · target 0x89A5D5bF00a27D55c02951E49078a5C5771051dB · V4FeeAdapter 0x89A5D5bF00a27D55c02951E49078a5C5771051dB: feeSetter() = owner() = Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC; its fee policy 0x1cd822b70a0591420F65E94b9B3A0D0b0fB3a314 has owner() = feeSetter() = the Timelock. - circle-usdc-base-owner-role-assignment-s23 [aligned_baseline] Circle USDC — USDC (Base) roles: owner, masterMinter, pauser and blacklister are single administrator addresses, as documented · Sprint 23 · block 58422815 (0x5aced8e0d59eebe168d9dc8778d0305063a1a02f9ffd264774cbd75b3b979a51) · target 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 · USDC 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (Base, block #58422815): owner() = 0x3ABd6f64A422225E61E435baE41db12096106df7, pauser() = 0xD3571B3bc51CECFf49194AD67aFFFC648d5e07b4, blacklister() = 0x1f2e3A640175d20ac31ed523B6733B977173E277 (no contract code); masterMinter() = MasterMinter 0x2230393EDAD0299b7E7B59F20AA856cD1bEd52e1, whose owner() is 0xb5bff84d169a72e76e94eC950da51Bac90b60284 (no code); rescuer() = 0x0; paused() = false; version() = 2. - circle-usdc-base-proxy-admin-upgrade-key-s23 [aligned_baseline] Circle USDC — USDC (Base) upgrades: a single proxy admin address switches the implementation, as documented · Sprint 23 · block 58422815 (0x5aced8e0d59eebe168d9dc8778d0305063a1a02f9ffd264774cbd75b3b979a51) · target 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 · USDC FiatTokenProxy 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 (Base, block #58422815): admin slot keccak256('org.zeppelinos.proxy.admin') = 0x4fc7850364958d97B4d3f5A08f79db2493f8cA44 (no contract code: no timelock or multisig contract in front of upgrades); implementation FiatTokenV2_2 0x2Ce6311ddAE708829bc0784C967b7d77D19FD779 (Sourcify exact match). - circle-usdc-eth-owner-role-assignment-s23 [aligned_baseline] Circle USDC — USDC (Ethereum) roles: owner, masterMinter, pauser and blacklister are single administrator addresses, as documented · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 · USDC 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 (Ethereum, block #26431152): owner() = 0xFcb19e6a322b27c06842A71e8c725399f049AE3a, pauser() = 0x4914f61d25e5C567143774B76EdbF4D5109a8566, blacklister() = 0x0A06BE16275B95a7d2567fBdAE118b36C7DA78F9 (no contract code); masterMinter() = MasterMinter 0xE982615d461DD5cD06575BbeA87624fda4e3de17, whose owner() is 0xC1d9fe41D19Dd52cb3Ae5d1D3b0030B5D498c704 (no code); rescuer() = 0x0; paused() = false; version() = 2. - circle-usdc-eth-proxy-admin-upgrade-key-s23 [aligned_baseline] Circle USDC — USDC (Ethereum) upgrades: a single proxy admin address switches the implementation, as documented · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 · USDC FiatTokenProxy 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 (Ethereum, block #26431152): admin slot keccak256('org.zeppelinos.proxy.admin') = 0x807a96288A1A408dBC13DE2b1d087d10356395d2 (no contract code: no timelock or multisig contract in front of upgrades); implementation FiatTokenV2_2 0x43506849D7C04F9138D1A2050bbF3A0c054402dd (Sourcify match). - frax-usd-frxusd-admin-upgrades-1d-timelock-s23 [aligned_baseline] Frax USD (frxUSD) — frxUSD upgrades: ProxyAdmin owned by a 1-day timelock run by the 4-of-7 Frax Safe · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29 · frxUSD 0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0x0b2C3dF006b2bd43cBCC60075e7a0bf314474eD6, owner() = Timelock 0xb898Ad2976b4d8f2E21521C9db16b7497825E503 (Sourcify exact match): delay() = 86400s (1 day), admin() = Safe 0xfFFffF4F3baC444b2C0ecf2A1840d018bE783937 (4-of-7, v1.3.0); frxUSD owner() is the same Safe directly. - frax-usd-frxusd-amo-timelock-msig-3of6-s23 [aligned_baseline] Frax USD (frxUSD) — AMO Timelock (msig): a 3-of-6 Safe, as listed · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x831822660572bd54ebaa065C2acef662a6277D40 · AMO Timelock (msig) 0x831822660572bd54ebaa065C2acef662a6277D40: Safe getThreshold() = 3, getOwners() = 6 owners (v1.3.0, no modules); a multisig with no delay of its own. - frax-usd-sfrxusd-proxyadmin-safe-3of5-s23 [aligned_baseline] Frax USD (frxUSD) — sfrxUSD upgrades: ProxyAdmin owned directly by the 3-of-5 Frax Safe (no timelock) · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0xcf62F905562626CfcDD2261162a51fd02Fc9c5b6 · sfrxUSD 0xcf62F905562626CfcDD2261162a51fd02Fc9c5b6: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0xeA0a6EC8114a0Af6Cf74Ca0036Ab31d892Df13cB, owner() = Safe 0xB1748C79709f4Ba2Dd82834B8c82D4a505003f27 (3-of-5, v1.3.0; no timelock); timelockAddress() = Safe 0x4b45D73b83686e69d08E61105FdB7F7b51f41Bc1 (3-of-6, v1.4.1); asset() = frxUSD 0xCAcd6fd266aF91b8AeD52aCCc382b4e165586E29. - paypal-usd-pyusd-pause-asset-protection-single-owner-role-s23 [aligned_baseline] PayPal USD (PYUSD) — Pause and asset-protection roles: one address without contract code, as documented · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8 · PYUSD 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8: defaultAdmin() = owner() = 0x3Af3e85f4f97De7AD0f000B724Fb77fE5ffc024B (no contract code), holding PAUSE_ROLE, ASSET_PROTECTION_ROLE and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (roles not enumerable); defaultAdminDelay() = 10800s (3 hours); no pending default admin; paused() = false. - paypal-usd-pyusd-proxy-admin-upgrade-key-s23 [aligned_baseline] PayPal USD (PYUSD) — Upgrades: AdminUpgradeabilityProxy with a separate proxy admin address · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8 · PYUSD 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8: admin slot keccak256('org.zeppelinos.proxy.admin') = 0xC94BcF6e1d8B3558E3B62e743630D50497E3851C (no contract code), distinct from the default admin 0x3Af3e85f4f97De7AD0f000B724Fb77fE5ffc024B; AdminUpgradeabilityProxy (Sourcify match); implementation PYUSD 0x8C35CaA5FD5bDC64b6B11344aD57594A3676256a (Sourcify exact match). - paypal-usd-pyusd-supply-control-contract-s23 [aligned_baseline] PayPal USD (PYUSD) — Supply: minting and burning through the separately deployed SupplyControl contract · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8 · PYUSD 0x6c3ea9036406852006290770BEdFcAbA0e23A0e8: supplyControl() = SupplyControl 0x31d9bDEa6F104606C954f8FE6ba614F1BD347Ec3 (ERC-1967 proxy, implementation 0xFaB5891ED867a1195303251912013b92c4fc3a1D); getAllSupplyControllerAddresses() lists 5 supply controllers; SupplyControl defaultAdmin() = 0x3Af3e85f4f97De7AD0f000B724Fb77fE5ffc024B, holding SUPPLY_CONTROLLER_MANAGER_ROLE. - reserve-eusd-long-freeze-1-week-s23 [aligned_baseline] Reserve Protocol (eUSD RToken) — Long freeze: 1 week, the documented default · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x7697aE4dEf3C3Cd52493Ba3a6F57fc6d8c59108a · eUSD Main 0x7697aE4dEf3C3Cd52493Ba3a6F57fc6d8c59108a (eUSD 0xA0d69E286B938e21CBf7E51D71F6A4c8918f482F.main()): longFreeze() = 604800s (1 week); frozen() = false. - reserve-eusd-short-freeze-3-days-s23 [aligned_baseline] Reserve Protocol (eUSD RToken) — Short freeze: 3 days, the documented default · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x7697aE4dEf3C3Cd52493Ba3a6F57fc6d8c59108a · eUSD Main 0x7697aE4dEf3C3Cd52493Ba3a6F57fc6d8c59108a (eUSD 0xA0d69E286B938e21CBf7E51D71F6A4c8918f482F.main()): shortFreeze() = 259200s (3 days); tradingPaused() = issuancePaused() = false. - reserve-eusd-unstaking-delay-2-weeks-s23 [aligned_baseline] Reserve Protocol (eUSD RToken) — RSR unstaking delay: 2 weeks; withdrawal leak 5% (documented mainnet defaults) · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x18ba6e33ceb80f077DEb9260c9111e62f21aE7B8 · eUSD StRSR 0x18ba6e33ceb80f077DEb9260c9111e62f21aE7B8: unstakingDelay() = 1209600s (2 weeks); withdrawalLeak() = 50000000000000000 (5%); rewardRatio() = 1069666666666 (default 1146076687500; inside the documented 1e11-1e14 range). - tether-usdt-owner-multisig-3of6-s23 [aligned_baseline] Tether USDT — Owner: a 3-of-6 MultiSigWallet (multi-signature authorization) · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7 · TetherToken 0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7: getOwner() = owner() = MultiSigWallet 0xC6CDE7C39eB2f0F0095F41570af89eFC2C1Ea828 (Sourcify match): required() = 3, getOwners() = 6 owners (transactionCount() = 5848). - tether-usdt-token-live-blacklist-under-owner-s23 [aligned_baseline] Tether USDT — Token live (not deprecated); blacklisting, pausing and deprecation sit with the owner multisig · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7 · TetherToken 0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7: deprecated() = false, upgradedAddress() = 0x0, paused() = false, basisPointsRate() = 0, maximumFee() = 0; addBlackList / destroyBlackFunds, pause and deprecate are onlyOwner (the 3-of-6 MultiSigWallet 0xC6CDE7C39eB2f0F0095F41570af89eFC2C1Ea828; no timelock) (Sourcify match). - uniswap-governance-quorum-40m-uni-s23 [aligned_baseline] Uniswap V3 & Governance Timelock — Quorum: 40M UNI · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3 · GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3: quorumVotes() = 40,000,000 UNI (40000000000000000000000000); proposalThreshold() = 1,000,000 UNI; timelock() = 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC. - uniswap-governance-timelock-delay-2d-s23 [aligned_baseline] Uniswap V3 & Governance Timelock — Timelock: 2 days before execution · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC · Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC: delay() = 172800s (2 days) = MINIMUM_DELAY(); GRACE_PERIOD() = 1209600s; admin() = GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3. - uniswap-governance-v3-factory-owner-timelock-s23 [aligned_baseline] Uniswap V3 & Governance Timelock — UniswapV3Factory owner: a fee adapter owned by the governance Timelock · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984 · UniswapV3Factory 0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984: owner() = 0xf2371551Fe3937Db7c750f4DfABe5c2fFFdcBf5A (V3OpenFeeAdapter, Sourcify exact match), whose owner() = Timelock 0x1a9C8182C09F50C8318d769245beA52c32BE35BC (delay 172800s) and FACTORY() = this factory. - uniswap-governance-voting-period-40320-blocks-s23 [parameter_delta] Uniswap V3 & Governance Timelock — Voting period: 40,320 blocks (~5.6 days at 12-second slots), not 7 days · Sprint 23 · block 26431152 (0xfe2ed4e127f30bb42dd30c6fc1460a82d8438cff3a717ec89210805e55199a46) · target 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3 · GovernorBravoDelegator 0x408ED6354d4973f66138C91495F2f2FCbd8724C3: votingPeriod() = 40320 blocks = 483,840s (5.6 days) at 12-second slots; votingDelay() = 13140 blocks (~1.83 days). - across-protocol-hubpool-abt-proposer-allowlist-s22 [aligned_baseline] Across Protocol (HubPool) — Root-bundle proposals: only allow-listed ABT proposers · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xee1DC6BCF1Ee967a350e9aC6CaaAA236109002ea · Across Bond Token 0xee1DC6BCF1Ee967a350e9aC6CaaAA236109002ea (Sourcify exact match): proposers(0xf7bAc63fc7CEaCf0589F25454Ecf5C2ce904997c, the current root-bundle proposer) = true, proposers(address(0)) = false; hubPool() = HubPool 0xc186fA914353c44b2E33eBE05f21846F1048bEda; owner() = the HubPool owner Safe 0xB524735356985D2f267FA010D681f061DfF03715. - across-protocol-hubpool-bond-045-abt-s22 [aligned_baseline] Across Protocol (HubPool) — Root-bundle bond: 0.45 ABT · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xc186fA914353c44b2E33eBE05f21846F1048bEda · HubPool 0xc186fA914353c44b2E33eBE05f21846F1048bEda: bondAmount() = 450000000000000000 (0.45 ABT); bondToken() = Across Bond Token 0xee1DC6BCF1Ee967a350e9aC6CaaAA236109002ea; liveness() = 1800s; paused() = false; owner() = Safe 0xB524735356985D2f267FA010D681f061DfF03715 (3-of-5, v1.3.0); not a proxy (Sourcify match). - beefy-finance-base-fee-config-owner-dev-multisig-s22 [aligned_baseline] Beefy Finance (Base) — BeefyFeeConfig owner: the 3-of-6 dev multisig · Sprint 22 · block 58315414 (0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd) · target 0xfc69704cC3cAac545cC7577009Ea4AA04F1a61Eb · BeefyFeeConfig 0xfc69704cC3cAac545cC7577009Ea4AA04F1a61Eb: owner() = dev multisig 0x6FfaCA7C3B38Ec2d631D86e15f328ee6eF6C6226 (3-of-6 Safe, v1.3.0, no modules); transparent proxy (Sourcify exact match), implementation 0xAb35d11199216c7F7368080Cf41beD8f3AbBc4E4, EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0x2b0C9702A4724f2BFe7922DB92c4082098533c62. - beefy-finance-base-strategy-owner-timelock-6h-s22 [aligned_baseline] Beefy Finance (Base) — Strategy owner and upgrades: 6-hour timelock · Sprint 22 · block 58315414 (0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd) · target 0x3B60F7f25b09E71356cdFFC6475c222A466a2AC9 · strategyOwner timelock 0x3B60F7f25b09E71356cdFFC6475c222A466a2AC9: getMinDelay() = 21600s (6 hours); the dev multisig 0x6FfaCA7C3B38Ec2d631D86e15f328ee6eF6C6226 holds PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE; the timelock is its own admin; it owns the FeeConfig's ProxyAdmin 0x2b0C9702A4724f2BFe7922DB92c4082098533c62 (Sourcify exact match). - beefy-finance-base-vault-owner-timelock-zero-delay-s22 [parameter_delta] Beefy Finance (Base) — Vault owner timelock: no delay (0 seconds) · Sprint 22 · block 58315414 (0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd) · target 0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309 · vaultOwner timelock 0x09D19184F46A32213DF06b981122e06882B61309: getMinDelay() = 0s; the dev multisig 0x6FfaCA7C3B38Ec2d631D86e15f328ee6eF6C6226 holds PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE, so an operation it schedules can execute in the same block; the timelock is its own admin (Sourcify exact match). - liquity-v1-lusd-collateral-ratios-110-150-s22 [aligned_baseline] Liquity V1 (LUSD) — Liquidation thresholds: 110% minimum, 150% in Recovery Mode · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2 · TroveManager 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2: MCR() = 1100000000000000000 (110%), CCR() = 1500000000000000000 (150%); compile-time constants of a contract with no owner and no proxy. - liquity-v1-lusd-core-ownership-renounced-s22 [aligned_baseline] Liquity V1 (LUSD) — No admin: ownership renounced on every core contract, no proxies · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2 · TroveManager 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2: owner() = 0x0; BorrowerOperations 0x24179CD81c9e782A4096035f7eC97fB8B783e007, StabilityPool 0x66017D22b0f8556afDd19FC67041899Eb65a21bb, ActivePool, DefaultPool, PriceFeed, SortedTroves, CollSurplusPool, LQTYStaking, CommunityIssuance and HintHelpers also report owner() = 0x0; none of them, nor the LUSD 0x5f98805A4E8be255a32880FDeC7F6728C6568bA0 or LQTY token, has an EIP-1967 implementation or admin slot set. - liquity-v1-lusd-fee-floors-and-min-debt-s22 [aligned_baseline] Liquity V1 (LUSD) — Fees: borrowing 0.5%-5%, redemption floor 0.5%; minimum debt 2,000 LUSD · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2 · TroveManager 0xA39739EF8b0231DbFA0DcdA07d7e29faAbCf4bb2: BORROWING_FEE_FLOOR() = 5000000000000000 (0.5%), MAX_BORROWING_FEE() = 50000000000000000 (5%), REDEMPTION_FEE_FLOOR() = 5000000000000000 (0.5%); MIN_NET_DEBT() = 1800 LUSD + LUSD_GAS_COMPENSATION() = 200 LUSD. - resupply-core-voter-execution-delay-1d-s22 [aligned_baseline] Resupply — On-chain governance: the Voter executes as Core after a 1-day delay · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d · Core 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d: voter() = Voter 0x11111111063874cE8dC6232cb5C1C849359476E6 (owner() = core() = Core); Voter executionDelay() = 86400s (1 day), votingPeriod() = 604800s (1 week), quorumPct() = 3000 of MAX_PCT 10000 (30%), minCreateProposalPct() = 100 (1%), EXECUTION_DEADLINE() = 1814400s (3 weeks). - resupply-guardian-role-main-multisig-s22 [aligned_baseline] Resupply — Emergency guardian role: the main multisig, through a Core-owned operator proxy · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xA4745e0B1F40ab3DCFD98F381835De591a8974E3 · Guardian operator proxy 0xA4745e0B1F40ab3DCFD98F381835De591a8974E3: guardian() = Main Multisig 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6; owner() = Core 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d; ERC-1967 proxy with implementation GuardianUpgradeable 0x74C85620F1459862834A947dB9441911BCEBF066 (Sourcify match). The Treasury Manager operator proxy 0x4CF97a55d58Aad14C493A46C8151a0BFffb10403: manager() = the same multisig, owner() = Core. - resupply-main-multisig-3of5-s22 [parameter_delta] Resupply — Main multisig: 3-of-5 signers · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6 · Main Multisig 0xFE11a5009f2121622271e7dd0FD470264e076af6: 3-of-5 (getThreshold() = 3, getOwners() = 5 owners; Safe v1.4.1, no modules). - resupply-registry-owned-by-core-s22 [aligned_baseline] Resupply — Registry owner: Core (changes only through governance) · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0x10101010E0C3171D894B71B3400668aF311e7D94 · Registry 0x10101010E0C3171D894B71B3400668aF311e7D94: owner() = core() = Core 0xc07e000044F95655c11fda4cD37F70A94d7e0a7d; the Voter 0x11111111063874cE8dC6232cb5C1C849359476E6 and both operator proxies also report owner() = Core. - stake-dao-protocol-timelock-min-delay-5d-s22 [protective_delta] Stake DAO — Protocol changes wait 5 days, longer than the documented 48 hours · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a · ProtocolTimelock 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a: getMinDelay() = 432000s (5 days). It owns the ProtocolController 0x2d8BcE1FaE00a959354aCD9eBf9174337A64d4fb; the Governance Safe 0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765 holds PROPOSER_ROLE; OpenZeppelin TimelockController (Sourcify exact match). - stake-dao-timelock-executor-permissioned-s22 [parameter_delta] Stake DAO — Executing queued changes: permissioned (EXECUTOR_ROLE held by the governance multisig), not permissionless · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a · ProtocolTimelock 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a: hasRole(EXECUTOR_ROLE, address(0)) = false, so execution is permissioned, not permissionless; the Governance Safe 0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765 (3-of-5, Safe v1.3.0, 3 modules enabled) holds EXECUTOR_ROLE, PROPOSER_ROLE, CANCELLER_ROLE and GUARDIAN_ROLE; the timelock is its own admin and does not hold EXECUTOR_ROLE (AccessControl without enumeration: other holders are not excluded). - stake-dao-timelock-owns-protocol-controller-s22 [aligned_baseline] Stake DAO — ProtocolController owner: the ProtocolTimelock · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0x2d8BcE1FaE00a959354aCD9eBf9174337A64d4fb · ProtocolController 0x2d8BcE1FaE00a959354aCD9eBf9174337A64d4fb: owner() = ProtocolTimelock 0xb27afc7844988948FBd6210AeF4E1362bC2d8E6a; pendingOwner() = 0; not a proxy (Sourcify exact match); the timelock's protocolController() is this contract. - stake-dao-treasury-safe-3of5-s22 [parameter_delta] Stake DAO — Treasury wallet (Ethereum): a 3-of-5 multisig · Sprint 22 · block 26429396 (0x3fb83aa053c26ac6b98d634858da1b3c23bb65bae7a12f8f14d72d8273e16d71) · target 0xF930EBBd05eF8b25B1797b9b2109DDC9B0d43063 · Treasury Safe 0xF930EBBd05eF8b25B1797b9b2109DDC9B0d43063: 3-of-5 (getThreshold() = 3, getOwners() = 5 owners; Safe v1.3.0, no modules), the same five signers as the Governance Safe 0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765. - yo-protocol-approval-registry-owner-admin-safe-s22 [parameter_delta] YO Protocol — Approval Registry owner: the Admin Multisig directly, not the 48-hour timelock · Sprint 22 · block 58315414 (0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd) · target 0xB4b3F5C964A360bBd7201f72a55D0c48B8aD7021 · YoApprovalRegistry 0xB4b3F5C964A360bBd7201f72a55D0c48B8aD7021: owner() = YO Admin Multisig 0x67b6F699F1c8040414032a3C2C88a54db144FCd2 (4-of-6 Safe, v1.4.1, no modules), not the YO Timelock 0x38cE5e45D0f5d03E83863bb19B3b1A272C186F48; pendingOwner() = 0; not a proxy (Sourcify exact match). It is the approvalRegistry() of yoETH 0x3A43AEC53490CB9Fa922847385D82fe25d0E9De7 and yoUSD 0x0000000f2eB9f69274678c76222B35eEc7588a65; the Pool, BridgeRoute, MorphoMarket, SwapPair and ERC4626Vault registries are also owned directly by the Admin Multisig. - yo-protocol-timelock-48h-admin-multisig-s22 [aligned_baseline] YO Protocol — Upgrade timelock: 48 hours, scheduled by the 4-of-6 Admin Multisig · Sprint 22 · block 58315414 (0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd) · target 0x38cE5e45D0f5d03E83863bb19B3b1A272C186F48 · YO Timelock 0x38cE5e45D0f5d03E83863bb19B3b1A272C186F48: getMinDelay() = 172800s (48 hours); the YO Admin Multisig 0x67b6F699F1c8040414032a3C2C88a54db144FCd2 (4-of-6) holds PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE; the timelock is its own admin (Sourcify match). - yo-protocol-vault-upgrades-behind-timelock-s22 [aligned_baseline] YO Protocol — yoETH and yoUSD upgrades: ProxyAdmins owned by the YO Timelock · Sprint 22 · block 58315414 (0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd) · target 0xd460CF1f5D764acAD1c3276c549EE5f1BB671473 · yoETH 0x3A43AEC53490CB9Fa922847385D82fe25d0E9De7: EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin 0xd460CF1f5D764acAD1c3276c549EE5f1BB671473, owner() = YO Timelock 0x38cE5e45D0f5d03E83863bb19B3b1A272C186F48; yoUSD 0x0000000f2eB9f69274678c76222B35eEc7588a65: ProxyAdmin 0x12E81209d180fF0b3FBFbfe8fA9fFdb5990e1073, owner() = the same Timelock; both use implementation 0xc84a6E01BFF58996540F1ABC22355A9DFE0d78DC; the vaults' owner() is the Admin Multisig 0x67b6F699F1c8040414032a3C2C88a54db144FCd2. - aerodrome-finance-base-emergency-council-migration-s21 [parameter_delta] Aerodrome Finance (Base) — Voter emergency council and epoch governor: the AerodromeMigration contract · Sprint 21 · block 58203774 (0x619b45ca763563ff11fc3246da1d039a7d0ab2780bedff6cb0428c9290a2cb10) · target 0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5 · Voter 0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5: emergencyCouncil() = epochGovernor() = AerodromeMigration 0x22a2F7340a3fB4C7C389D91eE954766B12476721 (Sourcify match; MIGRATION_OPEN() = 1792620000), owned by Safe 0x42255e3C2d0b71a0b006243148fdF1a71d054cE0 (3-of-7, v1.5.0, the same 7 signers as the governor Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075). - aerodrome-finance-base-poolfactory-max-fee-3pct-s21 [aligned_baseline] Aerodrome Finance (Base) — Custom pool fee cap: 3%; pauser and fee manager: the 3-of-7 Safe · Sprint 21 · block 58203774 (0x619b45ca763563ff11fc3246da1d039a7d0ab2780bedff6cb0428c9290a2cb10) · target 0x420DD381b31aEf6683db6B902084cB0FFECe40Da · PoolFactory 0x420DD381b31aEf6683db6B902084cB0FFECe40Da: MAX_FEE() = 300 (3.00%), stableFee() = 5, volatileFee() = 30 (basis points); pauser() = feeManager() = Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075 (3-of-7, v1.3.0, no modules), also the Voter governor() and the FactoryRegistry 0x5C3F18F06CC09CA1910767A34a20F771039E37C0 owner(); isPaused() = false. - balancer-v2-vault-timelock-authorizer-admin-dao-multisig-s21 [aligned_baseline] Balancer V2 Vault & TimelockAuthorizer — Authorizer DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: the 6-of-11 DAO Multi-sig · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 · Authorizer 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 (the getActualAuthorizer() of the Vault's AuthorizerWithAdaptorValidation 0x6048A8c631Fb7e77EcA533Cf9C29784e482391e7): getRoleMemberCount(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) = 1, member 0 = DAO Multi-sig 0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f, a 6-of-11 Safe (v1.1.1, no modules). - balancer-v2-vault-timelock-vault-immutable-pause-expired-s21 [aligned_baseline] Balancer V2 Vault & TimelockAuthorizer — Vault: not a proxy; pause window ended · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0xBA12222222228d8Ba445958a75a0704d566BF2C8 · Vault 0xBA12222222228d8Ba445958a75a0704d566BF2C8: getPausedState() = (false, 1626633407, 1629225407) - the pause window and buffer period ended before the pin; EIP-1967 implementation and admin slots empty. - coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth-oracle-exchange-rate-updater-s21 [aligned_baseline] Coinbase Wrapped Staked ETH — Exchange-rate oracle: the rate-limited ExchangeRateUpdater · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704 · cbETH 0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704: oracle() = ExchangeRateUpdater 0x9b37180d847B27ADC13C2277299045C1237Ae281 (Sourcify exact match), whose owner() is an externally owned account 0xA57aFe0Ba93f6854ed1DCd58dCE301E10B15D1D6. - coinbase-wrapped-staked-eth-proxy-admin-separate-owner-s21 [aligned_baseline] Coinbase Wrapped Staked ETH — Proxy admin separate from the token owner · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704 · cbETH FiatTokenProxy 0xBe9895146f7AF43049ca1c1AE358B0541Ea49704: admin slot = 0xEeE4Ac8A22a6b310c53d59a7d59b3E0336C19577 (externally owned); owner() = 0x4b8741C89ABFf2562e854899E24d67A36406eA03, pauser() = 0x9596EAE1744997161ac094252e5020E9314BDCc2, blacklister() = 0xBE3c68821D585Cf1552214897a1c091014B1EB0a, masterMinter() = 0x7Dd4aa646b2e2850f9D809F9299E8E87AC97b77a: four distinct externally owned accounts, none of them the proxy admin; implementation StakedTokenV1 0x31724cA0C982A31fbb5C57f4217AB585271fc9a5. - grove-finance-alm-admin-subproxy-s21 [aligned_baseline] Grove Finance — Role admin over allocator custody: Grove SubProxy (Sky governance) · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0x491EDFB0B8b608044e227225C715981a30F3A44E · ALMProxy 0x491EDFB0B8b608044e227225C715981a30F3A44E, MainnetController 0xfd9dEA9a8D5B955649579Af482DB7198A392A9F5 and RateLimits 0x5F5cfCB8a463868E37Ab27B5eFF3ba02112dF19a: hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, Grove SubProxy 0x1369f7b2b38c76B6478c0f0E66D94923421891Ba) = true; CONTROLLER on the ALMProxy and RateLimits = the MainnetController; none of the three is a proxy. - grove-finance-freezer-safe-2of5-s21 [aligned_baseline] Grove Finance — Emergency freeze of relayers: 2-of-5 Freezer Safe · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0xfd9dEA9a8D5B955649579Af482DB7198A392A9F5 · MainnetController 0xfd9dEA9a8D5B955649579Af482DB7198A392A9F5: hasRole(FREEZER, 0xB0113804960345fd0a245788b3423319c86940e5) = true; that Safe is 2-of-5 (v1.4.1, no modules). - grove-finance-relayer-safe-4of7-s21 [aligned_baseline] Grove Finance — Day-to-day DeFi execution: 4-of-7 Relayer Safe · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0xfd9dEA9a8D5B955649579Af482DB7198A392A9F5 · MainnetController 0xfd9dEA9a8D5B955649579Af482DB7198A392A9F5: hasRole(RELAYER, 0x0eEC86649E756a23CBc68d9EFEd756f16aD5F85f) = true; that Safe is 4-of-7 (v1.4.1, no modules). - re-48h-timelock-token-admin-s21 [aligned_baseline] Re Protocol (reUSD / reUSDe) — reUSD and reUSDe tokens: admin and upgrades wait 48 hours · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0x5086bf358635B81D8C47C66d1C8b9E567Db70c72 · reUSD 0x5086bf358635B81D8C47C66d1C8b9E567Db70c72 and reUSDe 0xdDC0f880ff6e4e22E4B74632fBb43Ce4DF6cCC5a: DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and UPGRADER_ROLE held by TimelockController 0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93 (getMinDelay() = 172800s); the Safe 0x8eec10616802Ef639CA55c98ac856553fAdEfBaD holds neither; the ICL 0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093 holds MINTER_ROLE on reUSD. - re-icl-admin-timelock-not-safe-s21 [protective_delta] Re Protocol (reUSD / reUSDe) — Deposit vault role admin held behind the delay; multisig lacks it · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093 · ICL 0x4691C475bE804Fa85f91c2D6D0aDf03114de3093 (shareToken() = reUSD): hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, Safe 0x8eec10616802Ef639CA55c98ac856553fAdEfBaD) = false; the Timelock 0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93 holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and UPGRADER_ROLE; getRoleAdmin(UPGRADER_ROLE) = DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, so granting UPGRADER_ROLE on this ICL waits the 48-hour delay. - re-safe-sole-timelock-proposer-s21 [aligned_baseline] Re Protocol (reUSD / reUSDe) — Scheduling rights: one 3-of-5 multisig proposes, executes, cancels · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93 · TimelockController 0x69dDEa332723cF5407151aAF68B9b076557FCA93: hasRole(PROPOSER_ROLE / EXECUTOR_ROLE / CANCELLER_ROLE, Safe 0x8eec10616802Ef639CA55c98ac856553fAdEfBaD) = true; the timelock is its own admin; the Safe is 3-of-5 (v1.4.1, no modules). - ssv-network-dao-multisig-owns-network-s21 [aligned_baseline] SSV Network — SSVNetwork and SSVNetworkViews owner: the DAO governance multisig · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1 · SSVNetwork 0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1: owner() = SSV DAO Treasury 0xb35096b074fdb9bBac63E3AdaE0Bbde512B2E6b6, a 5-of-9 Safe (v1.3.0, no modules); pendingOwner() = 0; SSVNetworkViews 0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4 has the same owner(); both are UUPS proxies (empty EIP-1967 admin slot). - ssv-network-operator-fee-guardrails-s21 [aligned_baseline] SSV Network — Operator fee increases: 14-day declaration, 7-day execution, 10% cap · Sprint 21 · block 26427612 (0x1c5ef52eb0b586e49da2a11dc9f905cae4125008dc814d6781f53a142f6555ac) · target 0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4 · SSVNetworkViews 0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4: getOperatorFeePeriods() = (1209600, 604800) seconds (declaration 14 days, execution 7 days); getOperatorFeeIncreaseLimit() = 1000 (10.00%). - cap-1d-timelock-min-delay-s20 [aligned_baseline] Cap — TimelockController minimum delay: 1 day · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab · Timelock 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab: getMinDelay() = 86400 (1 day); PROPOSER / EXECUTOR / CANCELLER = Developer multisig 0xb8FC49402dF3ee4f8587268FB89fda4d621a8793 (3-of-5 Safe); the timelock is its own admin. - cap-access-control-admin-is-timelock-s20 [protective_delta] Cap — Access-control admin: the Timelock, not the multisig directly · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0x7731129a10d51e18cDE607C5C115F26503D2c683 · AccessControl 0x7731129a10d51e18cDE607C5C115F26503D2c683: the only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member, and the only grantAccess / revokeAccess holder, is the Timelock 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab; the Developer multisig 0xb8FC49402dF3ee4f8587268FB89fda4d621a8793 does not hold DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, so role changes wait the 1-day delay. - cap-cusd-upgrade-role-timelock-only-s20 [aligned_baseline] Cap — cUSD upgrade role (bytes4(0)) holder: the Timelock only · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0x7731129a10d51e18cDE607C5C115F26503D2c683 · getRoleMemberCount(bytes4(0) | cUSD 0xcCcc62962d17b8914c62D74FfB843d73B2a3cccC) = 1, member 0 = the Timelock 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab; the Developer multisig does not hold it; the same single holder for stcUSD, AccessControl, Lender, Delegation, Oracle and FeeAuction. - concrete-vault-default-admin-unassigned-s20 [aligned_baseline] Concrete — Vault DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: unassigned · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20 · getRoleMemberCount(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) = 0; every *_ADMIN role of the vault has one member, the 2-of-3 Safe 0x70EBF87bA7a1517c204979e51979cfbf693364F9. - concrete-vault-owner-safe-1of2-s20 [parameter_delta] Concrete — Vault owner, VAULT_MANAGER and factory manager Safe threshold: 1-of-2 · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381 · Safe 0x8F5f1d40243b259cEB7aB44bA421Ff191bCD3381: getThreshold() = 1 with 2 owners; it is the vault owner() (the gate for factory-driven vault upgrades), the only VAULT_MANAGER member and the factory's getFactoryManager(). - concrete-vault-proxy-admin-factory-s20 [aligned_baseline] Concrete — Vault proxy admin: the factory · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20 · ctDeltaWeETH vault (0xB9DC54c8261745CB97070CeFBE3D3d815aee8f20) EIP-1967 admin slot = ConcreteFactory 0x0265d73a8E61F698d8EB0dfeb91Ddce55516844C, which is also the vault's factory() and lists it (isRegisteredVault = true); implementation 0xFB65336D4323BA79d07F7024c81B8B69E1781527. - frax-ether-comptroller-owns-frxethminter-s20 [aligned_baseline] Frax Ether (frxETH / sfrxETH) — frxETHMinter owner: the documented Comptroller · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xbAFA44EFE7901E04E39Dad13167D089C559c1138 · frxETHMinter 0xbAFA44EFE7901E04E39Dad13167D089C559c1138: owner() = Comptroller 0x8306300ffd616049FD7e4b0354a64Da835c1A81C (4-of-7 Safe), nominatedOwner() = 0; not upgradeable. - frax-ether-lockbox-multisig-3of5-s20 [aligned_baseline] Frax Ether (frxETH / sfrxETH) — Ethereum lockbox owner Safe threshold: 3-of-5 · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xB1748C79709f4Ba2Dd82834B8c82D4a505003f27 · Safe 0xB1748C79709f4Ba2Dd82834B8c82D4a505003f27: getThreshold() = 3 with 5 owners (v1.3.0); owner() of the frxETH lockbox 0x1c1649A38f4A3c5A0c4a24070f688C525AB7D6E6 and the sfrxETH lockbox 0xbBc424e58ED38dd911309611ae2d7A23014Bd960. - frax-ether-upgrade-timelock-24h-s20 [aligned_baseline] Frax Ether (frxETH / sfrxETH) — Ethereum upgrade Timelock delay: 24 hours · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xb898Ad2976b4d8f2E21521C9db16b7497825E503 · Timelock 0xb898Ad2976b4d8f2E21521C9db16b7497825E503: delay() = 86400 (MINIMUM_DELAY() = 7200), admin() = 4-of-7 Safe 0xfFFffF4F3baC444b2C0ecf2A1840d018bE783937; owner of ProxyAdmin 0x223a681fc5c5522c85C96157c0efA18cd6c5405c, the EIP-1967 admin of both Ethereum lockboxes. - infinifi-long-timelock-7d-s20 [aligned_baseline] infiniFi — Long governance timelock delay: 7 days (Short timelock: 1 day) · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0x3D18480CC32B6AB3B833dCabD80E76CfD41c48a9 · Long Timelock 0x3D18480CC32B6AB3B833dCabD80E76CfD41c48a9: getMinDelay() = 604800 (7 days); Short Timelock 0x4B174afbeD7b98BA01F50E36109EEE5e6d327c32: 86400 (1 day). The Long Timelock holds GOVERNOR on InfiniFiCore 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490; the only PROPOSER / CANCELLER is the Team Multisig 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b16939235fEc2400c. - infinifi-pause-role-admin-minor-roles-s20 [parameter_delta] infiniFi — PAUSE / UNPAUSE role admin: MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER, not GOVERNOR · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490 · InfiniFiCore 0xF6d48735EcCf12bDC1DF2674b1ce3fcb3bD25490: getRoleAdmin(UNPAUSE) = getRoleAdmin(PAUSE) = keccak256("MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER") (0x9849206c..6512), whose members are the Team Multisig 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b16939235fEc2400c and the Long Timelock; GOVERNOR is not the admin of either role. - infinifi-team-multisig-4of7-s20 [aligned_baseline] infiniFi — Team Multisig threshold: 4-of-7 · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b16939235fEc2400c · Safe 0x80608f852D152024c0a2087b16939235fEc2400c: getThreshold() = 4 with 7 owners (v1.4.1), no modules, no guard. - puffer-7d-timelock-delay-s20 [aligned_baseline] Puffer Finance (pufETH) — Timelock delay: 7 days · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0x3C28B7c7Ba1A1f55c9Ce66b263B33B204f2126eA · Timelock 0x3C28B7c7Ba1A1f55c9Ce66b263B33B204f2126eA: delay() = 604801, MINIMUM_DELAY() = 604800 (the verified source accepts only delays above the minimum); ACCESS_MANAGER() = 0x8c1686069474410E6243425f4a10177a94EBEE11, the authority() of PufferVault 0xD9A442856C234a39a81a089C06451EBAa4306a72, where upgradeToAndCall maps to role 0, held by the Timelock. - puffer-community-multisig-3of7-s20 [parameter_delta] Puffer Finance (pufETH) — Community Multisig threshold: 3-of-7 · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0x446d4d6b26815f9bA78B5D454E303315D586Cb2a · Safe 0x446d4d6b26815f9bA78B5D454E303315D586Cb2a (= Timelock COMMUNITY_MULTISIG()): getThreshold() = 3 with 7 owners (v1.3.0); holds AccessManager role 1 (upgrader) with execution delay 0. - puffer-operations-multisig-3of6-s20 [aligned_baseline] Puffer Finance (pufETH) — Operations Multisig threshold: 3-of-6 · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xC0896ab1A8cae8c2C1d27d011eb955Cca955580d · Safe 0xC0896ab1A8cae8c2C1d27d011eb955Cca955580d (= Timelock OPERATIONS_MULTISIG()): getThreshold() = 3 with 6 owners (v1.3.0); holds AccessManager roles 22 and 77, not roles 0 or 1. - stake-link-governance-timelock-48h-s20 [aligned_baseline] stake.link — GovernanceTimelock delay: 48 hours · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xb72d8F5213b3E52FAf13Aa074b03C4788e78349F · GovernanceTimelock 0xb72d8F5213b3E52FAf13Aa074b03C4788e78349F: getMinDelay() = 172800 (48 hours); owner() of StakingPool / stLINK 0xb8b295df2cd735b15BE5Eb419517Aa626fc43cD5, PriorityPool, WithdrawalPool, FundFlowController, RebaseController, OperatorVCS