Protocol docs drift.
The chain doesn’t.
Pacta reads who can upgrade, pause or change 316 DeFi protocols on Ethereum and Base, and flags where that differs from their docs. Every finding is pinned to a block and attested onchain.
Free, read-only check — select or type a protocol or token (Aave, Lido, Pendle, Moonwell, LBTC, ETHx), or paste any 0x… contract address. No API key, no wallet. Runs when you press Check or pick an example below.
Building an agent? Use the MCP serverRun a protocol? For protocol teams
Stader ETHx
- Docs say
- Manager Safe is 3-of-5
- Chain says
- Manager Safe is 3-of-6
- Finalized block
- Ethereum #26,403,676
- Base EAS UID
- 0x7caae9c2…b16de9
63 of 316 protocols differ from their docs: 56 adverse, 7 protective.
Listed and verifiable:Official MCP Registry (v0.1.5)Glama MCP listingawesome-mcp-servers (merged #19455)Base Mainnet EAS schemaOpenAPI 3.1
How it works
Three steps for every protocol, and two ways to use the result.
Read the docs
We record what each protocol publishes about who can upgrade, pause or change its contracts, and how long changes must wait.
Read the chain at a finalized block
We read the live contracts at a finalized block on two independent RPC providers: owners, multisig quorums, timelock delays and roles.
Attest the difference on Base
Each result is attested on Base with EAS, so anyone can re-check it later with one command.
RosetteStrongModerateWeakNot determinedLonger, greener slices are stronger. Clockwise from the top: upgradeability, timelock floor, signer quorum, emergency scope, docs-vs-chain parity.
Remote MCP over Streamable HTTP and a REST API: 60 requests / minute per caller, free, no API key, no wallet. Remote tools: 7 read-only inspection tools + 1 opt-in coverage/feature request tool (pacta_submit_request).
claude mcp add --transport http pacta https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp
{
"mcpServers": {
"pacta": {
"url": "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp"
}
}
}curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=base&address=0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913" # Re-read an indexed record yourself at its pinned block: Stader Labs (ETHx) cast call 0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26403676 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403676 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae
Protocol scorecards
8 of 316 protocols, highest signal first: adverse deltas, then protective and aligned references. Search or filter to load all 316.
Aligned means the docs are accurate, not that the protocol is low-risk.
RosetteStrongModerateWeakNot determinedLonger, greener slices are stronger. Clockwise from the top: upgradeability, timelock floor, signer quorum, emergency scope, docs-vs-chain parity.
| Protocol | Docs vs chain | Control-plane rosette | What differs | Expand |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | Delta | Manager Safe: docs 3-of-5 · chain 3-of-6 | ||
Docs say: staderlabs.gitbook.io/ethereum states 'The Manager multisig is a 3-of-5 and is tasked with maintaining the protocol' and specifies a 7-day minimum delay on contract upgrades. Chain says: Manager Safe (0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF) getThreshold() = 3, getOwners().length = 6 (3-of-6 Gnosis Safe); ETHx (0xA35b1B31Ce002FBF2058D22F30f95D405200A15b) EIP-1967 admin slot = ProxyAdmin (0x67B12264Ca3e0037Fc7E22F2457b42643a04C86e), owner() = TimelockController (0x1112D5C55670Cb5144BF36114C20a122908068B9, getMinDelay() = 604800s / 7d, PROPOSER_ROLE held by 6-of-9 Community Safe 0x45B977CeCB9Dfaa17dFcBa88826ef684b8489fF6), which also holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on ETHx and StaderConfig (0x4ABEF2263d5A5ED582FC9A9789a41D85b68d69DB); ETHx MINTER_ROLE held by StakePoolsManager (0xcf5EA1b38380f6aF39068375516Daf40Ed70D299), totalSupply = 58,434.16 ETHx (18 dec).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xAAfb31780e4b9c95Bc920e388f4925A874cd07AF \ "getThreshold()" \ --block 26403676 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26403676 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xf4246ca23c4c38d520de16080a11b5186d04c8242b2c85edcb04c455d291c3ae | ||||
