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Liquidity-pool bridge between chains run by a state guardian network (Ethereum)

cBridge: control-plane safety record

1 indexed control-plane surface for cBridge, pinned to a canonical Ethereum block and compared with what the protocol documents. Contract: 0x5427…1820

What differs

Changed / discrepant

  • Pool Bridge signers: owner can resetSigners after 7-day notice; owner = 3-of-5 EOA governance: cBridge Bridge 0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820 (Ethereum, not a proxy; verified source): withdraw() and relay() accept a message signed by the stored signer set, and resetSigners … observed vs 'It is only when nodes with more than ⅔ of the total stake are malicious, that the fund pool will be at risk.' documented
    Show the full onchain evidence

    cBridge Bridge 0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820 (Ethereum, not a proxy; verified source): withdraw() and relay() accept a message signed by the stored signer set, and resetSigners(signers, powers) replaces that set onlyOwner, gated only by block.timestamp > resetTime (notifyResetSigners() sets it to now + noticePeriod()); noticePeriod() = 604,800 s, resetTime() = unset (max) at this pin. owner() = 0xF380166F8490F24AF32Bf47D1aA217FBA62B6575, a SimpleGovernance (verified source): 6 voters, all accounts with no code, powers 10000, 10000, 10000, 10000, 10000, 1; QuorumThreshold params(1) = 60% and FastPassThreshold params(2) = 40% of total power, so 3 of the 5 full-power voters pass a proposal it executes. delayPeriod() = 21,600 s (large-transfer delay). This record does not allege any misuse.

    Show the full documented text

    'It is only when nodes with more than ⅔ of the total stake are malicious, that the fund pool will be at risk.' (cbridge-docs.celer.network/print.html)

Protocol maintainer and fixed this gap? Get it re-verified on mainnet in 24h

Control-plane scorecard

Upgradeability: StrongTimelock floor: StrongSigner quorum: Not determinedEmergency / freeze scope: Not determinedDocs-vs-chain parity: Weak

Delta Docs and chain differ

Aligned means the docs are accurate, not that the protocol is low-risk. The rosette rates the controls themselves.
Upgradeability
Strong · Immutable or ownership renouncedEvidence: cbridge-liquidity-bridge-owner-resets-signers-s33: … 0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820 (Ethereum, not a proxy; verified source): withdraw() and relay() …
Timelock floor
Strong · 7d minimum enforced delay across control surfacesEvidence: cbridge-liquidity-bridge-owner-resets-signers-s33: observed_delay_seconds = 604800
Signer quorum
Not determined · No signer quorum in the published records
Emergency / freeze scope
Not determined · No pause / freeze authority in the published records
Docs-vs-chain parity
Weak · Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)

Each slice is derived only from the pinned records on this page and their controller facts (/api/v1/scorecards.json). A hollow slice is not determined by the published evidence (never a guess); docs-vs-chain parity is uncompared for RPC-observed protocols. How to read it.

Check it live (free)

The pre-flight API re-reads the controller, proxy and capabilities of one contract at the latest block. No key, no wallet. The score rates that single contract, not the whole protocol.

cURL
curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum&address=0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820"
Python (requests)
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
                 params={"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])
MCP tool call · https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp
pacta_check_preflight({"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820"})

Pool Bridge signers: owner can resetSigners after 7-day notice; owner = 3-of-5 EOA governance

Status
Delta
Target
cBridge pool-based Bridge (Ethereum) 0x5427…1820 · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,452,373 · Etherscan · sprint 33
Block hash
0x63bfaa16…23c55d
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0x897a…d03c

Observed onchain. cBridge Bridge 0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820 (Ethereum, not a proxy; verified source): withdraw() and relay() accept a message signed by the stored signer set, and resetSigners(signers, powers) replaces that set onlyOwner, gated only by block.timestamp > resetTime (notifyResetSigners() sets it to now + noticePeriod()); noticePeriod() = 604,800 s, resetTime() = unset (max) at this pin. owner() = 0xF380166F8490F24AF32Bf47D1aA217FBA62B6575, a SimpleGovernance (verified source): 6 voters, all accounts with no code, powers 10000, 10000, 10000, 10000, 10000, 1; QuorumThreshold params(1) = 60% and FastPassThreshold params(2) = 40% of total power, so 3 of the 5 full-power voters pass a proposal it executes. delayPeriod() = 21,600 s (large-transfer delay). This record does not allege any misuse.

Documented. 'It is only when nodes with more than ⅔ of the total stake are malicious, that the fund pool will be at risk.' (cbridge-docs.celer.network/print.html)

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0x5427FEFA711Eff984124bFBB1AB6fbf5E3DA1820 \
  "owner()" \
  --block 26452373 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26452373 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0x63bfaa16f0019d8b37e757265d351bd135ad41e6ffa46207284198917123c55d

Control-plane badge: Parameter Delta

Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta

This badge is amber because at least one Base-EAS-attested surface of cBridge differs from what the protocol documents. It turns to the neutral Aligned · Base EAS shield only when the on-chain state or the documentation changes and the two match at a new finalized block, whoever requests the re-check.

Submit updated docs

Embed this badge (it updates when the status changes):

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Badge: https://pacta.wtf/badges/cbridge.svg · live: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/cbridge.svg.

For maintainers and issuers

Fixed this gap? 24h mainnet re-verification ($99 intro)

A maintainer and an independent verifier re-check cBridge on mainnet within 24h and attest the result on Base. The fee pays for the 24-hour mainnet re-verification work, never the grade: your attestation reads Aligned when on-chain controls match the published documentation, and Delta when they do not.

Maintaining cBridge? Verify and reconcile the record

Two paths, both public. A free doc-update notice asks the maintainers to correct the documentation or the onchain parameter; anyone can send it. A Full Control-Plane Dossier ($2,500–$5,000 USDC, 24h SLA) re-reads the multisig and timelock control planes on archive RPCs and prepares an upstream docs reconciliation PR. Either way the classification changes only when the onchain state or the documentation aligns at a new finalized block.

Need procurement paperwork? Request a commercial invoice (PDF).

Read-only onchain analysis. Not investment advice. Exploit-sensitive vulnerabilities are never published here; they go through Immunefi or Cantina bounty programmes.Request a dossier (24h SLA)