and CommunityVCS; PROPOSER / CANCELLER = the multisig 0xB351EC0FEaF4B99FdFD36b484d9EC90D0422493D. - stake-link-multisig-6of8-s20 [aligned_baseline] stake.link — Gnosis Safe signer threshold: 6-of-8 · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0xB351EC0FEaF4B99FdFD36b484d9EC90D0422493D · Safe 0xB351EC0FEaF4B99FdFD36b484d9EC90D0422493D: getThreshold() = 6 with 8 owners (v1.3.0), no modules, no guard. - stake-link-operator-strategy-fees-s20 [aligned_baseline] stake.link — Node Operator strategy fees: SDL stakers 15%, node operators 5% · Sprint 20 · block 26425374 (0xfa22e277760f1df7134b0af20499d6305ee4e017219a917a61a78aa76e89382d) · target 0x4852e48215A4785eE99B640CACED5378Cc39D2A4 · OperatorVCS 0x4852e48215A4785eE99B640CACED5378Cc39D2A4: getFees() = [1500 bps to the stLINK rewards pool 0x8753C00D1a94D04A01b931830011d882A3F8Cc72], operatorRewardPercentage() = 500; CommunityVCS 0xAc12290b097f6893322F5430627e472131fBC1B5: getFees() = [1000 bps to the same pool]. - aave-v3-base-emergency-admin-protocol-guardian-4of7-s19 [aligned_baseline] Aave V3 (Base) — EMERGENCY_ADMIN (pause / unpause) = Aave Protocol Guardian 4-of-7 Safe · Sprint 19 · block 57886975 (0xf88ef5af0e0555ca6b7e28b325f5057163cb52d6ced0f509507613423c6ad277) · target 0x56C1a4b54921DEA9A344967a8693C7E661D72968 · Protocol Guardian Safe (0x56C1a4b54921DEA9A344967a8693C7E661D72968, v1.3.0): getThreshold() = 4 of 7 owners, the 7 signers listed in the docs; ACLManager 0x43955b0899Ab7232E3a454cf84AedD22Ad46FD33 hasRole(EMERGENCY_ADMIN, Safe) = true, hasRole(POOL_ADMIN, Safe) = false. - aave-v3-base-payloads-level1-1d-delay-s19 [aligned_baseline] Aave V3 (Base) — Level-1 governance payloads execute on Base through ExecutorLvl1 after a 1-day delay · Sprint 19 · block 57886975 (0xf88ef5af0e0555ca6b7e28b325f5057163cb52d6ced0f509507613423c6ad277) · target 0x2DC219E716793fb4b21548C0f009Ba3Af753ab01 · PayloadsController (0x2DC219E716793fb4b21548C0f009Ba3Af753ab01).getExecutorSettingsByAccessControl(1) = (ExecutorLvl1 0x9390B1735def18560c509E2d0bc090E9d6BA257a, 86400s); MIN_EXECUTION_DELAY() = 86400s, MAX_EXECUTION_DELAY() = 864000s; MESSAGE_ORIGINATOR() = Ethereum Governance V3 0x9AEE0B04504CeF83A65AC3f0e838D0593BCb2BC7 (ORIGIN_CHAIN_ID() = 1); access level 2 has no executor on Base. ExecutorLvl1 (owner() = the PayloadsController) is owner() and getACLAdmin() of PoolAddressesProvider 0xe20fCBdBfFC4Dd138cE8b2E6FBb6CB49777ad64D and holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and POOL_ADMIN on ACLManager 0x43955b0899Ab7232E3a454cf84AedD22Ad46FD33. - compound-v3-base-mainnet-timelock-local-1d-delay-s19 [aligned_baseline] Compound V3 (Base) — Both Base Comet markets are governed by the Ethereum Timelock through a bridge receiver and a 1-day local timelock · Sprint 19 · block 57886975 (0xf88ef5af0e0555ca6b7e28b325f5057163cb52d6ced0f509507613423c6ad277) · target 0x18281dfC4d00905DA1aaA6731414EABa843c468A · BridgeReceiver (0x18281dfC4d00905DA1aaA6731414EABa843c468A).govTimelock() = Ethereum Timelock 0x6d903f6003cca6255D85CcA4D3B5E5146dC33925 (delay() = 172800s on Ethereum); localTimelock() = 0xCC3E7c85Bb0EE4f09380e041fee95a0caeDD4a02 (delay() = 86400s, admin() = the BridgeReceiver); governor() of cUSDbCv3 (0x9c4ec768c28520B50860ea7a15bd7213a9fF58bf) and cUSDCv3 (0xb125E6687d4313864e53df431d5425969c15Eb2F), owner() of CometProxyAdmin 0xbdE8F31D2DdDA895264e27DD990faB3DC87b372d and governor() of the Configurator 0x45939657d1CA34A8FA39A924B71D28Fe8431e581 are the local timelock. - compound-v3-base-pause-guardian-community-multisig-5of9-s19 [aligned_baseline] Compound V3 (Base) — Pause Guardian of both Base markets = 5-of-9 Safe with the Community Multi-Sig's owners · Sprint 19 · block 57886975 (0xf88ef5af0e0555ca6b7e28b325f5057163cb52d6ced0f509507613423c6ad277) · target 0x9c4ec768c28520B50860ea7a15bd7213a9fF58bf · cUSDbCv3 (0x9c4ec768c28520B50860ea7a15bd7213a9fF58bf) and cUSDCv3 (0xb125E6687d4313864e53df431d5425969c15Eb2F) pauseGuardian() = Safe 0x3cb4653F3B45F448D9100b118B75a1503281d2ee (5-of-9, v1.3.0), whose 9 owners equal, in order, those of the Ethereum Community Multi-Sig 0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c (5-of-9); no market is paused. - ethena-usdtb-psm-owner-24h-timelock-s19 [protective_delta] Ethena USDtb — USDtb PSM owned by a 24-hour TimelockController (Dev multisig proposes), not by the Dev multisig directly · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728 · PSM (0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728).owner() = EthenaTimelockController 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 (getMinDelay() = 86400s), which also holds the PSM DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (the Dev multisig does not); the Dev multisig 0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862 (5-of-10, v1.3.0) holds PROPOSER_ROLE, CANCELLER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE on the timelock; asset() = USDtb, isSwapEnabled() = true. - ethena-usdtb-single-admin-no-timelock-s19 [aligned_baseline] Ethena USDtb — USDtb token administered by a single admin address with no timelock (issuer: Anchorage) · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C · USDtb (0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C).owner() = 0xd93826BB299765c87D13AeBa2A7E5d9B27A03956 (no code), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and owns the ProxyAdmin 0x3C405F68d5C6eCE868e5646cAC926679839aCd68; implementation AnchorageTokenUSDtb 0x9D6d77a21702b9AFcF924983fbFB84AAAAe79589; MINTER_BURNER_ROLE, BLOCKLISTER_ROLE and PAUSER_ROLE are each held by one address without code; the former Ethena admin Safe 0xe897D8620D5EbA2C8ecAAF0aDa191a23230aB8Ec no longer holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. - liquid-collective-lseth-admin-multisig-4of7-s19 [aligned_baseline] Liquid Collective (LsETH) — River (LsETH) upgrade and admin Firewalls are administered by 4-of-7 Safes · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549 · River (0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549) EIP-1967 admin slot = Firewall 0x3A5b4db174a3CC17d8cE40C5B04272737195151b, whose getAdmin() is Safe 0x8EE3fC0Bcd7B57429203751C5bE5fdf1AB8409f3 (4-of-7, v1.3.0, no modules); getAdmin() = Firewall 0xd745A68c705F5aa75DFf528540678288ed2aD9eE, whose getAdmin() is Safe 0xE3208Aa9d1186c1D1C8A5b76E794b2B68E6cb3a5 (4-of-7, the same 7 owners, no modules); the Firewall executor Safe 0xDE55C9dc78f985fE1502484Cb98EBfAB66A56B62 (2-of-3) may call pause() but not unpause() or upgradeTo(address). Implementation RiverV1 0x0056f9ed62dAa4dc3F972340C92326AcCddd1a9D (version() = 1.3.0). - liquid-collective-lseth-service-fee-10pct-s19 [aligned_baseline] Liquid Collective (LsETH) — Protocol service fee = 10.0% of network rewards · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549 · River (0x8c1BEd5b9a0928467c9B1341Da1D7BD5e10b6549).getGlobalFee() = 1000 basis points (the verified source divides by 10000) = 10.0%. - pendle-finance-v2-reserve-fee-80-lp-20-s19 [aligned_baseline] Pendle Finance V2 — Market factory sends 80% of swap fees to the treasury, leaving 20% to LPs · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0x6d247b1c044fA1E22e6B04fA9F71Baf99EB29A9f · PendleMarketFactory (0x6d247b1c044fA1E22e6B04fA9F71Baf99EB29A9f).reserveFeePercent() = 80 (maxReserveFeePercent() = 100); treasury() = 0x8270400d528c34e1596EF367eeDEc99080A1b592; owner() = PendleGovernanceProxy 0x2aD631F72fB16d91c4953A7f4260A97C2fE2f31e (DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: 3-of-5 Safe 0x8119EC16F0573B7dAc7C0CB94EB504FB32456ee1); EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin 0xA28c08f165116587D4F3E708743B4dEe155c5E64 (owner() = the Safe). - pendle-finance-v2-yt-interest-fee-5pct-s19 [aligned_baseline] Pendle Finance V2 — Yield contract factory takes a 5% fee on YT yield · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0x3E6EBa46AbC5ab18ED95F6667d8B2fd4020E4637 · PendleYieldContractFactory (0x3E6EBa46AbC5ab18ED95F6667d8B2fd4020E4637, the marketFactory's yieldContractFactory()).interestFeeRate() = 5e16 (5%, 1e18 = 100%); rewardFeeRate() = 5e16; maxima 2e17 (20%); owner() = the 3-of-5 Safe 0x8119EC16F0573B7dAc7C0CB94EB504FB32456ee1. - rocket-pool-reth-odao-quorum-51pct-s19 [aligned_baseline] Rocket Pool (rETH) — Oracle DAO proposal quorum = 51% of members · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0xdA1AB39e62E0A5297AF44C7064E501b0613f0D01 · RocketDAONodeTrustedSettingsMembers (0xdA1AB39e62E0A5297AF44C7064E501b0613f0D01).getQuorum() = 0.51e18 (51%); RocketDAONodeTrusted getMemberCount() = 9. - rocket-pool-reth-security-council-leave-time-28d-s19 [parameter_delta] Rocket Pool (rETH) — Security council members.leave.time = 28 days (RPIP-33 bound: < 14 days) · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf · RocketDAOProtocolSettingsSecurity (0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf).getLeaveTime() = 2419200s (28 days). The security council has 1 member, Safe 0x6C565aF34f15dE064b56afEdF7B0F59C15bB20FE (2-of-3). - rocket-pool-reth-upgrade-delay-1w-s19 [aligned_baseline] Rocket Pool (rETH) — oDAO contract upgrades wait a 1-week upgrade delay (security council veto window) · Sprint 19 · block 26422243 (0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410) · target 0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf · RocketDAOProtocolSettingsSecurity (0xC9D771AaF504F33bB3C8a7E67eA9f1881F837cFf, RocketStorage getAddress('contract.address' + name)).getUpgradeDelay() = 604800s (1 week); getUpgradeVetoQuorum() = 0.33e18; getQuorum() = 0.51e18; RocketStorage getDeployedStatus() = true; both DAO bootstrap modes disabled. - aerodrome-slipstream-clfactory-team-3of7-s18 [aligned_baseline] Aerodrome Slipstream (Base) — CLFactory owner, swap & unstaked fee managers = Protocol Team 3-of-7 Safe · Sprint 18 · block 57842915 (0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129) · target 0x5e7BB104d84c7CB9B682AaC2F3d509f5F406809A · CLFactory (0x5e7BB104d84c7CB9B682AaC2F3d509f5F406809A) owner() = swapFeeManager() = unstakedFeeManager() = 3-of-7 Safe 0xE6A41fE61E7a1996B59d508661e3f524d6A32075; swapFeeModule() = 0x090b2A6bb475c00e2256e2095A60887cD710803b, unstakedFeeModule() = 0x0AD08370c76Ff426F534bb2AFFD9b5555338ee68, defaultUnstakedFee() = 100000, allPoolsLength() = 3684. Context, not compared: Voter (0x16613524e02ad97eDfeF371bC883F2F5d6C480A5) governor() = the same Safe; emergencyCouncil() = epochGovernor() = AerodromeMigration (0x22a2F7340a3fB4C7C389D91eE954766B12476721, owner() a 3-of-7 Safe v1.5.0), not the security page's Council 0x99249b10593fCa1Ae9DAE6D4819F1A6dae5C013D; the docs announce the 2026 merger into Aero. - enzyme-dispatcher-7d-migration-timelock-s18 [protective_delta] Enzyme Finance — Dispatcher migration timelock = 7 days (specs: 'no longer used and is set to 0') · Sprint 18 · block 26421541 (0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d) · target 0xC3DC853dD716bd5754f421ef94fdCbac3902ab32 · Dispatcher (0xC3DC853dD716bd5754f421ef94fdCbac3902ab32, Sourcify exact_match) getMigrationTimelock() = 604800s (7d), enforced by signalMigration (executableTimestamp = block.timestamp + migrationTimelock). getOwner() = 3-of-5 Safe 0xb270FE91e8E4b80452fBF1b4704208792A350f53 (getNominatedOwner() = 0), which also owns the live FundDeployer 0x4f1C53F096533C04d8157EFB6Bca3eb22ddC6360 (getCurrentFundDeployer()); setCurrentFundDeployer and setMigrationTimelock are onlyOwner with no delay. - euler-v2-evk-factorygovernor-4d-timelock-s18 [aligned_baseline] Euler V2 (EVK) — EVK factory upgradeAdmin = FactoryGovernor behind a 4d TimelockController (DAO 4-of-8 proposes) · Sprint 18 · block 26421541 (0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d) · target 0x29a56a1b8214D9Cf7c5561811750D5cBDb45CC8e · GenericFactory (0x29a56a1b8214D9Cf7c5561811750D5cBDb45CC8e).upgradeAdmin() = FactoryGovernor 0x2F13256E04022d6356d8CE8C53C7364e13DC1f3d; its only DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member is TimelockController 0xfb034c1C6c7F42171b2d1Cb8486E0f43ED07A968 (getMinDelay() = 345600s, 4d; PROPOSER_ROLE: 4-of-8 Safe 0xcAD001c30E96765aC90307669d578219D4fb1DCe; EXECUTOR_ROLE open; CANCELLER_ROLE: that Safe and 2-of-3 Safe 0xb3b84e8320250Afe7a5fb313Ee32B52982b73c53). PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE has 3 members (2-of-6 Safe 0xB1345E7A4D35FB3E6bF22A32B3741Ae74E5Fba27, 0xff217004BdD3A6A592162380dc0E6BbF143291eB, 0xcC6451385685721778E7Bd80B54F8c92b484F601); UNPAUSE_ADMIN_ROLE: the 2-of-6 Safe. EthereumVaultConnector (0x0C9a3dd6b8F28529d72d7f9cE918D493519EE383): no EIP-1967 slots; owner() and admin() revert. - moonwell-pause-guardian-2of4-safe-s18 [parameter_delta] Moonwell Lending (Base) — Comptroller pauseGuardian = 2-of-4 Safe (Constitution: pause = Security Council 3-of-5) · Sprint 18 · block 57842915 (0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129) · target 0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C · Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1); 1 of its 4 owner addresses is also an owner of the 3-of-5 Security Council Safe 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E. borrowCapGuardian() = supplyCapGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x08eDEbFFaE68970DCf751baa826182b3a4aCFC05. - moonwell-temporal-governor-24h-security-council-3of5-s18 [aligned_baseline] Moonwell Lending (Base) — Unitroller admin = TemporalGovernor (24h proposal delay), owned by the 3-of-5 Security Council · Sprint 18 · block 57842915 (0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129) · target 0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C · Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).admin() = TemporalGovernor 0x8b621804a7637b781e2BbD58e256a591F2dF7d51 (pendingAdmin() = 0); TemporalGovernor proposalDelay() = 86400s, owner() = 3-of-5 Safe 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E; allTrustedSenders(2) (Ethereum) = [MultichainGovernor 0x8769B70ac7c93AF0e75de0D69877709B66d75838], allTrustedSenders(16) (Moonbeam) = []. Context, not compared: permissionlessUnpauseTime() = 2592000s (30d), while the moonwell-contracts-v2 developer docs say a pause blocks proposals 'for a period of ten days'; the governance pages still describe proposals executed on Moonbeam. - nexus-mutual-governor-24h-timelock-s18 [aligned_baseline] Nexus Mutual — Governor: 3 Advisory Board votes + 24h timelock; Registry upgrades every module · Sprint 18 · block 26421541 (0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d) · target 0xcafea6063d4Ec6b045d9676e58897C1f0882Ca32 · Governor (0xcafea6063d4Ec6b045d9676e58897C1f0882Ca32, EIP-1967 proxy; implementation Governor 0xcafea466bF6dEFe480cdd54056C020c63b7DA830, Sourcify exact_match): TIMELOCK_PERIOD() = 86400s, VOTING_PERIOD() = 259200s, ADVISORY_BOARD_THRESHOLD() = 3. Registry (0xcafea2c575550512582090AA06d0a069E7236b9e, ADVISORY_BOARD_SEATS() = 5) lists the Governor at contract index 2, is the proxyOwner() of all 10 module proxies resolved through NXMaster.getLatestAddress (GV, P1, MR, TC, CO, SP, RA, AS, CI, LO), and is itself an EIP-1967 proxy administered by the Governor; its verified upgradeContract is onlyGovernor. Pause: getPauseConfig() = 0; isEmergencyAdmin() is true for 6 EOAs (the 5 Advisory Board seat holders and 0x6fe2c2643cb5064951fb7dd87fbce4777fb146e3), and a pause needs one admin to propose and another to confirm. Context, not compared: the legacy NXMaster (0x01BFd82675DBCc7762C84019cA518e701C0cD07e) is owned by the legacy Governance proxy (0x4A5C681dDC32acC6ccA51ac17e9d461e6be87900) running TemporaryGovernance, whose advisoryBoardMultisig (0x51ad1265C8702c9e96Ea61Fe4088C2e22eD4418e, 3-of-5 Safe owned by the 5 seat holders) can execute any call through it without a timelock; the docs list NXMaster and Governance as legacy. - stargate-v2-onesig-5of7-owner-planner-fees-s18 [aligned_baseline] Stargate V2 — V2 pool, TokenMessaging & Treasurer owner = 5-of-7 OneSig multisig; planner sets fees · Sprint 18 · block 26421541 (0xfc2e93c53812cd390b29924a4e217bd4f75d77725bd2882968fb5b087a17150d) · target 0xc026395860Db2d07ee33e05fE50ed7bD583189C7 · StargatePoolUSDC (0xc026395860Db2d07ee33e05fE50ed7bD583189C7).owner() = OneSig 0xBE634B030FEAaB661300667EaF82510a3a025413 (threshold() = 5 of 7 signers, VERSION() = 0.0.1, Sourcify exact_match: executes threshold-signed Merkle roots carrying only an expiry, no delay); TokenMessaging (0x6d6620eFa72948C5f68A3C8646d58C00d3f4A980) and Treasurer (0x1041D127b2d4BC700F0F563883bC689502606918) owner() = the same OneSig. getAddressConfig() planner = 0xe37f7c80ceD04c4F243C0Fd04A5510D663CB88b5 (an EOA) = TokenMessaging.planner() = FeeLibV1USDC (0x52B35406CB2FB5e0038EdEcFc129A152a1f74087).owner(); status() = 1. Context, not compared: the docs' StargateDAO multisig 0x65bb797c2B9830d891D87288F029ed8dACc19705 (3-of-5 Safe) is not the owner of these V2 contracts. - falcon-susdf-zero-cooldown-instant-unstake-s17 [aligned_baseline] Falcon Finance (USDf / sUSDf) — sUSDf cooldownDuration() = 0 — instant unstaking to USDf · Sprint 17 · block 26418060 (0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c) · target 0xc8CF6D7991f15525488b2A83Df53468D682Ba4B0 · sUSDf (0xc8CF6D7991f15525488b2A83Df53468D682Ba4B0).cooldownDuration() = 0; asset() = USDf (0xFa2B947eEc368f42195f24F36d2aF29f7c24CeC2); totalSupply() = 33,273,012.15 sUSDf (USDf 1,516,215,860.42). Context, not compared with documentation: USDf and sUSDf are EIP-1967 proxies whose admins (0x3Ef1127Fdf81B553066daE0FaEA58785A2AA6E14, 0x16a2605C026BFe4f4B7f4471933714D9b2149AcE) both return owner() = 4-of-6 Safe 0x1E482B60bf19Cb1cc859389e0eA3DED153f16Bd7. - m0-mtoken-no-eip1967-proxy-immutable-s17 [aligned_baseline] M0 Protocol ($M) — MToken: no EIP-1967 proxy slots (immutable core logic) · Sprint 17 · block 26418060 (0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c) · target 0x866A2BF4E572CbcF37D5071A7a58503Bfb36be1b · MToken (0x866A2BF4E572CbcF37D5071A7a58503Bfb36be1b) EIP-1967 implementation and admin slots are both 0 (no EIP-1967 proxy); name() = 'M by M^0', totalSupply() = 249,955,861.65 M (6 decimals); ttgRegistrar() = Registrar (0x119FbeeDD4F4f4298Fb59B720d5654442b81ae2c), minterGateway() = MinterGateway (0xf7f9638cb444D65e5A40bF5ff98ebE4ff319F04E). - m0-ttg-registrar-governors-match-docs-s17 [aligned_baseline] M0 Protocol ($M) — TTG Registrar governors = the docs-listed Standard / Emergency / Zero Governor · Sprint 17 · block 26418060 (0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c) · target 0x119FbeeDD4F4f4298Fb59B720d5654442b81ae2c · Registrar (0x119FbeeDD4F4f4298Fb59B720d5654442b81ae2c): standardGovernor() = 