| Base | Delta | Timelock delay: docs 2 days · chain none | ||
Docs say: docs.yo.xyz (YO V2 Security Framework): 'Approval Registry: Onchain, timelocked caps on how much of each asset a vault may approve to each contract' and 'Every path a dollar can take is written into immutable adapters and timelocked registries' Chain says: YoApprovalRegistry 0xB4b3F5C964A360bBd7201f72a55D0c48B8aD7021: owner() = YO Admin Multisig 0x67b6F699F1c8040414032a3C2C88a54db144FCd2 (4-of-6 Safe, v1.4.1, no modules), not the YO Timelock 0x38cE5e45D0f5d03E83863bb19B3b1A272C186F48; pendingOwner() = 0; not a proxy (Sourcify exact match). It is the approvalRegistry() of yoETH 0x3A43AEC53490CB9Fa922847385D82fe25d0E9De7 and yoUSD 0x0000000f2eB9f69274678c76222B35eEc7588a65; the Pool, BridgeRoute, MorphoMarket, SwapPair and ERC4626Vault registries are also owned directly by the Admin Multisig.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xB4b3F5C964A360bBd7201f72a55D0c48B8aD7021 \ "owner()" \ --block 58315414 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 58315414 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x5092b494a9f8555faecfaa0f49202536e0edcf26f2bdc6e25a563442258119cd | ||||
| Base | Delta | Pause guardian: docs 3-of-5 Security Council · chain 2-of-4 Safe | ||
Docs say: Moonwell DAO Constitution 8.1: 'The Security Council has the power to execute any pause functionality, or perform other required actions with no delay ... Performing any Emergency Action requires a 3-of-5 approval from the Security Council.' Chain says: Unitroller (0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C).pauseGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x5B710010586C1b728B047c3E42473c700eeA4026 (v1.4.1); 1 of its 4 owner addresses is also an owner of the 3-of-5 Security Council Safe 0x446342AF4F3bCD374276891C6bb3411bf2F8779E. borrowCapGuardian() = supplyCapGuardian() = 2-of-4 Safe 0x08eDEbFFaE68970DCf751baa826182b3a4aCFC05.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xfBb21d0380beE3312B33c4353c8936a0F13EF26C \ "pauseGuardian()" \ --block 57842915 --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" cast block 57842915 --field hash --rpc-url "$BASE_RPC_URL" # expect 0x7ae27f2be8e931c33ac284c8d5c548c8fd7a68f08e18bb372c70e2ca3b4bd129 | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Timelock delay: docs 7 days · chain 1 day | ||
Docs say: key-trust-assumptions.md lists 7-day time-locks and 7 signatures (key-addresses.md lists 5/11); Risk Committee forum topic 810 (Jul 2026) notes 1-day delay. Chain says: getMinDelay() = 86400s (1 day); Dev Multisig (0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862) getThreshold() = 5, getOwners().length = 10 (5-of-10 Gnosis Safe).
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26401638 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26401638 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xe62ad2969617ad07c23bec298c3d5e197ea7c3084f7f66c90d2eb51d04c6273e | ||||
| Ethereum | Delta | Deployment config lists an older gateway implementation; 3-day timelock with operator path | ||
Docs say: axelar-contract-deployments (mainnet config, chains.ethereum, linked from docs.axelar.dev): '"implementation": "0x99B5FA03a5ea4315725c43346e55a6A6fbd94098"' / '"authModule": "0xE3B83f79Fbf01B25659f8A814945aB82186A8AD0"' Chain says: AxelarGateway 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5: implementation() = 0x16C22cbDD77350b1AC88AdDA344F691c12f41960, authModule() = 0x3d3C73E91B1b0C243f1437F2d8363b1D5B093BD0 (whose owner() is the gateway); the deployment config lists implementation 0x99B5FA03a5ea4315725c43346e55a6A6fbd94098 and auth module 0xE3B83f79Fbf01B25659f8A814945aB82186A8AD0.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5 \ "authModule()" \ --block 26434786 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26434786 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xb712439847099ec3e8b1617aafd1bc7ece29e22a88dc4e7c8afcf05e6944d987 | ||||
| Ethereum | Protective | USDtb PSM is owned by a 24-hour timelock, not the Dev multisig directly | ||
Docs say: docs.ethena.fi key addresses (Dev multisig): '5/11 signers.' and 'Owner of Ethena's deployed mainnet smart contracts & able to modify contract parameters.' Chain says: PSM (0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728).owner() = EthenaTimelockController 0xE8Dc0Fab349EA169283C48Ccfd09d797E6DB7c94 (getMinDelay() = 86400s), which also holds the PSM DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (the Dev multisig does not); the Dev multisig 0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862 (5-of-10, v1.3.0) holds PROPOSER_ROLE, CANCELLER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE on the timelock; asset() = USDtb, isSwapEnabled() = true.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0x73E35C5c35A274E34AdE6EB13cC7f62aEE323728 \ "owner()" \ --block 26422243 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26422243 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xbbe80f9ef9966a9d04cea23db216847f8c8fcc8d66f87c215dc7f712f0743410 | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | ACL admin role, executor delay and Guardian Safe match the docs | ||
Docs say: Aave V3 & Governance v3 address book specifies Level 1 Short Executor (1-day execution delay) and 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe. Chain says: ACLManager hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A) = true; PayloadsController (0xdAbad81aF85554E9ae636395611C58F7eC1aAEc5) getExecutorSettingsByAccessControl(1) = (0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A, 86400s / 1d); EMERGENCY_ADMIN held by 4-of-7 Protocol Guardian Safe (0x2CFe3ec4d5a6811f4B8067F0DE7e47DfA938Aa30); GHO (0x40D16FC0246aD3160Ccc09B8D0D3A2cD28aE6C2f) totalSupply = 699,000,000 GHO.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xc2aaCf6553D20d1e9d78E365AAba8032af9c85b0 \ "hasRole(bytes32,address)" 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0x5300A1a15135EA4dc7aD5a167152C01EFc9b192A \ --block 26402160 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26402160 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc | ||||
| Ethereum | Aligned | Core ProxyAdmin, executor Safe and 10-day Timelock match the docs | ||
Docs say: Layr-Labs/eigenlayer-contracts main README documents Core ProxyAdmin, 10-day TimelockController + CommunityMultisig Executor wrapper, and PauserRegistry 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806. Chain says: DelegationManager (0x39053D51B77DC0d36036Fc1fCc8Cb819df8Ef37A) EIP-1967 admin slot = Core ProxyAdmin (0x8b9566AdA63B64d1E1dcF1418b43fd1433b72444), owner() = 1-of-2 ExecutorMultisig (0x369e6F597e22EaB55fFb173C6d9cD234BD699111) shared between 10d TimelockController (0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d, getMinDelay() = 864000s) and 9-of-13 CommunityMultisig (0xFEA47018D632A77bA579846c840d5706705Dc598); pauserRegistry() = 0xB8765ed72235d279c3Fb53936E4606db0Ef12806.
Reproduce on any archive node cast call 0xC06Fd4F821eaC1fF1ae8067b36342899b57BAa2d \ "getMinDelay()" \ --block 26402160 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" cast block 26402160 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL" # expect 0xd04a5e8aa3500c5b60d90c25a810ef28eb9d1bfffadf28f1da58a31ed90582dc | ||||
No protocol matches these filters.
Queued timelock radar
Governance changes waiting in onchain timelocks, and when each one can execute.
Every row is a live Ethereum Mainnet or Base timelock read, no demo data: read at Ethereum finalized block #26,457,377 and Base finalized block #59,999,187.