0xB024aC5a7c6bC92fbACc8C3387E628a07e1Da016, emergencyGovernor() = 0x886d405949F709bC3f4451491bDd07ff51Cdf90A, zeroGovernor() = 0xa0DAFaEEA4A1d44534e1b9227e19CAE6358b80FE; EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0. MinterGateway.ttgRegistrar() returns the same Registrar. - solv-solvbtc-owner-3of5-safe-s17 [aligned_baseline] Solv Protocol (SolvBTC) — SolvBTC owner() = 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe (OpenZeppelin Ownable) · Sprint 17 · block 26418060 (0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c) · target 0x7A56E1C57C7475CCf742a1832B028F0456652F97 · SolvBTC (0x7A56E1C57C7475CCf742a1832B028F0456652F97).owner() = 3-of-5 Safe 0x0c2Bc4d2698820e12E6eBe863E7b9E2650CD5b7D; name() = 'Solv BTC', totalSupply() = 2,397.43 SolvBTC (18 decimals). - solv-solvbtc-upgrade-beacon-3d-timelock-s17 [protective_delta] Solv Protocol (SolvBTC) — SolvBTC beacon upgrades behind a 3d TimelockController (docs: timelock 'will be added') · Sprint 17 · block 26418060 (0x8914f5134a4488a812b61c1c7f479c3082d80f6fbe2f181abb9e5ef4ff973f3c) · target 0xfd4B809AD88db6Ca9dbB295A4B9d23bB0093f497 · SolvBTC is a beacon proxy: EIP-1967 beacon slot = UpgradeableBeacon 0xFc335FdA7E6a33329A83F4d5F578eC7d8A43DC4A (implementation() = 0xA4b6cf2BAaA235ab7Fe10EADB84b82460165B38F), whose owner() = SolvBTCFactory 0x443628281E4f3E5b5A5D029B9a0D13900ae41578 (getBeacon('Solv BTC') = that beacon). The factory's admin() = TimelockController 0xfd4B809AD88db6Ca9dbB295A4B9d23bB0093f497 (pendingAdmin() = 0) with getMinDelay() = 259200s (3d); governor() = the 3-of-5 Safe 0x0c2Bc4d2698820e12E6eBe863E7b9E2650CD5b7D (pendingGovernor() = 0), which holds the timelock's PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE and CANCELLER_ROLE but not DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (held by the timelock itself; EXECUTOR_ROLE not open). Verified source pinned to runtime code: SolvBTCFactory is a Sourcify exact_match and every beacon-mutating path (setImplementation -> upgradeTo, transferBeaconOwnership, importBeacon) and transferAdmin is onlyAdmin, while onlyGovernor only deploys new beacon proxies; the timelock (SolvTimelock is OpenZeppelin v5.0.0 TimelockController, fully verified on Blockscout, not on Sourcify) reverts schedule when delay < getMinDelay() and only lets itself call updateDelay. - steakhouse-usdc-base-timelock-7d-s17 [aligned_baseline] Steakhouse USDC MetaMorpho (Base) — MetaMorpho timelock() = 7d (604800s) · Sprint 17 · block 57635450 (0x78ddbdca540b630c823e1c79dcadbfc25dd957c60d1396f4c6b60f11f67a164f) · target 0xbeeF010f9cb27031ad51e3333f9aF9C6B1228183 · Steakhouse USDC (steakUSDC, 0xbeeF010f9cb27031ad51e3333f9aF9C6B1228183) on Base: timelock() = 604800s (7d); asset() = USDC (0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913); MORPHO() = 0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb; owner() = 5-of-10 Safe 0x0A0e559bc3b0950a7e448F0d4894db195b9cf8DD; curator() = 3-of-9 Safe 0x827e86072B06674a077f592A531dcE4590aDeCdB; totalAssets() = 102,512,832.83 USDC. Context, not compared with documentation: guardian() = 0x9e0FdDDa790651E6a05CD2dE69e624B94C04eAf5 has no contract code (eth_getCode = 0x on Base and on Ethereum at #26,418,060) and nonce 0 on Base; the docs say guardians are 'typically onchain Aragon multisigs ... When they're not, it's usually because a commercial distribution partner has taken on that role' and list this vault with partner Coinbase; chain state does not show who holds it. - lombard-lbtc-gmpbascule-zero-validate-threshold-s16 [aligned_baseline] Lombard (LBTC) — GMPBascule validateThreshold() = 0 — deposit-ID validation on every inbound mint · Sprint 16 · block 26407707 (0x9030abf37638c14a5f9c145f298a0f4cd74b247a99f3dddd119b9c6b09f5dced) · target 0xC3ecFE771564e3f28CFB7a9b203F4d10279338eD · GMPBascule (0xC3ecFE771564e3f28CFB7a9b203F4d10279338eD).validateThreshold() = 0. The Sprint 16 summary reports that the contract source requires validation when amount >= validateThreshold, so a zero threshold applies Bascule deposit-ID validation to every inbound cross-chain mint. - treehouse-teth-owner-5d-timelock-s16 [aligned_baseline] Treehouse (TREE / tETH) — tETH owner() = 5d TimelockController · Sprint 16 · block 26407707 (0x9030abf37638c14a5f9c145f298a0f4cd74b247a99f3dddd119b9c6b09f5dced) · target 0xD11c452fc99cF405034ee446803b6F6c1F6d5ED8 · tETH (0xD11c452fc99cF405034ee446803b6F6c1F6d5ED8).owner() = TimelockController (0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e) with getMinDelay() = 432000s (5d); tETH totalSupply() = 19,359.96 tETH. - threshold-tbtc-timelock-1d-walletregistry-op-0xb667 [aligned_baseline] Threshold Network (tBTC) — tBTC TimelockController 1d delay — public WalletRegistry upgradeAndCall schedule · Sprint 15 · block 26407707 (0x9030abf37638c14a5f9c145f298a0f4cd74b247a99f3dddd119b9c6b09f5dced) · target 0x92f2d8b72a7F6a551Be60b9aa4194248E9B4913D · getMinDelay() = 86400s (1d). Operation 0xb6671bbbedf818d7232a4006d4a85b21e3f3055d17244188f244c1da8263e0c7: isOperationPending() = true, getTimestamp() = 1794604955 (2026-11-13 21:22:35 UTC). It is a public CallScheduled upgradeAndCall (0x9623609d) on ProxyAdmin (0x7Affa05f726D293eB1193807A91617318292008e) for WalletRegistry (0x46d52E41C2F300BC82217Ce22b920c34995204eb) to implementation 0x14fAD0C11C83AC736e5929D5661bbA7E6BB9c0D6. - ethena-minting-rlusd-usat-onboarding-ops [parameter_delta] Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) — EthenaTimelockController 1d delay — queued RLUSD & USAT collateral onboarding · Sprint 14 · block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · target 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 · getMinDelay() = 86400s (1d). Operations 0x1fe5e3e892708310bbfcf50efc03a1b8e21e0d0042035d7e8315e0cd5f26d85b (ETA 1794651635, 2026-11-14 10:20:35 UTC) and 0x0ca0fcc4856b87f3df9a74532bd60db58d1310c27c17e7d9bfa8a56846f57a90 (ETA 1794651743, 2026-11-14 10:22:23 UTC) are pending. Both call EthenaMinting (0xe3490297a08d6fC8Da46Edb7B6142E4F461b62D3).addSupportedAsset (0x7cfbc42f) for RLUSD and USAT as STABLE with 200M / 20M USDe-per-block mint / redeem caps, the same as the USDC / USDT configuration. EthenaMinting.stablesDeltaLimit() = 0. - inverse-firm-borrowcontroller-staleness-sentinel [protective_delta] Inverse Finance (FiRM) — BorrowController stalenessThreshold 0-sentinel — queued 48h fix for sDOLA market · Sprint 14 · block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · target 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 · Timelock (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h), and the Timelock is BorrowController.operator(). stalenessThreshold(sDOLA market 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d) = 0, which disables the oracle staleness check (isPriceStale returns false when the threshold is 0). A queued Timelock transaction (queuedTransactions = true) sets it to 86500s at eta 1794633827 (2026-11-14 05:23:47 UTC), which enables the check (protective). - kelp-rseth-proxyadmin-10d-timelock-s14 [aligned_baseline] Kelp DAO (rsETH) — rsETH & LRTDepositPool ProxyAdmin owned by 10d TimelockController · Sprint 14 · block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · target 0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7 · rsETH (0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7) and LRTDepositPool (0x036676389e48133B63a802f8635AD39E752D375D) EIP-1967 admin = ProxyAdmin (0xb61e0E39b6d4030C36A176f576aaBE44BF59Dc78); owner() = TimelockController (0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1) with getMinDelay() = 864000s (10d). - treehouse-tree-timelock-op-0x2f11 [aligned_baseline] Treehouse (TREE / tETH) — TREE UUPS owner = 5d TimelockController — queued Blacklistable upgrade · Sprint 14 · block 26406106 (0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf) · target 0x2225DAbFfC7F862c99477381E971E8B1FDaB467e · getMinDelay() = 432000s (5d); TREE (0x77146784315Ba81904d654466968e3a7c196d1f3).owner() = TimelockController. Operation 0x2f11dcc36860f09b9ef94585589ced1798cef603d133efecd017ce7e544c451f is pending (ETA 1794891107, 2026-11-17 04:51:47 UTC). It upgrades TREE to implementation 0x0fedcbfEBc293Ad8048726B0F887e6C1126EffA6, which adds a Blacklistable module whose blacklister is a 5-of-7 Safe; after execution that Safe can freeze transfers with no delay. - etherfi-core-timelock-op-0x244e [protective_delta] ether.fi Core (eETH / weETH) — Core Upgrade Timelock (10d) — queued LayerZero V2 setDelegate to Timelock · Sprint 13 · block 26405302 (0xe05f4fd5698556131e7514b3a8eb24960962a768f8e0bfe0e99e3f1681127f65) · target 0x9f26d4C958fD811A1F59B01B86Be7dFFc9d20761 · getMinDelay() = 864000s (10d); operation 0x244e3f6c3df722246c471cee58804dd34c7703fce9cee1eadc1c5a85f171359f: isOperationPending() = true, getTimestamp() = 1795193651 (2026-11-20 16:54:11 UTC). The scheduled call EtherfiL1SyncPoolETH (0xD789870beA40D056A4d26055d0bEFcC8755DA146).setDelegate(EtherFiTimelock) puts the LayerZero V2 endpoint delegate behind the 10-day timelock. - stader-ethx-manager-safe-and-timelock [parameter_delta] Stader Labs (ETHx) — Manager Safe Quorum & 7-Day TimelockController Admin Path · Sprint 12 · block 26403676 (0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae) · target 0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF · Manager Safe (0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF) getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 6 (3-of-6 Gnosis Safe); ETHx (0xA35b1B31Ce002FBF2058D22F30f95D405200A15b) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0x67B12264Ca3e0037Fc7E22F2457b42643a04C86e), owner() = TimelockController (0x1112D5C55670Cb5144BF36114C20a122908068B9, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7d, PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-9 Community Safe 0x45B977CeCB9Dfaa17dFcBa88826ef684b8489fF6), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on ETHx and StaderConfig (0x4ABEF2263d5A5ED582FC9A9789a41D85b68d69DB); ETHx MINTER_ROLE held by StakePoolsManager (0xcf5EA1b38380f6aF39068375516Daf40Ed70D299), totalSupply = 58,434.16 ETHx (18 dec). - stakewise-v3-oseth-oracle-quorum-and-ltv [aligned_baseline] StakeWise V3 (osETH) — Sampled Keeper Oracle Quorum, osETH Fee & LTV Configuration · Sprint 12 · block 26403676 (0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae) · target 0x6B5815467da09DaA7DC83Db21c9239d98Bb487b5 · Sampled Keeper (0x6B5815467da09DaA7DC83Db21c9239d98Bb487b5) totalOracles() = 11, rewardsMinOracles() = 6, validatorsMinOracles() = 6 (6-of-11 oracle signature quorum); osETH (0xf1C9acDc66974dFB6dEcB12aA385b9cD01190E38) owner() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, totalSupply = 148,452.02 osETH (18 dec); OsTokenVaultController (0x2A261e60FB14586B474C208b1B7AC6D0f5000306) feePercent() = 500 (5%), totalAssets = 160,753.18 ETH; OsTokenConfig (0x287d1e2A8dE183A8bf8f2b09Fa1340fBd766eb59) getConfig(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000) = (1.01e18, 0.92e18, 0.90e18) (90% mint LTV, 92% liquidation threshold). - superstate-ustb-uscc-fee-and-usdc-alignment [aligned_baseline] Superstate (USTB / USCC) — Sampled USDC Subscription Fee & Fund Supply Alignment · Sprint 12 · block 26403676 (0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae) · target 0x43415eB6ff9DB7E26A15b704e7A3eDCe97d31C4e · Sampled USTB (0x43415eB6ff9DB7E26A15b704e7A3eDCe97d31C4e) supportedStablecoins(0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48) returns sweep destination 0x774AE279c21B6a17a6E2BD5ab5398FF98F398807 and subscription fee = 0 for USDC; USTB totalSupply = 39,459,575.14 USTB (6 dec), USCC (0x14d60E7FDC0D71d8611742720E4C50E7a974020c) totalSupply = 4,066,680.13 USCC (6 dec). - swell-sweth-rsweth-timelock-and-reprice-bounds [aligned_baseline] Swell (swETH / rswETH) — Sampled 7-Day SwellTimelock, ProxyAdmins & Reprice Bounds · Sprint 12 · block 26403676 (0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae) · target 0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b · swETH (0xf951E335afb289353dc249e82926178EaC7DEd78) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0x25EAf579cA2255fAA5463c635eec28697b5b8846) and rswETH (0xFAe103DC9cf190eD75350761e95403b7b8aFa6c0) EIP-1967 admin ProxyAdmin (0xD750B84845f1cAdfEAc63f96Ec74635e949bFd14) both resolve owner() to SwellTimelock (0xbA829003e6b5dD858fbed3945719939a6DC3073b, delay() = 604800s / 7d, admin() = 4-of-7 Safe 0x20fDF47509C5eFC0e1101e3CE443691781C17F90), which is also the sole PLATFORM_ADMIN on both AccessControlManagers (0x625087d72c762254a72CB22cC2ECa40da6b95EAC, 0x796592b2092F7E150C48643dA19Dd2F28be3333F); minimumRepriceTime = 3600s (1h), maximumRepriceDifferencePercentage = 1% (1e16); swETH totalSupply = 9,635.13 swETH, rswETH totalSupply = 10,363.44 rswETH. - curve-crvusd-factory-lending-owner-proxy [parameter_delta] Curve Finance (crvUSD) — ControllerFactory Admin Proxy & EmergencyDAO Debt-Ceiling Guard · Sprint 11 · block 26403523 (0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a) · target 0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC · ControllerFactory (0xC9332fdCB1C491Dcc683bAe86Fe3cb70360738BC) admin() = LendingOwnerProxy (0xeDA020b067872717901916a3B8C724C21f6080d1), where dao() = CurveOwnershipAgent (0x40907540d8a6C65c637785e8f8B742ae6b0b9968, Aragon voteTime = 604800s / 7d on 0xE478de485ad2fe566d49342Cbd03E49ed7DB3356) and emergency_dao() = 5-of-9 EmergencyDAO Safe (0x467947EE34aF926cF1DCac093870f613C96B1E0c); crvUSD (0xf939E0A03FB07F59A73314E73794Be0E57ac1b4E) minter() = ControllerFactory, totalSupply = 2,134,809,204.98 crvUSD; debt_ceiling(0x370a449FeBb9411c95bf897021377fe0B7D100c0) = 1,000,000,000 crvUSD. - gearbox-v3-legacy-timelock-and-instance-safe [parameter_delta] Gearbox V3 / V3.1 — LegacyTimelock Delay & InstanceManager Safe Quorum · Sprint 11 · block 26403523 (0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a) · target 0xa133C9A92Fb8dDB962Af1cbae58b2723A0bdf23b · LegacyTimelock (0xa133C9A92Fb8dDB962Af1cbae58b2723A0bdf23b) delay() = 129600s (36 hours, GIP-104), admin() = LegacyGovernor (0x29B97F37B3E0C704bCFD785F5b7bBa2A0B7df2c7); InstanceManager (0x77777777144339Bdc3aCceE992D8d4D31734CB2e) owner() = 4-of-21 Gnosis Safe (0x1E9ec044853611F4bCD4BBcFE7657508BD1c53D3); Tech (0xA7D5DDc1b8557914F158076b228AA91eF613f1D5, 6-of-12), Veto (0xbb803559B4D58b75E12dd74641AB955e8B0Df40E, 4-of-12), Treasury (0x7b065Fcb0760dF0CEA8CFd144e08554F3CeA73D1, 5-of-10), and Fee (0x3E965117A51186e41c2BB58b729A1e518A715e5F, 5-of-10) Guard Safes match documented thresholds. - lombard-lbtc-core-proxy-upgrade-timelock [aligned_baseline] Lombard (LBTC) — Sampled Core ProxyAdmin Wiring & 24h TimelockController · Sprint 11 · block 26403523 (0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a) · target 0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59 · LBTC (0x8236a87084f8B84306f72007F36F2618A5634494) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xbae061C73876952aa2C5e483B74DfA785425f879), whose owner() — along with AssetRouter ProxyAdmin (0xBf4202c8a0d852D432266dfE112ED624a1a36754) and Consortium ProxyAdmin (0x1629AE77cC70DaAc95Ec479caAEA23ECE77c67c5) — resolves to TimelockController (0x055E84e7FE8955E2781010B866f10Ef6E1E77e59, getMinDelay() = 86400s / 24h, EXECUTOR_ROLE held by 3-of-5 Safe 0x251a604E8E8f6906d60f8dedC5aAeb8CD38F4892 with Guard 0x87bde523e05Fee2C557d6F592F7EB686C69189Ab); LBTC totalSupply = 6,203.54 LBTC (8 dec). - resolv-usr-default-admin-delay-and-safe [aligned_baseline] Resolv (USR / RLP) — Sampled USR AccessControlDefaultAdminRules Delay & Request Counters · Sprint 11 · block 26403523 (0xfc7beaa2338e8054577c0b101b641bc42afca2af39cb85d3fc13cbee32d4681a) · target 0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110 · Sampled USR (0x66a1E37c9b0eAddca17d3662D6c05F4DECf3e110) defaultAdmin() = 4-of-6 Core Safe (0xD6889F307BE1b83Bb355d5DA7d4478FB0d2Af547) with defaultAdminDelay() = 86400s (1 day); sampled UsrExternalRequestsManager (0xa27a69Ae180e202fDe5D38189a3F24Fe24E55861) and RlpExternalRequestsManager (0xc7AB90c2Ea9271EFB31f5fA2843Eeb4B331eaFA0) return paused() = true; USR totalSupply = 6,085,929.53 USR, RLP (0x4956b52aE2fF65D74CA2d61207523288e4528f96) totalSupply = 1,592,731.62 RLP. - lido-dual-governance-emergency-timelock [aligned_baseline] Lido (stETH / Dual Governance) — EmergencyProtectedTimelock Delays, DualGovernance & Committee Safes · Sprint 10 · block 26403121 (0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c) · target 0xCE0425301C85c5Ea2A0873A2dEe44d78E02D2316 · EmergencyProtectedTimelock (0xCE0425301C85c5Ea2A0873A2dEe44d78E02D2316) getAfterSubmitDelay() = 259200s (3d), getAfterScheduleDelay() = 86400s (1d), getGovernance() = DualGovernance (0xC1db28B3301331277e307FDCfF8DE28242A4486E), getEmergencyProtectionDetails() = (2592000, 0, 1813449600); Emergency Activation (0x8B7854488Fde088d686Ea672B6ba1A5242515f45, 4-of-7 Safe), Emergency Execution (0xC7792b3F2B399bB0EdF53fECDceCeB97FBEB18AF, 5-of-7 Safe), Reseal (0xFFe21561251c49AdccFad065C94Fb4931dF49081, 5-of-6 Safe), and CircuitBreaker (0x8772E3a2D86B9347A2688f9bc1808A6d8917760C, 3-of-6 Safe); stETH totalSupply = 9,759,371.53 stETH. - mantle-lsp-meth-upgrade-timelock [protective_delta] Mantle Liquid Staking (mETH / cmETH) — Core Proxy EIP-1967 Admin Slot & 3-Day UpgradeTimelock · Sprint 10 · block 26403121 (0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c) · target 0xc26016f1166bE7b6c5611AAB104122E0f6c2aCE2 · mETH (0xd5F7838F5C461fefF7FE49ea5ebaF7728bB0ADfa) & Staking (0xe3cBd06D7dadB3F4e6557bAb7EdD924CD1489E8f) EIP-1967 admin slots point to UpgradeTimelock (0xc26016f1166bE7b6c5611AAB104122E0f6c2aCE2) with getMinDelay() = 259200s (3 days) and PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-14 Security Council Safe (0x4e59e778a0fb77fBb305637435C62FaeD9aED40f); mETH totalSupply = 217,256.94 mETH. - ondo-ousg-rate-limiter-and-flux-timelock [parameter_delta] Ondo Finance (OUSG & Flux Finance) — OUSG RateLimiter Global Subscription Limit & Flux 1d Timelock · Sprint 10 · block 26403121 (0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c) · target 0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c · RateLimiter (0x98Db502215Da1ad9F626D4a0090A8A2f4971003c) globalSubscriptionLimits(0x1B19C19393e2d034D8Ff31ff34c81252FcBbee92) word [2] = 100000000000000000000000000 ($100M per 86400s window), globalRedemptionLimits(OUSG) word [2] = 50000000000000000000000000 ($50M per 86400s); Flux Comptroller (0x95Af143a021DF745bc78e845b54591C53a8B3A51) admin() = FluxTimelock (0x2c5898da4DF1d45EAb2B7B192a361C3b9EB18d9c, delay() = 86400s / 1d, admin() = 0x336505EC1BcC1A020EeDe459f57581725D23465A); OUSG totalSupply = 1,110,569.33 