| Protocol | Queued operation | Execution window | Brief |
|---|---|---|---|
| ether.fiPENDING | ether.fi — LayerZero V2 delegate moved behind the 10-day timelock | ETA 2026-11-20 16:54 UTC2026-11-20 16:54 UTC · 10d delay | Read brief |
| Compound V3PENDING | Compound V3 — all 25.94 WETH of reserves on Linea's cWETHv3 withdrawn and bridged to the Ethereum Timelock | ETA 2026-11-20 18:58 UTC2026-11-20 18:58 UTC · 2d delay | Read brief |
| Yearn V3PENDING | Yearn V3 — 8 new strategies added to 6 vaults with max-debt caps | ETA 2026-11-23 16:39 UTC2026-11-23 16:39 UTC · 7d delay | Read brief |
| TreehouseEXECUTED | Treehouse TREE — UUPS upgrade adding Blacklistable | Executed: isOperationDone = true at block #26,457,377 | Read brief |
| LombardEXECUTED | Lombard — AssetRouter, BTC.b and LBTC upgrades adding a fixed deposit fee | Executed: isOperationDone = true at block #26,457,377 | Read brief |
| Beefy Finance (Base)EXECUTED | Beefy CLM USDC-VVV on Aerodrome — calm-check tolerance widened from 9 to 25 ticks | Executed: isOperationDone = true at Base block #59,999,187 | Read brief |
| EthenaEXECUTED | Ethena USDe — mint caps cut to 50M per block, USDm delisted, a custodian added | Executed: isOperationDone = true at block #26,457,377 | Read brief |
| EthenaEXECUTED | Ethena USDe — RLUSD & USAT collateral onboarding | Executed: isOperationDone = true at block #26,457,377 | Read brief |
| ether.fi LiquidEXECUTED | ether.fi Liquid — strategist Merkle roots rotated on liquidUSD, liquidETH and liquidBTC | Executed: isOperationDone = true at block #26,457,377 | Read brief |
| CapEXECUTED | Cap — EigenLayer service-manager upgrade: slashes paid out only after EigenLayer's resolution delay | Executed: isOperationDone = true at block #26,457,377 | Read brief |
| LombardEXECUTED | Lombard — LBTC and BTC.b deposit fees set to 2,000 sats; minimum request doubled | Executed: isOperationDone = true at block #26,457,377 | Read brief |
| Lista LendingEXECUTED | Lista Lending — four liquidator upgrades add an emergency pause; PAUSER to a 1-of-15 Safe and the EmergencySwitchHub | Executed: isOperationDone = true at block #26,457,377 | Read brief |
Also built for agents and protocol teams
The same data, two more ways in.
AI agents & builders
Pre-execution contract checks over MCP or REST: 60 requests / minute per caller, no key, no wallet.
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
params={"chain": "base", "address": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])import json, urllib.request
cards = json.load(urllib.request.urlopen("https://pacta.wtf/api/v1/scorecards.json"))
print(len(cards["protocols"]), "protocols")Claude Code, Cursor, curl and cast commands
Remote MCP (7 read-only inspection tools + 1 opt-in coverage/feature request tool (pacta_submit_request)) · 60 requests / minute per caller.
Protocol & security teams
Keep your public docs and your onchain authority aligned.
Send a free doc-update notice, commission a 24h verification dossier, and embed a live Base-EAS status badge in your docs. Paid work never changes a result.
[](https://pacta.wtf/protocols/aave-v3-gho/)
Pricing
Every scorecard, the API and the MCP server are free. Paid work is verification for protocol teams.
Pacta never sells grades.
Free scorecards, API & MCP
$0No key, no wallet
- All 316 scorecards and Base EAS proofs, free, with live re-check on demand
- 50 free preflight / wallet-exposure checks a day, then $0.01 a call over x402
- Free doc-update queue, typically 6–8 weeks
Full Wallet & Safe Exposure Report
$9USDC · one-time
- Read-only Multicall3 scan across Ethereum & Base holdings
- Cross-position signer overlap, Safe exit-window check & all held gaps
- Signed SHA-256 Committee Receipt + printable report
Live Timelock & Signer Webhook
$49USDC / month
- Timelocks and Safes polled every 30 minutes on Ethereum and Base
- Alerts before queued upgrades or signer rotations execute
- Slack, Telegram, Discord or any HTTPS webhook
24h Mainnet Control-Plane Seal
$99USDC · regular $500
- Maintainer and independent verifier re-check within 24h
- Safe Transaction Builder JSON and an upstream docs PR
- Base EAS attestation of the observed result
Paid work never changes a result: dossiers, monitoring and seals can still read Delta when docs and chain diverge.
Exploit-sensitive vulnerabilities are never published here. They go through the protocol’s Immunefi or Cantina bounty programme.
When code changes are needed, Pacta can refer teams to independent smart-contract auditors; under our Independence Policy, referrals never influence docs-vs-chain status.