OUSG. - symbiotic-core-immutable-registries-and-safes [aligned_baseline] Symbiotic Core — Sampled Non-Upgradeable Core Registries & Factory/Adapter Safes · Sprint 10 · block 26403121 (0x71acee2313a2c8eacd7d2c87667dc505310b3e9224d84eaebb71d5a890ef9d1c) · target 0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346 · VaultFactory (0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346), OperatorRegistry (0xAd817a6Bc954F678451A71363f04150FDD81Af9F), and NetworkRegistry (0xC773b1011461e7314CF05f97d95aa8e92C1Fd8aA) hold zero EIP-1967 implementation/admin slots (0x00...00); VaultFactory.owner() = 2-of-3 Gnosis Safe (0x5721ce64Ee0D772Ce613b62D411350091C544cD0); AdapterRegistry (0x788823C9579A049D986eB76718bC758C0998594a) owner() = 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe (0xf6BB2e64Bd201A862f2Fe5461fc7Ef01e2040b6A). - aave-v3-gho-acl-manager-and-executor-lvl1 [aligned_baseline] Aave V3 / GHO — ACLManager Admin Role, Executor Lvl1 Delay & Guardian Safe · Sprint 9 · block 26402160 (0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc) · target 0xc2aaCf6553D20d1e9d78E365AAba8032af9c85b0 · ACLManager hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A) = true; PayloadsController (0xdAbad81aF85554E9ae636395611C58F7eC1aAEc5) getExecutorSettingsByAccessControl(1) = (0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A, 86400s / 1d); EMERGENCY_ADMIN held by 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe (0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30); GHO (0x40D16FC0246aD3160Ccc09B8D0D3A2cD28aE6C2f) totalSupply = 699,000,000 GHO. - compound-v3-comet-timelock-and-pause-safe [aligned_baseline] Compound V3 (Comet) — Comet Governor, 48h Timelock & Pause-Guardian Safe · Sprint 9 · block 26402160 (0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc) · target 0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3 · Sampled cUSDCv3 (0xc3d688B66703497DAA19211EEdff47f25384cdc3) & cWETHv3 (0xA17581A9E3356d9A858b789D68B4d866e593aE94) governor() = CompoundTimelock (0x6d903f6003cca6255D85CcA4D3B5E5146dC33925, delay() = 172800s / 48h, admin() = CompoundGovernor 0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0); pauseGuardian() = 5-of-9 Community Pause Safe (0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c). - eigenlayer-core-proxy-admin-and-timelock [aligned_baseline] EigenLayer Core — Core ProxyAdmin, Dual-Owner Executor Safe & 10d Timelock · Sprint 9 · block 26402160 (0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc) · target 0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d · DelegationManager (0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A) EIP-1967 admin slot = Core ProxyAdmin (0x8b9566AdA63B64d1E1dcF1418b43fd1433b72444), owner() = 1-of-2 ExecutorMultisig (0x369e6F597e22EaB55fFb173C6d9cD234BD699111) shared between 10d TimelockController (0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d, getMinDelay() = 864000s) and 9-of-13 CommunityMultisig (0xFEA47018D632A77bA579846c840d5706705Dc598); pauserRegistry() = 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806. - kelp-dao-rseth-proxy-admin-and-timelock [aligned_baseline] Kelp DAO (rsETH) — ProxyAdmin 10d Timelock & LRTConfig Admin Safe · Sprint 9 · block 26402160 (0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc) · target 0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1 · rsETH (0xA1290d69c65A6Fe4DF752f95823fae25cB99e5A7) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0xb61e0E39b6d4030C36A176f576aaBE44BF59Dc78), owner() = TimelockController (0x49bD9989E31aD35B0A62c20BE86335196A3135B1, getMinDelay() = 864000s / 10d); LRTConfig (0x947Cb49334e6571ccBFEF1f1f1178d8469D65ec7) DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by 6-of-11 Safe (0xb3696a817D01C8623E66D156B6798291fa10a46d); rsETH totalSupply = 338,071.33 rsETH. - renzo-ezeth-deposit-queue-fee [parameter_delta] Renzo Protocol (ezETH) — DepositQueue.feeBasisPoints Parameter vs. Staking Docs · Sprint 8 · block 26401725 (0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1) · target 0xf2F305D14DCD8aaef887E0428B3c9534795D0d60 · feeBasisPoints() = 1500 (15%); Admin Multisig (0xD1e6626310fD54Eceb5b9a51dA2eC329D6D4B68A) is 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe; ezETH (0xbf5495Efe5DB9ce00f80364C8B423567e58d2110) totalSupply = 39,495.32 ezETH. - usual-money-registry-access-delay [parameter_delta] Usual Money (USD0 / USD0++) — OpenZeppelin AccessControlDefaultAdminRules Delay · Sprint 8 · block 26401725 (0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1) · target 0x0D374775E962c3608B8F0A4b8B10567DF739bb56 · defaultAdminDelay() = 1s (0x01); pendingDefaultAdminDelay() = (0, 0); defaultAdmin() = 0x6e9d65eC80D69b1f508560Bc7aeA5003db1f7FB7 (8-of-15 Gnosis Safe). - yearn-v3-role-manager-timelock [protective_delta] Yearn V3 — Sampled RoleManager.governance() Timelock Wiring · Sprint 8 · block 26401725 (0xec3820f0a9db32c01728e66f78dc1958e410269e1077fd1db53df4fbce2ad7a1) · target 0xb3bd6B2E61753C311EFbCF0111f75D29706D9a41 · governance() = 0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336B7090767F367BF73 (TimelockController, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7 days); getDaddy() = 0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52 (6-of-9 ychad.eth Safe); getBrain() = 0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7 (3-of-6 Safe). - ethena-admin-timelock-and-dev-safe [parameter_delta] Ethena (USDe / sUSDe) — TimelockController MinDelay & Dev Multisig Quorum · Sprint 7 · block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · target 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 · getMinDelay() = 86400s (1 day); Dev Multisig (0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862) getThreshold() = 5, getOwners().length = 10 (5-of-10 Gnosis Safe). - etherfi-core-timelocks [aligned_baseline] ether.fi Core (eETH / weETH) — Sampled Upgrade & Operating Timelock Delays · Sprint 7 · block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · target 0x9f26d4C958fD811A1F59B01B86Be7dFFc9d20761 · Upgrade Timelock getMinDelay() = 864000s (10 days); Operating Timelock (0xcD425f44758a08BaAB3C4908f3e3dE5776e45d7a) getMinDelay() = 172800s (2 days); LiquidityPool (0x308861A430be4cce5502d0A12724771Fc6DaF216) getTotalPooledEther = 2,276,605.53 ETH. - spark-sky-gsm-pause-delay [aligned_baseline] Spark / Sky — Sampled PoolAddressesProvider Owner & GSM Delay · Sprint 7 · block 26401638 (0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e) · target 0xbE286431454714F511008713973d3B053A2d38f3 · GSM_PAUSE_PROXY.delay() = 172800s (48 hours); Spark PoolAddressesProvider (0x02C3eA4e34C0cBd694D2adFa2c690EECbC1793eE) owner() = 0x3300f198988e4C9C63F75dF86De36421f06af8c4 (SPARK_PROXY). - liquity-v2-bold-immutability [aligned_baseline] Liquity V2 (BOLD) — Sampled Owner & EIP-1967 Slot Alignment · Sprint 6 · block 26401540 (0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641) · target 0x6440f144b7e50D6a8439336510312d2F54beB01D · BOLD.owner() = 0x0; Governance (0x807DEf5E7d057DF05C796F4bc75C3Fe82Bd6EeE1) owner() = 0x0; CollateralRegistry (0xf949982B91C8c61e952B3bA942cbbfaef5386684) EIP-1967 implementation slot = 0x00...00. - maple-v2-syrup-ppm-admin [parameter_delta] Maple Finance V2 / Syrup — EIP-1967 Proxy Admin Slot vs. GovernorTimelock · Sprint 6 · block 26401540 (0x49324aaf84b0ffd4e21026c5345272788bff377f0f86fcdb74280cdfc32a9641) · target 0xBe10aDcE8B6E3E02Db384E7FaDA5395DD113D8b3 · EIP-1967 admin slot holds 4-of-7 Maple DAO Safe (0xd6d4Bcde6c816F17889f1Dd3000aF0261B03a196); Globals.governor() (0x804a6F5F667170F545Bf14e5DDB48C70B788390C) points to GovernorTimelock (0x2eFFf88747EB5a3FF00d4d8d0f0800E306C0426b, getMinDelay = 259200s / 3d); syrupUSDC (0x80ac24aA929eaF5013f6436cdA2a7ba190f5Cc0b) totalAssets = 898,551,580.57 units (6 dec). - fluid-instadapp-vault-factory-auth [parameter_delta] Fluid / Instadapp — VaultFactory.isVaultAuth Migration Scope · Sprint 5 · block 26401405 (0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510) · target 0x324c5Dc1fC42c7a4D43d92df1eBA58a54d13Bf2d · isVaultAuth(vault, 0x4F6F977aCDD1177DCD81aB83074855EcB9C2D49e) returns true on Vault 76 (0x7FE0B032cB5982Af72498F96be3DD6566F7B7de8), Vault 110 (0xee327311D8640156E87eC33ea55FcbF2309e0ce6), Vault 111 (0x984636a30ed2B4A61FB7150CED644096349275d3), and Vault 144 (0x0e19B64F3A79FeeE12Df1b6f239929c6ab6C7ED0) per IGP-98 / IGP-126 migration configuration. - metamorpho-re7-weth-guardian-parity [parameter_delta] MetaMorpho (Re7 WETH vs. Re7 USDT) — Sampled MetaMorpho Vault Guardian Configuration · Sprint 5 · block 26401405 (0x26e155e1569d436406a52ecee31c94d8d8ef2ca4c45d82211a84c8c802be1510) · target 0x78Fc2c2eD1A4cDb5402365934aE5648aDAd094d0 · Re7 WETH owner() = 0xE86399fE6d7007FdEcb08A2ee1434Ee677a04433 (2-of-4 Safe), timelock() = 259200s (3d), guardian() = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000, pendingGuardian() = (0x0, 0); peer Re7 USDT (0x95EeF579155cd2C5510F312c8fA39208c3Be01a8) sets guardian() = 0x2F80ba89362f86a9acC71BFfE5EcF4997F52BDd4 (Aragon Guardian). - convex-booster-governance-chain [aligned_baseline] Convex Finance — Sampled Booster Governance Ownership Chain · Sprint 4 · block 26401312 (0x95866ea3ef8f9a0567ce000bc8075f6dc5fb0f1e80cb4e9999ae624a2f0dc109) · target 0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31 · Convex Booster (0xF403C135812408BFbE8713b5A23a04b3D48AAE31) owner() resolves via 0x3cE6408F923326f81A7D7929952947748180f1E6 -> 0x256e1bbA846611C37CF89844a02435E6C098b86D -> 3-of-5 DAO Multisig (0xa3C5A1e09150B75ff251c1a7815A07182c3de2FB) at block 26401312. - mellow-lido-earn-curator-quorum [parameter_delta] Mellow Protocol / Lido Earn — Curator Safe Quorum & Lazy Admin Signer Overlap · Sprint 4 · block 26401312 (0x95866ea3ef8f9a0567ce000bc8075f6dc5fb0f1e80cb4e9999ae624a2f0dc109) · target 0xe5abcc40196174Ae0d12153dE286F0D8E401769d · getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 5 (3-of-5 Gnosis Safe); DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on earnETH (0x6a37725ca7f4CE81c004c955f7280d5C704a249e) and earnUSD (0x014e6DA8F283C4aF65B2AA0f201438680A004452) held by 5-of-8 Lazy Vault Admin Safe (0x0Dd73341d6158a72b4D224541f1094188f57076E, Timelock 0x363Ba8843d06BA5968f55C26aB055162eDd62189 getMinDelay = 0s), where all 5 Curator signers are Lazy Vault Admin owners. - etherfi-liquid-veda-roles-authority [aligned_baseline] ether.fi Liquid / Veda BoringVault — Sampled RolesAuthority Owner & Timelock Wiring · Sprint 3 · block 26401070 (0xcf55f6a42ae610c1f8766b5c2fb676d91f178469fa10ef777eccbb76f6506234) · target 0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122 · AccountantWithRateProviders (0x0d05D94a5F1E76C18fbeB7A13d17C8a314088198) authority() = 0x485Bde66Bb668a51f2372E34e45B1c6226798122; RolesAuthority.owner() = 0xD829F278016b90FEc735F9A12Bf8b75E06102C89 (TimelockController, getMinDelay = 86400s / 1d at block 26401070). - morpho-blue-singleton-owner [aligned_baseline] Morpho Blue Core — Sampled Singleton Owner & Fee/LLTV Bounds · Sprint 3 · block 26401070 (0xcf55f6a42ae610c1f8766b5c2fb676d91f178469fa10ef777eccbb76f6506234) · target 0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb · Morpho Blue owner() = 0xcBa28b38103307Ec8dA98377ffF9816C164f9AFa and sampled fee/LLTV bounds match documentation at block 26401070. - fx-protocol-v2-treasury-admin [parameter_delta] f(x) Protocol v2 — ProtocolTreasury DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE Holders · Sprint 2 · block 26400152 (0xa9a61622304ec55c5fec49abbcabec60069f66f28792cf841bdd7aef12ce63aa) · target 0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6 · DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00) on all 4 v2 ProtocolTreasury proxies (0x32356FE312Eba9B7D6A157ad28D1ca91b571CdA6, 0xb178197E88D58Da21bE22A408E850d1e6Dc09A38, 0x6D9e81c5b7C4b37d0Fe9E8CDA776e057f4040868, 0x87d5e4cAaF4358A4337C10859c7107c7AEF4f8Ce) held directly by OpsSafe (0x26B2ec4E02ebe2F54583af25b647b1D619e67BbF, 6-of-9 Safe) and EmergencySafe (0x28c921adAC4c1072658eB01a28DA06b5F651eF62, 3-of-4 Safe), while Timelock (0x68863fb8855b04509a835082478D6E3D0bE4E61a, getMinDelay = 259200s) holds false. - inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe [parameter_delta] Inverse Finance (FiRM) — Policy Committee Safe Quorum & GovernorMills Timelock · Sprint 1 · block 26399876 (0x8bf896b892683ff3267b88b367ab015a70cf5caf53542eb405f4f648f6bcde8a) · target 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 · GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe (0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7) with getThreshold() = 4, getOwners().length = 7 (4-of-7 Gnosis Safe); GovernorMills.timelock() (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h). ## RPC-pinned records (from /api/v1/rpc-pinned.json; NOT EAS-attested) No sprint number, summary document or Base EAS UID: block-pinned public JSON-RPC reads, independently re-read at the same block. Classification rpc_observed: on-chain control plane pinned at an archive block height over JSON-RPC; documentation parameter comparison unassessed (documentation is linked for reference only). - 3f-control-plane [rpc_observed] 3F — ERC1967Factory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x54F862fa0612A8709F6Dec4A7B39AF015CD4E82E · ERC1967Factory (0x54F862fa0612A8709F6Dec4A7B39AF015CD4E82E) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (1,887 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/3f/ - adi-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] ADI Bridge — ADI · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x8B1484d57abBE239bB280661377363b03c89CaEa · ADI (0x8B1484d57abBE239bB280661377363b03c89CaEa) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (170 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x9cb8142aEBBcdc60AF7c97Af897A67A8f3CA71C2, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/adi-bridge/ - aera-v3-control-plane [rpc_observed] Aera V3 — MultiDepositorVaultFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x29722cC9a1cACff4a15914F9bC274B46F3b90B4F · MultiDepositorVaultFactory (0x29722cC9a1cACff4a15914F9bC274B46F3b90B4F) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (5,465 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns timelock (1 d delay) 0xce75E223E6DbB0503D2B6f55bC5907d1A0372E2B. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/aera-v3/ - anemoy-capital-control-plane [rpc_observed] Anemoy Capital — Janus Henderson Treasury Fund (Tranche) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x8c213ee79581Ff4984583C6a801e5263418C4b86 · Janus Henderson Treasury Fund (Tranche) (0x8c213ee79581Ff4984583C6a801e5263418C4b86) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (9,417 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/anemoy-capital/ - angle-control-plane [rpc_observed] Angle — ANGLE · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x31429d1856aD1377A8A0079410B297e1a9e214c2 · ANGLE (0x31429d1856aD1377A8A0079410B297e1a9e214c2) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (10,122 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/angle/ - ankr-control-plane [rpc_observed] Ankr — Ankr Network · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x8290333ceF9e6D528dD5618Fb97a76f268f3EDD4 · Ankr Network (0x8290333ceF9e6D528dD5618Fb97a76f268f3EDD4) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (5,479 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ankr/ - ao-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] AO Bridge — Distribution · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xfE08D40Eee53d64936D3128838867c867602665c · Distribution (0xfE08D40Eee53d64936D3128838867c867602665c) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (177 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x76488832A88475AF0aC223d8FD4d053177A012cc, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ao-bridge/ - apex-pro-control-plane [rpc_observed] ApeX Pro — ApeX Token · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x52A8845DF664D76C69d2EEa607CD793565aF42B8 · ApeX Token (0x52A8845DF664D76C69d2EEa607CD793565aF42B8) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (9,190 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/apex-pro/ - arkis-control-plane [rpc_observed] Arkis — AgreementFactory · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xEA623eebd9c5bFd56067e36C89Db0C13e6c70ba8 · AgreementFactory (0xEA623eebd9c5bFd56067e36C89Db0C13e6c70ba8) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,304 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x9Cd84E2587A78b424eC913Ac3fA23cA810e91776, admin 0x324adD185708E4Cc85546085849a27b9Ba75f0Bb. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0x324adD185708E4Cc85546085849a27b9Ba75f0Bb. That controller is in turn controlled by externally owned account (no code) 0xC0096A2032Cd8ad726181D1399C5F20768037fc1. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/arkis/ - aster-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Aster Bridge — AstherusVault · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x604DD02d620633Ae427888d41bfd15e38483736E · AstherusVault (0x604DD02d620633Ae427888d41bfd15e38483736E) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (855 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x2CC878ac49C3BF8B0f2B053af7845BA6590eEc4f, admin slot zero. DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member is Safe 4-of-7 0x1FE3Fe2Ddd19AB58B0c56054a5AF217Afb27eCEA. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/aster-bridge/ - augur-control-plane [rpc_observed] Augur — Reputation · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x221657776846890989a759BA2973e427DfF5C9bB · Reputation (0x221657776846890989a759BA2973e427DfF5C9bB) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (7,860 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/augur/ - autofinance-control-plane [rpc_observed] AUTOfinance — SystemRegistry · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x2218F90A98b0C070676f249EF44834686dAa4285 · SystemRegistry (0x2218F90A98b0C070676f249EF44834686dAa4285) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (9,299 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 6-of-11 0x8b4334d4812C530574Bd4F2763FcD22dE94A969B. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/autofinance/ - avalon-superearn-control-plane [rpc_observed] Avalon Superearn — AVL (AvalonMintable) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x5c8D0C48810FD37A0A824D074ee290E64f7A8Fa2 · AVL (AvalonMintable) (0x5c8D0C48810FD37A0A824D074ee290E64f7A8Fa2) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,739 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x3228995749610Bea00b59C44F8d1df21C14027F1, admin 0x1792f73b586F3e931B51826195Ff015a23C86009. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0x1792f73b586F3e931B51826195Ff015a23C86009. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 4-of-5 0xbA7468D7ACcd1Bb2E346a003ab1713C3d8C4Da6d. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/avalon-superearn/ - avant-aveth-control-plane [rpc_observed] Avant avETH — avETH (AvantCoin) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x9469470C9878bf3d6d0604831d9A3A366156f7EE · avETH (AvantCoin) (0x9469470C9878bf3d6d0604831d9A3A366156f7EE) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (6,253 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns externally owned account (no code) 0xd4d23209aaE8630bf386b7393763a5b7865e57cb. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/avant-aveth/ - badger-dao-control-plane [rpc_observed] Badger DAO — Badger (MiniMeToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x3472A5A71965499acd81997a54BBA8D852C6E53d · Badger (MiniMeToken) (0x3472A5A71965499acd81997a54BBA8D852C6E53d) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (7,440 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/badger-dao/ - baseline-protocol-control-plane [rpc_observed] Baseline Protocol — Baseline (BToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x9fDbDE76236998Dc2836FE67A9954eDE456A1D63 · Baseline (BToken) (0x9fDbDE76236998Dc2836FE67A9954eDE456A1D63) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,573 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/baseline-protocol/ - blast-pre-launch-farm-control-plane [rpc_observed] Blast pre-launch Farm — LaunchBridge · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x5F6AE08B8AeB7078cf2F96AFb089D7c9f51DA47d · LaunchBridge (0x5F6AE08B8AeB7078cf2F96AFb089D7c9f51DA47d) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (792 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x0bD88b59D580549285f0A207Db5F06bf24a8e561, admin slot zero. Direct owner() returns Safe 5-of-5 0x67CA7Ca75b69711cfd48B44eC3F64E469BaF608C. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/blast-pre-launch-farm/ - blur-bids-control-plane [rpc_observed] Blur Bids — Blur · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x5283D291DBCF85356A21bA090E6db59121208b44 · Blur (0x5283D291DBCF85356A21bA090E6db59121208b44) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (8,696 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 5-of-5 0x6e596823A8c9c48Eb6Fa4aB2208F34B97453A327. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/blur-bids/ - bmx-freestyle-control-plane [rpc_observed] BMX Freestyle — MultiAccount · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0x6D63921D8203044f6AbaD8F346d3AEa9A2719dDD · MultiAccount (0x6D63921D8203044f6AbaD8F346d3AEa9A2719dDD) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (2,227 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x589910C5836711a779eDf19Fce2935dc7aC95107, admin 0x5db3C638235b14520Ebd617267cAC0b108Be3157. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0x5db3C638235b14520Ebd617267cAC0b108Be3157. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 3-of-7 0x5146C35725d9b8F11A84ebD4a3abe9845698Ada9. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/bmx-freestyle/ - brickken-control-plane [rpc_observed] Brickken — Brickken · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x0A638F07ACc6969abF392bB009f216D22aDEa36d · Brickken (0x0A638F07ACc6969abF392bB009f216D22aDEa36d) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (10,653 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/brickken/ - chamber-vaults-control-plane [rpc_observed] Chamber Vaults — dHedge DAO Token (DHedgeTokenProxy) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xca1207647Ff814039530D7d35df0e1Dd2e91Fa84 · dHedge DAO Token (DHedgeTokenProxy) (0xca1207647Ff814039530D7d35df0e1Dd2e91Fa84) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (1,589 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x50a6B25101173B41E41C1A30A5bae42f213b2687, admin 0x5a76f841bFe5182f04bf511fC0Ecf88C27189FCB. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds Safe 3-of-5 0x5a76f841bFe5182f04bf511fC0Ecf88C27189FCB. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/chamber-vaults/ - clipper-control-plane [rpc_observed] Clipper — SAIL Token · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xd8F1460044925d2D5c723C7054cd9247027415B7 · SAIL Token (0xd8F1460044925d2D5c723C7054cd9247027415B7) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (13,151 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-9 0xD8Cc0304de58fCE5147796606Db14500d94b5EF2. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/clipper/ - concentrator-control-plane [rpc_observed] Concentrator — Concentrator Token (Vyper_contract) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xb3Ad645dB386D7F6D753B2b9C3F4B853DA6890B8 · Concentrator Token (Vyper_contract) (0xb3Ad645dB386D7F6D753B2b9C3F4B853DA6890B8) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (3,412 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct admin() returns Safe 6-of-9 0xA0FB1b11ccA5871fb0225B64308e249B97804E99. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/concentrator/ - convergence-fi-control-plane [rpc_observed] Convergence Fi — CvgControlTowerV2 · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xB0Afc8363b8F36E0ccE5D54251e20720FfaeaeE7 · CvgControlTowerV2 (0xB0Afc8363b8F36E0ccE5D54251e20720FfaeaeE7) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,109 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xbdbdDc4bF67e9Bc02706e4Ce53BC14d6cE3038f1, admin 0xF16d93ACF337de38ee55dfb2F2A276883FF59e89. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0xF16d93ACF337de38ee55dfb2F2A276883FF59e89. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 3-of-6 0x0af815364BD9e9E60f3d2D3bAc1320B77d3E35F7. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/convergence-fi/ - creth2-control-plane [rpc_observed] CRETH2 — Cream (Comp) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x2ba592F78dB6436527729929AAf6c908497cB200 · Cream (Comp) (0x2ba592F78dB6436527729929AAf6c908497cB200) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (6,790 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/creth2/ - cronos-zkevm-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Cronos zkEVM Bridge — Cronos zkEVM CRO (ZkCro) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x28Ff2E4dD1B58efEB0fC138602A28D5aE81e44e2 · Cronos zkEVM CRO (ZkCro) (0x28Ff2E4dD1B58efEB0fC138602A28D5aE81e44e2) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (170 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x34B35beD5AceD7C4472De906912Acb3e4C4616A5, admin slot zero. DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member is externally owned account (no code) 0x65b5cFaad25c39063A248684DA546cAB1Cc46cf5. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/cronos-zkevm-bridge/ - d2-finance-control-plane [rpc_observed] D2 Finance — DRV++ (VaultV3) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x07Dff4087b43c4A759f4Fc69511c26d51929dAF4 · DRV++ (VaultV3) (0x07Dff4087b43c4A759f4Fc69511c26d51929dAF4) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (23,568 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 2-of-3 0xBB856548bCD0EBa1749c2336244139F1dbE93498. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/d2-finance/ - defil-control-plane [rpc_observed] DeFIL — DeFIL-V2 (DFL) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x09ce2B746C32528B7d864A1e3979Bd97d2f095AB · DeFIL-V2 (DFL) (0x09ce2B746C32528B7d864A1e3979Bd97d2f095AB) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (8,469 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract Unitroller 0x6B4F20B2259Eebb97945b6EF549a1c44FcA6Cd81. That controller is in turn controlled by externally owned account (no code) 0x557EdaaFD875569F0bd6AbaE1185c17fD5A30Ba0. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/defil/ - delv-yield-control-plane [rpc_observed] DELV Yield — TrancheFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x62F161BF3692E4015BefB05A03a94A40f520d1c0 · TrancheFactory (0x62F161BF3692E4015BefB05A03a94A40f520d1c0) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (13,566 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/delv-yield/ - derivadex-control-plane [rpc_observed] DerivaDEX — DerivaDAO (DDX) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x3A880652F47bFaa771908C07Dd8673A787dAEd3A · DerivaDAO (DDX) (0x3A880652F47bFaa771908C07Dd8673A787dAEd3A) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (13,644 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/derivadex/ - derive-v3-options-control-plane [rpc_observed] Derive V3 Options — Derive · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xB1D1eae60EEA9525032a6DCb4c1CE336a1dE71BE · Derive (0xB1D1eae60EEA9525032a6DCb4c1CE336a1dE71BE) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (1,167 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x4909AD99441Ea5311b90a94650C394cEa4A881B8, admin 0xaA7b17C2539437Efa236FED262A5815358Ae2CC3. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0xaA7b17C2539437Efa236FED262A5815358Ae2CC3. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/derive-v3-options/ - dexfi-aggregator-control-plane [rpc_observed] DexFi Aggregator — DexFiVaultFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x4C1a8a04577286Ce58d0723b1a90160F380E550A · DexFiVaultFactory (0x4C1a8a04577286Ce58d0723b1a90160F380E550A) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (16,297 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 2-of-3 0x76e1736ea8Cda4d0Ed4923B8E119586716C5725f. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/dexfi-aggregator/ - dodo-amm-control-plane [rpc_observed] DODO AMM — DODO bird · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x43Dfc4159D86F3A37A5A4B3D4580b888ad7d4DDd · DODO bird (0x43Dfc4159D86F3A37A5A4B3D4580b888ad7d4DDd) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (1,995 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/dodo-amm/ - drakewell-usddw-control-plane [rpc_observed] Drakewell USDdw — JUSD Credit Vault (AccountableAsyncRedeemVault) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x2B5895b716311A1eaC8f93fB88C56aF9eC8C1A69 · JUSD Credit Vault (AccountableAsyncRedeemVault) (0x2B5895b716311A1eaC8f93fB88C56aF9eC8C1A69) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (18,511 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/drakewell-usddw/ - dxsale-control-plane [rpc_observed] DxSale — DxSale.Network (MainToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xF063fE1aB7a291c5d06a86e14730b00BF24cB589 · DxSale.Network (MainToken) (0xF063fE1aB7a291c5d06a86e14730b00BF24cB589) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (6,700 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/dxsale/ - easedefi-org-control-plane [rpc_observed] Easedefi.org — Ease Token · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xEa5eDef1287AfDF9Eb8A46f9773AbFc10820c61c · Ease Token (0xEa5eDef1287AfDF9Eb8A46f9773AbFc10820c61c) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (3,255 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/easedefi-org/ - edgex-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] edgeX Bridge — Edge · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xB0076DE78Dc50581770BBa1D211dDc0aD4F2a241 · Edge (0xB0076DE78Dc50581770BBa1D211dDc0aD4F2a241) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (136 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x9406dD76452c172B3CC77092B42398e87daB3161, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/edgex-bridge/ - eigenpie-control-plane [rpc_observed] Eigenpie — EigenpieConfig · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x20b70E4A1883b81429533FeD944d7957121c7CAB · EigenpieConfig (0x20b70E4A1883b81429533FeD944d7957121c7CAB) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,837 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x416dFb213f640B18E367A91Fd39E6EE0F55f6753, admin 0xaF69B55b083AB19893D5Ff18213b3E67875E01F3. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0xaF69B55b083AB19893D5Ff18213b3E67875E01F3. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 3-of-7 0xf433c2A2D6FACeCDd9Edd7B8cE9cEaaB96F41866. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/eigenpie/ - elfomofi-control-plane [rpc_observed] ElfomoFi — VaultsManager · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0x64f8bE47A011DF0fAB47319d5De258D18E93f4ef · VaultsManager (0x64f8bE47A011DF0fAB47319d5De258D18E93f4ef) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (16,167 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-5 0x1a0554f4832a0901709b9C13BBE459f72f7b9ACb. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/elfomofi/ - extra-finance-base-control-plane [rpc_observed] Extra Finance (Base) — ExtraLendingPool_Base · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Role Architecture · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0xBB505c54D71E9e599cB8435b4F0cEEc05fC71cbD · ExtraLendingPool_Base (0xBB505c54D71E9e599cB8435b4F0cEEc05fC71cbD) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (20,198 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns governance controller contract 0x5a70429e0e5c7BE9E5F83B497C18F5AC82345113. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/extra-finance-base/ - fake-world-assets-v2-control-plane [rpc_observed] Fake World Assets V2 — Fake World Assets (FWAToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845 · Fake World Assets (FWAToken) (0xa0Df17B5aC76ABaBA36E1450E2cbCd18A620C845) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (11,394 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns externally owned account (no code) 0x019817aD02a31B990433542097bE29D97613E8Cb. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/fake-world-assets-v2/ - fermiswap-control-plane [rpc_observed] FermiSwap — FermiSwapper · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xb1076fE3AB5e28005C7c323Bac5AC06a680d452e · FermiSwapper (0xb1076fE3AB5e28005C7c323Bac5AC06a680d452e) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (10,182 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/fermiswap/ - flexa-control-plane [rpc_observed] Flexa — Amp · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xfF20817765cB7f73d4bde2e66e067E58D11095C2 · Amp (0xfF20817765cB7f73d4bde2e66e067E58D11095C2) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (13,920 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract contract 0x533a36b5e56C1f0361a53d4395F4F0c5f1AD63f8. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/flexa/ - flokifi-locker-control-plane [rpc_observed] FlokiFi Locker — FLOKI · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xcf0C122c6b73ff809C693DB761e7BaeBe62b6a2E · FLOKI (0xcf0C122c6b73ff809C693DB761e7BaeBe62b6a2E) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (8,007 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns externally owned account (no code) 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/flokifi-locker/ - frankencoin-control-plane [rpc_observed] Frankencoin — Frankencoin Shares (FCS) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xDb861830D9Ae2d1fCF99fA0cfd3973de382B0B5b · Frankencoin Shares (FCS) (0xDb861830D9Ae2d1fCF99fA0cfd3973de382B0B5b) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (11,451 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/frankencoin/ - friend-tech-v1-control-plane [rpc_observed] friend.tech V1 — FRIEND (Points) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0x0bD4887f7D41B35CD75DFF9FfeE2856106f86670 · FRIEND (Points) (0x0bD4887f7D41B35CD75DFF9FfeE2856106f86670) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (6,037 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/friend-tech-v1/ - geth-control-plane [rpc_observed] GETH — Guarded Ether (StakeToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x3802c218221390025BCEABBaD5D8C59F40eB74B8 · Guarded Ether (StakeToken) (0x3802c218221390025BCEABBaD5D8C59F40eB74B8) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (5,764 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/geth/ - glif-control-plane [rpc_observed] GLIF — Staked ICNT (PoolV2) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0xAeD7C2eD7Bb84396AfCB55fF72c8F8E87FFb68f3 · Staked ICNT (PoolV2) (0xAeD7C2eD7Bb84396AfCB55fF72c8F8E87FFb68f3) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (141 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x530a0cDd4E5f24A5BE77587146A05056c35edcEb, admin slot zero. Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-6 0x5CC0FC29C893Bba884D3E073997C97Bf776dA9F3. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/glif/ - gondi-v3-control-plane [rpc_observed] Gondi V3 — GONDI_MULTI_SOURCE_LOAN (MultiSourceLoan) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xf65B99CE6DC5F6c556172BCC0Ff27D3665a7d9A8 · GONDI_MULTI_SOURCE_LOAN (MultiSourceLoan) (0xf65B99CE6DC5F6c556172BCC0Ff27D3665a7d9A8) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (24,576 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns externally owned account (no code) 0xE9c9Ef882f534a21d74b084845348044d03aca85. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/gondi-v3/ - gro-control-plane [rpc_observed] Gro — Gro DAO Token · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x3Ec8798B81485A254928B70CDA1cf0A2BB0B74D7 · Gro DAO Token (0x3Ec8798B81485A254928B70CDA1cf0A2BB0B74D7) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (5,256 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-7 0x359F4fe841f246a095a82cb26F5819E10a91fe0d. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/gro/ - grvt-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Grvt Bridge — GRVT (GRVTToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xAD29F2723fcdBcF665F210F25E06f97477e417cF · GRVT (GRVTToken) (0xAD29F2723fcdBcF665F210F25E06f97477e417cF) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (3,953 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/grvt-bridge/ - harvest-finance-control-plane [rpc_observed] Harvest Finance — FARM Reward Token · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xa0246c9032bC3A600820415aE600c6388619A14D · FARM Reward Token (0xa0246c9032bC3A600820415aE600c6388619A14D) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (4,746 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/harvest-finance/ - hegic-control-plane [rpc_observed] Hegic — Hegic · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x584bC13c7D411c00c01A62e8019472dE68768430 · Hegic (0x584bC13c7D411c00c01A62e8019472dE68768430) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,546 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/hegic/ - hyperlane-control-plane [rpc_observed] Hyperlane — XERC20Lockbox · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x6D265C7dD8d76F25155F1a7687C693FDC1220D12 · XERC20Lockbox (0x6D265C7dD8d76F25155F1a7687C693FDC1220D12) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (1,563 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/hyperlane/ - ichi-control-plane [rpc_observed] ICHI — ICHI (IchiV2) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x111111517e4929D3dcbdfa7CCe55d30d4B6BC4d6 · ICHI (IchiV2) (0x111111517e4929D3dcbdfa7CCe55d30d4B6BC4d6) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (11,873 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ichi/ - idex-v1-control-plane [rpc_observed] IDEX V1 — IDEX Token (IDEX) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xB705268213D593B8FD88d3FDEFF93AFF5CbDcfAE · IDEX Token (IDEX) (0xB705268213D593B8FD88d3FDEFF93AFF5CbDcfAE) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,437 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/idex-v1/ - injective-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Injective Bridge — Injective Token · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xe28b3B32B6c345A34Ff64674606124Dd5Aceca30 · Injective Token (0xe28b3B32B6c345A34Ff64674606124Dd5Aceca30) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (4,324 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/injective-bridge/ - interest-protocol-control-plane [rpc_observed] Interest Protocol — USDI Token · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x2A54bA2964C8Cd459Dc568853F79813a60761B58 · USDI Token (0x2A54bA2964C8Cd459Dc568853F79813a60761B58) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,151 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x57d0E13F353d630ab5218aC841C88985AB31A066, admin 0x3D9d8c08dC16Aa104b5B24aBDd1aD857e2c0D8C5. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0x3D9d8c08dC16Aa104b5B24aBDd1aD857e2c0D8C5. That controller is in turn controlled by externally owned account (no code) 0x3CB68a6762041aA05E762814A8791CA9d98E79A0. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/interest-protocol/ - juicebox-v1-control-plane [rpc_observed] Juicebox V1 — Juicebox (Tickets) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x3abF2A4f8452cCC2CF7b4C1e4663147600646f66 · Juicebox (Tickets) (0x3abF2A4f8452cCC2CF7b4C1e4663147600646f66) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (5,940 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract TicketBooth 0xee2eBCcB7CDb34a8A822b589F9E8427C24351bfc. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/juicebox-v1/ - k3-capital-control-plane [rpc_observed] K3 Capital — MigratableEntityProxy · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xdC47953c816531a8CA9E1D461AB53687d48EEA26 · MigratableEntityProxy (0xdC47953c816531a8CA9E1D461AB53687d48EEA26) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (808 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xDd649AdaB2e67cAdC2EC29d75ABe73f3Df08065c, admin 0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract VaultFactory 0xAEb6bdd95c502390db8f52c8909F703E9Af6a346. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 2-of-3 0x5721ce64Ee0D772Ce613b62D411350091C544cD0. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/k3-capital/ - kine-finance-control-plane [rpc_observed] Kine Finance — Unitroller · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xbB7D94a423f4978545ecf73161f0678e8AfD1a92 · Unitroller (0xbB7D94a423f4978545ecf73161f0678e8AfD1a92) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (1,533 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct admin() returns timelock (2 d delay) 0x9E8e622e0bA0deE491Fbc42d1Bb12Ab947e2D03B. That controller is in turn controlled by contract KineMultiSigWallet 0xa6e17aE4b683Ed2Ee7cB7414A92bD8316f330191. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/kine-finance/ - king-protocol-control-plane [rpc_observed] King Protocol — King Protocol (UUPSProxy) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x8F08B70456eb22f6109F57b8fafE862ED28E6040 · King Protocol (UUPSProxy) (0x8F08B70456eb22f6109F57b8fafE862ED28E6040) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (141 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x1cB489ef513E1Cc35C4657c91853A2E6fF1957dE, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/king-protocol/ - landx-finance-control-plane [rpc_observed] LandX Finance — LandX Governance Token (LNDX) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x08A1C30BBB26425c1031ee9E43FA0B9960742539 · LandX Governance Token (LNDX) (0x08A1C30BBB26425c1031ee9E43FA0B9960742539) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (22,113 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 2-of-3 0xf44Bc45368Fb7f6ffC74C5545326Aa0F068b6d4c. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/landx-finance/ - lazy-control-plane [rpc_observed] Lazy — LazyUSD (LazyUSDVault) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xd53B68fB4eb907c3c1E348CD7d7bEDE34f763805 · LazyUSD (LazyUSDVault) (0xd53B68fB4eb907c3c1E348CD7d7bEDE34f763805) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (15,843 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/lazy/ - ledgity-yield-control-plane [rpc_observed] Ledgity Yield — Ledgity Token (LDY) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x482dF7483a52496F4C65AB499966dfcdf4DDFDbc · Ledgity Token (LDY) (0x482dF7483a52496F4C65AB499966dfcdf4DDFDbc) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (6,041 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 2-of-3 0x30Fa557608017afB6E8e4ABe8027787C00473FF0. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ledgity-yield/ - legion-control-plane [rpc_observed] Legion — LegionPreLiquidSaleV2Factory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xa0BeB0A8C765482c128a2986c063AF5C3171ff2F · LegionPreLiquidSaleV2Factory (0xa0BeB0A8C765482c128a2986c063AF5C3171ff2F) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,941 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract LegionBouncer 0x4a7aCA57A685c9E893F60a716415E5e588500533. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 2-of-3 0x17C61f4a7f41b96eb9c0D8805255b8411387c63b. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/legion/ - lendflare-control-plane [rpc_observed] LendFlare — LendFlare DAO Token (LendFlareProxy) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xB620Be8a1949AA9532e6a3510132864EF9Bc3F82 · LendFlare DAO Token (LendFlareProxy) (0xB620Be8a1949AA9532e6a3510132864EF9Bc3F82) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,092 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xEf9423D140C8009597d1185b4b6d5302df21ca0f, admin 0xc413AcBb126fa228d7E3d1943bA506b507C91aF7. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds externally owned account (no code) 0xc413AcBb126fa228d7E3d1943bA506b507C91aF7. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/lendflare/ - lighter-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Lighter Bridge — Lighter · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x232CE3bd40fCd6f80f3d55A522d03f25Df784Ee2 · Lighter (0x232CE3bd40fCd6f80f3d55A522d03f25Df784Ee2) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (4,137 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/lighter-bridge/ - metis-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Metis Bridge — Metis Token (MToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x9E32b13ce7f2E80A01932B42553652E053D6ed8e · Metis Token (MToken) (0x9E32b13ce7f2E80A01932B42553652E053D6ed8e) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (8,912 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/metis-bridge/ - metronome-synth-control-plane [rpc_observed] Metronome Synth — Metronome2 · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x2Ebd53d035150f328bd754D6DC66B99B0eDB89aa · Metronome2 (0x2Ebd53d035150f328bd754D6DC66B99B0eDB89aa) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (15,045 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-5 0xd1DE3F9CD4AE2F23DA941a67cA4C739f8dD9Af33. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/metronome-synth/ - monolith-market-control-plane [rpc_observed] Monolith Market — Factory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x6D961c9DCF1AD73566822BA4B087892e3839B849 · Factory (0x6D961c9DCF1AD73566822BA4B087892e3839B849) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (5,071 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/monolith-market/ - morph-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Morph Bridge — L1CrossDomainMessenger · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xDc71366EFFA760804DCFC3EDF87fa2A6f1623304 · L1CrossDomainMessenger (0xDc71366EFFA760804DCFC3EDF87fa2A6f1623304) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,796 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x0cC37d5239F9027A1269f53D83c73084D538f3a9, admin 0x31110622D6CA24c9FF307d6ae1715F16E47F16A0. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0x31110622D6CA24c9FF307d6ae1715F16E47F16A0. That controller is in turn controlled by timelock (0 s delay) 0x542675E90E269F20ecbb9e0095d4751ac155B530. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/morph-bridge/ - mortgagefi-control-plane [rpc_observed] MortgageFi — mortgagefi-earn-usdc-weth (mortgagefipoolusdcweth) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0x1bE87D273d47C3832Ab7853812E9A995A4DE9EEA · mortgagefi-earn-usdc-weth (mortgagefipoolusdcweth) (0x1bE87D273d47C3832Ab7853812E9A995A4DE9EEA) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (17,646 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/mortgagefi/ - multichain-control-plane [rpc_observed] Multichain — Multichain (AnyswapV5ERC20) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x9Fb9a33956351cf4fa040f65A13b835A3C8764E3 · Multichain (AnyswapV5ERC20) (0x9Fb9a33956351cf4fa040f65A13b835A3C8764E3) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (10,660 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract AnyswapV3Router 0xe95fD76CF16008c12FF3b3a937CB16Cd9Cc20284. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/multichain/ - nami-control-plane [rpc_observed] Nami — BatcherAccountProxyFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x0100000002935Dce071f4AFA607b961575672b4C · BatcherAccountProxyFactory (0x0100000002935Dce071f4AFA607b961575672b4C) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (9,446 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 4-of-7 0x892081a87803B32559afC0Ad7b28a39E657fD844. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/nami/ - native-credit-pool-control-plane [rpc_observed] Native Credit Pool — CreditVault · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xe3D41d19564922C9952f692C5Dd0563030f5f2EF · CreditVault (0xe3D41d19564922C9952f692C5Dd0563030f5f2EF) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (20,743 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract contract 0x9b9Dc7c56e18cfdA57D402CA7Ded491b1544DC56. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 3-of-5 0x83fc28e6962E41e38F7854308eFF827E3f6b906B. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/native-credit-pool/ - nftx-control-plane [rpc_observed] NFTX — NFTX (MiniMeToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x87d73E916D7057945c9BcD8cdd94e42A6F47f776 · NFTX (MiniMeToken) (0x87d73E916D7057945c9BcD8cdd94e42A6F47f776) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (7,440 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/nftx/ - nodedao-control-plane [rpc_observed] NodeDAO — NodeDAOView · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xd7C049CD4ba216679ecC04Eb2767cC5E39812121 · NodeDAOView (0xd7C049CD4ba216679ecC04Eb2767cC5E39812121) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (708 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x857BF02B1f5fD85E064e6726658eA1864a14d948, admin slot zero. Direct owner() returns timelock (1 h delay) 0x16F692525f3b8c8a96F8c945D365Da958Fb5735B. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/nodedao/ - nucleus-control-plane [rpc_observed] Nucleus — Boba Native Yield Nucleus Token (BoringVault) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x52E4d8989fa8b3E1C06696e7b16DEf5d7707A0d1 · Boba Native Yield Nucleus Token (BoringVault) (0x52E4d8989fa8b3E1C06696e7b16DEf5d7707A0d1) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (7,494 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-5 0x0000000000417626Ef34D62C4DC189b021603f2F. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/nucleus/ - opengdp-shared-security-control-plane [rpc_observed] OpenGDP Shared Security — VaultSupervisor · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x54e44DbB92dBA848ACe27F44c0CB4268981eF1CC · VaultSupervisor (0x54e44DbB92dBA848ACe27F44c0CB4268981eF1CC) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (127 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x3788f64A0805f3eC777Ce26080BB2EeeB29C1199, admin slot zero. Direct owner() returns timelock (2 d delay) 0x275ac9C64eF372f528F7c87D3a987D1e3d76Ca65. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/opengdp-shared-security/ - origami-finance-control-plane [rpc_observed] Origami Finance — Origami SKY+ Auto-Compounder (OrigamiDelegated4626Vault) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x07c5500359161b81eb0DfFF83097d5025D3cF5A2 · Origami SKY+ Auto-Compounder (OrigamiDelegated4626Vault) (0x07c5500359161b81eb0DfFF83097d5025D3cF5A2) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (15,404 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 2-of-4 0x781B4c57100738095222bd92D37B07ed034AB696. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/origami-finance/ - outcome-finance-control-plane [rpc_observed] Outcome Finance — LongShortPairCreator · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x0b8de441B26E36f461b2748919ed71f50593A67b · LongShortPairCreator (0x0b8de441B26E36f461b2748919ed71f50593A67b) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (13,594 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/outcome-finance/ - overtime-control-plane [rpc_observed] Overtime — Overtime DAO Token (OverToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x90cE5720c17587D28E4Af120ae2d313B3BAD1722 · Overtime DAO Token (OverToken) (0x90cE5720c17587D28E4Af120ae2d313B3BAD1722) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (4,561 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns externally owned account (no code) 0x4dA7493C2CE2BEce36e75AaDdF39D5c041B6d468. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/overtime/ - pancakeswap-amm-v3-control-plane [rpc_observed] PancakeSwap AMM V3 — PlunderV3Factory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x0BFbCF9fa4f9C56B0F40a671Ad40E0805A091865 · PlunderV3Factory (0x0BFbCF9fa4f9C56B0F40a671Ad40E0805A091865) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (5,151 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract V3OpenFeeAdapter 0x0f6f9A6dd9f065DC4455bb2B8e3F0CFFB6F2410c. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 3-of-7 0x21835332cBDf1b3530fAE9f6Cd66FEB9477dFC02. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/pancakeswap-amm-v3/ - paradex-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Paradex Bridge — DIME · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xb32E10022FFBeDfE10bc818a1C7e67D9d87e0fa7 · DIME (0xb32E10022FFBeDfE10bc818a1C7e67D9d87e0fa7) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (170 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x515244B743dde07925d2D9e6478930528AE5e3Fc, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/paradex-bridge/ - pirex-control-plane [rpc_observed] Pirex — BTRFLY (BTRFLYV2) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xc55126051B22eBb829D00368f4B12Bde432de5Da · BTRFLY (BTRFLYV2) (0xc55126051B22eBb829D00368f4B12Bde432de5Da) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (4,729 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/pirex/ - punks-terminal-control-plane [rpc_observed] Punks Terminal — StashFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x000000000000A6fA31F5fC51c1640aAc76866750 · StashFactory (0x000000000000A6fA31F5fC51c1640aAc76866750) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (3,974 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract contract 0xb07603da6B63C936566F0A29856FbD52829b4605. That controller is in turn controlled by externally owned account (no code) 0x83Ea85356358411Ce320e1909Cc75DBd216d6182. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/punks-terminal/ - quickswap-v4-control-plane [rpc_observed] Quickswap V4 — AlgebraFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0xC5396866754799B9720125B104AE01d935Ab9C7b · AlgebraFactory (0xC5396866754799B9720125B104AE01d935Ab9C7b) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (10,699 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-5 0xDA1077c4b0dd6da1BDF166F30aa4BDbF517d637b. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/quickswap-v4/ - reflexer-control-plane [rpc_observed] Reflexer — Flex Ungovernance Token (DSDelegateToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x6243d8CEA23066d098a15582d81a598b4e8391F4 · Flex Ungovernance Token (DSDelegateToken) (0x6243d8CEA23066d098a15582d81a598b4e8391F4) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (15,011 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct authority() returns contract ProtocolTokenAuthority 0xcb8479840A5576B1cafBb3FA7276e04Df122FDc7. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/reflexer/ - ribbon-control-plane [rpc_observed] Ribbon — Ribbon · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x6123B0049F904d730dB3C36a31167D9d4121fA6B · Ribbon (0x6123B0049F904d730dB3C36a31167D9d4121fA6B) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (5,288 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ribbon/ - ring-few-control-plane [rpc_observed] Ring Few — FewFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x7D86394139bf1122E82FDF45Bb4e3b038A4464DD · FewFactory (0x7D86394139bf1122E82FDF45Bb4e3b038A4464DD) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (11,754 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ring-few/ - rockawayx-control-plane [rpc_observed] RockawayX — Ember Y10K (EmberVault) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x953972ea0C1703c58F09FB6fD2477Fdcf0FEe074 · Ember Y10K (EmberVault) (0x953972ea0C1703c58F09FB6fD2477Fdcf0FEe074) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (170 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xd0Ac2Cd802604702DF874Bc45AEE88E8884B896D, admin slot zero. Direct owner() returns timelock (1 d delay) 0x12917E06b55995e7a5D73681cE491774C73b7C6a. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/rockawayx/ - royco-v2-control-plane [rpc_observed] Royco V2 — RoycoFactory · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x7cC6fB28eC7b5e7afC3cB3986141797ffc27253C · RoycoFactory (0x7cC6fB28eC7b5e7afC3cB3986141797ffc27253C) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (87 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x34DB2f4215e55ec8e2c3dE0a826935EBF158be77, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/royco-v2/ - saffron-vaults-control-plane [rpc_observed] Saffron Vaults — Spice (SFI) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xb753428af26E81097e7fD17f40c88aaA3E04902c · Spice (SFI) (0xb753428af26E81097e7fD17f40c88aaA3E04902c) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (6,094 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/saffron-vaults/ - sato-control-plane [rpc_observed] SATO — SatoHook · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x0000f07d2B5F1Ddf3244b8780F972f306EFd2888 · SatoHook (0x0000f07d2B5F1Ddf3244b8780F972f306EFd2888) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (8,576 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/sato/ - saturn-control-plane [rpc_observed] Saturn — USDat · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x23238f20b894f29041f48D88eE91131C395Aaa71 · USDat (0x23238f20b894f29041f48D88eE91131C395Aaa71) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (761 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x496a4A33b6181F4536203488d9a05AC1429E702c, admin 0xcf1072DA5f0D127AEf99136489BAd08bFa3D1A7D. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0xcf1072DA5f0D127AEf99136489BAd08bFa3D1A7D. That controller is in turn controlled by timelock (5 d delay) 0xfD5782E3BFF366601da3973aE30C583dE4F08A67. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/saturn/ - sierra-protocol-control-plane [rpc_observed] Sierra Protocol — SOL Staking Yield Vault · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xe1b1252652A2FF0CC3A4214eE73d9FeD1FEa5b4f · SOL Staking Yield Vault (0xe1b1252652A2FF0CC3A4214eE73d9FeD1FEa5b4f) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (332 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct admin() returns externally owned account (no code) 0xbd0Ca95C5A104E14E60d0868667AF174D146C9FD. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/sierra-protocol/ - smardex-usdn-control-plane [rpc_observed] SMARDEX USDN — UsdnProtocolImpl · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x656cB8C6d154Aad29d8771384089be5B5141f01a · UsdnProtocolImpl (0x656cB8C6d154Aad29d8771384089be5B5141f01a) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (176 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x271df5517a4DaacB7caB988Aa64D23dEbda4c498, admin slot zero. Direct owner() returns Safe 2-of-3 0x1E3e1128F6bC2264a19D7a065982696d356879c5. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/smardex-usdn/ - sport-fun-control-plane [rpc_observed] Sport.fun — Sport.fun · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0x16EE7ecAc70d1028E7712751E2Ee6BA808a7dd92 · Sport.fun (0x16EE7ecAc70d1028E7712751E2Ee6BA808a7dd92) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (141 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x14ad363A292a2d837dFf864556663ec9Fa958Cb6, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/sport-fun/ - stablehodl-control-plane [rpc_observed] StableHodl — stake_pool · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x109D3042a3c682F94107b3818e93b3aDE2A47544 · stake_pool (0x109D3042a3c682F94107b3818e93b3aDE2A47544) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (170 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xc34DF695167aA2F9571976fFD5e3E0E95A53E470, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/stablehodl/ - stafi-control-plane [rpc_observed] Stafi — StaFi (FISToken) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xef3A930e1FfFFAcd2fc13434aC81bD278B0ecC8d · StaFi (FISToken) (0xef3A930e1FfFFAcd2fc13434aC81bD278B0ecC8d) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (9,840 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/stafi/ - starknet-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Starknet Bridge — StarkNet Token · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xCa14007Eff0dB1f8135f4C25B34De49AB0d42766 · StarkNet Token (0xCa14007Eff0dB1f8135f4C25B34De49AB0d42766) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (11,561 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/starknet-bridge/ - steer-protocol-control-plane [rpc_observed] Steer Protocol — SteerPeriphery · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xCEBF1A54A9Ce703FC80967760b5A6cbDb4111099 · SteerPeriphery (0xCEBF1A54A9Ce703FC80967760b5A6cbDb4111099) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,004 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xAc7D3A933c44b4D4bad6D5F0685900482E0d995E, admin 0xEB2D829FFbE494FC6535b0E4EB807EFd4b6BF0Bd. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0xEB2D829FFbE494FC6535b0E4EB807EFd4b6BF0Bd. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 2-of-5 0x570cE31D1309bb145DD3736B48c7328cc13f7e85. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/steer-protocol/ - supernova-cl-control-plane [rpc_observed] Supernova CL — AlgebraFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x44B7fBd4D87149eFa5347c451E74B9FD18E89c55 · AlgebraFactory (0x44B7fBd4D87149eFa5347c451E74B9FD18E89c55) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (10,874 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 4-of-8 0xB73494c3FB46Bf5cFC08f32A704fa180110d9226. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/supernova-cl/ - symbiosis-control-plane [rpc_observed] Symbiosis — Symbiosis · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xd38BB40815d2B0c2d2c866e0c72c5728ffC76dd9 · Symbiosis (0xd38BB40815d2B0c2d2c866e0c72c5728ffC76dd9) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (9,178 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/symbiosis/ - synapse-cross-chain-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Synapse Cross Chain Bridge — Synapse · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x0f2D719407FdBeFF09D87557AbB7232601FD9F29 · Synapse (0x0f2D719407FdBeFF09D87557AbB7232601FD9F29) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (45 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member is Safe 2-of-3 0x67F60b0891EBD842Ebe55E4CCcA1098d7Aac1A55. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/synapse-cross-chain-bridge/ - syntropia-control-plane [rpc_observed] Syntropia — Syntropia USDC Core · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x1b2CB79a4564206f53Ba80b4d780F251b4Ae6765 · Syntropia USDC Core (0x1b2CB79a4564206f53Ba80b4d780F251b4Ae6765) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (1,427 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xE50554ec802375C9c3F9c087a8a7bb8C26d3DEDf, admin 0x78AC58ED54018F5ccd5F5De2D7c0AE40800f2cf4. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract contract 0x78AC58ED54018F5ccd5F5De2D7c0AE40800f2cf4. That controller is in turn controlled by externally owned account (no code) 0x3daB62f33E7032bD33C532808092D033887EB456. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/syntropia/ - team-finance-control-plane [rpc_observed] Team Finance — TrustSwap Token (SwapToken) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xCC4304A31d09258b0029eA7FE63d032f52e44EFe · TrustSwap Token (SwapToken) (0xCC4304A31d09258b0029eA7FE63d032f52e44EFe) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,240 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xffe273a973c66da5b8ad6772f2476dBd6491034e, admin 0x088a012BF6d510aa923c814eA83807f75F7061A0. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds Safe 2-of-4 0x088a012BF6d510aa923c814eA83807f75F7061A0. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/team-finance/ - theo-network-thusd-control-plane [rpc_observed] Theo Network thUSD — thUSD · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xa3fE5c7596024E6811E14F029937D5bd8Ae485b3 · thUSD (0xa3fE5c7596024E6811E14F029937D5bd8Ae485b3) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (130 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xCD04F57464d25F257089A286AAb47DF096d300Ad, admin slot zero. Direct owner() returns timelock (2 d delay) 0x2bB4b7E6E83FA6b77d0143dad631843cB73DCA02. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/theo-network-thusd/ - tokenworks-control-plane [rpc_observed] TokenWorks — NFTStrategyFactory · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xA1a196b5BE89Be04a2c1dc71643689CE013c22e5 · NFTStrategyFactory (0xA1a196b5BE89Be04a2c1dc71643689CE013c22e5) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (15,864 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns externally owned account (no code) 0x019817aD02a31B990433542097bE29D97613E8Cb. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/tokenworks/ - tornado-cash-control-plane [rpc_observed] Tornado Cash — TornadoCash (TORN) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x77777FeDdddFfC19Ff86DB637967013e6C6A116C · TornadoCash (TORN) (0x77777FeDdddFfC19Ff86DB637967013e6C6A116C) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (8,839 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/tornado-cash/ - ultrayield-vaults-control-plane [rpc_observed] UltraYield Vaults — Stable Gain Vault (UUPSProxy) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x8ECC0B419dfe3AE197BC96f2a03636b5E1BE91db · Stable Gain Vault (UUPSProxy) (0x8ECC0B419dfe3AE197BC96f2a03636b5E1BE91db) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (122 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xE66f6a37C807F71591854e22075b3A613B46abe2, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ultrayield-vaults/ - uncx-network-v2-control-plane [rpc_observed] UNCX Network V2 — UniCrypt (UNCX) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xaDB2437e6F65682B85F814fBc12FeC0508A7B1D0 · UniCrypt (UNCX) (0xaDB2437e6F65682B85F814fBc12FeC0508A7B1D0) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (11,974 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns externally owned account (no code) 0x60e2E1b2a317EdfC870b6Fc6886F69083FB2099a. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/uncx-network-v2/ - unitus-control-plane [rpc_observed] Unitus — Unitus (UnitusCompOFT) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x3B6564b5DA73A41d3A66e6558a98FD0e9E1e77ad · Unitus (UnitusCompOFT) (0x3B6564b5DA73A41d3A66e6558a98FD0e9E1e77ad) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,227 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xC42aEce42Fb38437aFBBdFa0773e6C2C756e03E9, admin 0x22C34BdBE18A8bc8Edf7A6C69a03a5B2F2ed45F4. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin2Step 0x22C34BdBE18A8bc8Edf7A6C69a03a5B2F2ed45F4. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 3-of-5 0xd6F77422cF2825Cfa241CeaDD85d905D38255e58. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/unitus/ - unslashed-control-plane [rpc_observed] Unslashed — Unslashed Finance Governance Token (USF) · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xE0e05c43c097B0982Db6c9d626c4eb9e95C3b9ce · Unslashed Finance Governance Token (USF) (0xE0e05c43c097B0982Db6c9d626c4eb9e95C3b9ce) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (11,619 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/unslashed/ - usdt0-control-plane [rpc_observed] USDT0 — OAdapterUpgradeable · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x6C96dE32CEa08842dcc4058c14d3aaAD7Fa41dee · OAdapterUpgradeable (0x6C96dE32CEa08842dcc4058c14d3aaAD7Fa41dee) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,739 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xCD979B10A55FCdAC23ec785CE3066c6ef8a479A4, admin 0x4de7096B2131E84Fd6b2042AD8cd9B4E43F728Fc. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0x4de7096B2131E84Fd6b2042AD8cd9B4E43F728Fc. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 3-of-5 0x4DFF9b5b0143E642a3F63a5bcf2d1C328e600bf8. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/usdt0/ - veda-control-plane [rpc_observed] Veda — ArcticArchitectureLens · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x5232bc0F5999f8dA604c42E1748A13a170F94A1B · ArcticArchitectureLens (0x5232bc0F5999f8dA604c42E1748A13a170F94A1B) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (3,470 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/veda/ - wan-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Wan Bridge — CrossProxy · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xfCeAAaEB8D564a9D0e71Ef36f027b9D162bC334e · CrossProxy (0xfCeAAaEB8D564a9D0e71Ef36f027b9D162bC334e) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,179 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns contract GroupApprove 0xA1223a59a55eAad135BCe9F513181C388072cC71. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/wan-bridge/ - wildcat-protocol-control-plane [rpc_observed] Wildcat Protocol — WildcatArchController · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xfEB516d9D946dD487A9346F6fee11f40C6945eE4 · WildcatArchController (0xfEB516d9D946dD487A9346F6fee11f40C6945eE4) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (8,724 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-5 0xC15bE5214978d1fc509ECdd4f9D5BC067C94D9Ae. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/wildcat-protocol/ - woofi-earn-control-plane [rpc_observed] WOOFi Earn — Wootrade Network · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x4691937a7508860F876c9c0a2a617E7d9E945D4B · Wootrade Network (0x4691937a7508860F876c9c0a2a617E7d9E945D4B) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (4,011 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/woofi-earn/ - world-chain-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] World Chain Bridge — AnchorStateRegistry · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x90BB48fe3310499Db36437dCAE642F721e32d094 · AnchorStateRegistry (0x90BB48fe3310499Db36437dCAE642F721e32d094) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (2,059 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281, admin 0xd7405BE7f3e63b094Af6C7C23D5eE33Fd82F872D. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0xd7405BE7f3e63b094Af6C7C23D5eE33Fd82F872D. That controller is in turn controlled by Safe 3-of-6 0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/world-chain-bridge/ - xsy-control-plane [rpc_observed] XSY — Unity (UTY) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0xBA515304d8153c4b162dC79f867E152DF9c127eb · Unity (UTY) (0xBA515304d8153c4b162dC79f867E152DF9c127eb) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (122 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xF2F6E1a62d3d1f0efB01C28e485f1dC8B173cE2B, admin slot zero. Direct owner() returns Safe 3-of-4 0xB237EB3c71a0f351BD121b0C467248473fbC2ccA. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/xsy/ - yieldfi-control-plane [rpc_observed] YieldFi — YieldFi yUSD (YToken) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x19Ebd191f7A24ECE672ba13A302212b5eF7F35cb · YieldFi yUSD (YToken) (0x19Ebd191f7A24ECE672ba13A302212b5eF7F35cb) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (793 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x5bf44d32260AeE6b807c490e92eF0481D15Ab493, admin 0xE26E1D2ae51dcB89E382CA7400b080e6632117B9. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract contract 0xE26E1D2ae51dcB89E382CA7400b080e6632117B9. That controller is in turn controlled by timelock (1 d delay) 0x8E31eFdA4453494a84Fa6168D53Eb1418c0b4aC4. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/yieldfi/ - yuzu-money-control-plane [rpc_observed] Yuzu Money — Yuzu Cash (YuzuILPV3) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0x224e90591A2d63fb66E677D0561Ea4A6Ad1F098D · Yuzu Cash (YuzuILPV3) (0x224e90591A2d63fb66E677D0561Ea4A6Ad1F098D) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (793 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0x577C202011Dd122Bcb0ad1bf4a71e01E9F999b68, admin 0x1af1878e8d9E7263236529eCAdAcD345781538d0. The EIP-1967 admin slot holds contract ProxyAdmin 0x1af1878e8d9E7263236529eCAdAcD345781538d0. That controller is in turn controlled by timelock (2 d delay) 0xD2160Ad387C592010650B3BFE14a5e1A17DC7E5e. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/yuzu-money/ - zerobase-cedefi-control-plane [rpc_observed] ZEROBASE CeDeFi — ZEROBASE · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xfAB99fCF605fD8f4593EDb70A43bA56542777777 · ZEROBASE (0xfAB99fCF605fD8f4593EDb70A43bA56542777777) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (23,055 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). Direct owner() returns Safe 2-of-3 0xa14f20130E9a0a27D580FD30FD4bbF035a492AB2. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/zerobase-cedefi/ - zora-bridge-control-plane [rpc_observed] Zora Bridge — Zora · Non-Proxy Bytecode & Controller · Base block 60070202 (0x01b3f5dcecb67c63ba33350ec6942563f6b8a0d8ca9b4f69a752844a5bab4a20) · target 0x1111111111166b7FE7bd91427724B487980aFc69 · Zora (0x1111111111166b7FE7bd91427724B487980aFc69) verified on Base Mainnet at canonical block #60,070,202 (12,018 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 implementation and admin storage slots are both zero (non-EIP-1967 contract). No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/zora-bridge/ - ztln-p-control-plane [rpc_observed] ZTLN-P — Zoth Tokenized Liquid Notes Prime (ZTLNPrime) · EIP-1967 Proxy & Controller Chain · Ethereum block 26458556 (0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2) · target 0xfEd3D6557Dc46A1B25d0A6F666513Cb33835864B · Zoth Tokenized Liquid Notes Prime (ZTLNPrime) (0xfEd3D6557Dc46A1B25d0A6F666513Cb33835864B) verified on Ethereum Mainnet at canonical block #26,458,556 (93 bytes runtime code). EIP-1967 proxy: implementation 0xf5429683A15340a859dFdbD1B2De37b1ea77c2d5, admin slot zero. No owner(), admin(), authority(), curator() or AccessControl admin was readable on the contract. · page https://pacta.wtf/protocols/ztln-p/ ## Scope - Observations of on-chain state at the stated blocks; not code audits, reserve attestations or investment advice. - Exploit-sensitive vulnerabilities are never published here; they go through Immunefi or Cantina bounty programmes. - Pacta reads governance forums and never posts on them.