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Fixed-Rate Lending

Inverse Finance (FiRM): control-plane safety record

4 indexed control-plane surfaces for Inverse Finance (FiRM), each pinned to a canonical Ethereum block and compared with what the protocol documents. Contracts: 0x01EC…4ce8, 0x4b6c…F1B7

What differs

Changed / discrepant

  • Policy Committee Safe Quorum & GovernorMills Timelock: GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe … observed vs Working-groups governance documentation lists 5-of-9 Policy Committee multisig. documented
    Show the full onchain evidence

    GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe (0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7) with getThreshold() = 4, getOwners().length = 7 (4-of-7 Gnosis Safe); GovernorMills.timelock() (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h).

  • BorrowController stalenessThreshold 0-sentinel — queued 48h fix for sDOLA market: Timelock (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h), and the Timelock is BorrowController.operator(). observed vs Verified BorrowController source (Sourcify exact_match): 'if(marketStalenessThreshold == 0) return false;'. documented
    Show the full onchain evidence

    Timelock (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h), and the Timelock is BorrowController.operator(). stalenessThreshold(sDOLA market 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d) = 0, which disables the oracle staleness check (isPriceStale returns false when the threshold is 0). A queued Timelock transaction (queuedTransactions = true) sets it to 86500s at eta 1794633827 (2026-11-14 05:23:47 UTC), which enables the check (protective).

  • BorrowController stalenessThreshold (sDOLA market): 86,500 s at the Sprint pin, 0 (check off) at the #26,406,106 pin: FiRM BorrowController 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 (Ethereum): stalenessThreshold(sDOLA market 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d) = 86500s (24.03 h) at this pin. observed vs 'Every collateral market on FiRM has a maximum allowed age for price data, typically set between 1-24 hours depending on the asset's oracle characteristics.' documented
    Show the full onchain evidence

    FiRM BorrowController 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 (Ethereum): stalenessThreshold(sDOLA market 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d) = 86500s (24.03 h) at this pin. At Pacta's prior pin #26,406,106 (record inverse-firm-borrowcontroller-staleness-sentinel) it read 0, which switches the oracle staleness check off; the value read now equals the 86,500 s change that record observed queued. The docs describe a typical 1-24 hour range, not a hard maximum.

    Show the full documented text

    'Every collateral market on FiRM has a maximum allowed age for price data, typically set between 1-24 hours depending on the asset's oracle characteristics.' (docs.inverse.finance/inverse-finance/inverse-finance/products/firm/firm-security-and-safety.md)

  • Policy Committee Safe: 3-of-6 (docs: 5 of 9); 4-of-7 at #26,399,876: Inverse Finance Policy Committee Safe 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of 6 owners at this pin. observed vs '| **Policy Committee** | 5 of 9 | Governance guardian role (can cancel proposals), manages reward rate policies, operates as BondsManager |' … documented
    Show the full onchain evidence

    Inverse Finance Policy Committee Safe 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of 6 owners at this pin. It was 4-of-7 at Pacta's surface pin #26,399,876 (record inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe) and already 3-of-6 at #26,406,106 and at the protocol's latest pin #26,441,165: the change falls between #26,399,876 and #26,406,106, not after #26,441,165.

    Show the full documented text

    '| **Policy Committee** | 5 of 9 | Governance guardian role (can cancel proposals), manages reward rate policies, operates as BondsManager |' (docs.inverse.finance/inverse-finance/inverse-finance/governance/governance-overview.md)

Matched

  • Timelock delay: 2 d

Protocol maintainer and fixed this gap? Get it re-verified on mainnet in 24h

Control-plane scorecard

Upgradeability: Not determinedTimelock floor: StrongSigner quorum: StrongEmergency / freeze scope: StrongDocs-vs-chain parity: Weak

Delta Docs and chain differ

Aligned means the docs are accurate, not that the protocol is low-risk. The rosette rates the controls themselves.
Upgradeability
Not determined · Upgrade path not in the published records
Timelock floor
Strong · 2d minimum enforced delay across control surfacesEvidence: inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe: observed_delay_seconds = 172800
Signer quorum
Strong · Lowest controlling quorum: 3-of-6Evidence: inverse-firm-policy-safe-3of6-s30: … inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe) and already 3-of-6 at #26,406,106 and at the protocol's …
Emergency / freeze scope
Strong · Pause / freeze authority scoped behind a multi-signer controller (3-of-N Safe)Evidence: inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe: GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe …
Docs-vs-chain parity
Weak · Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)

Each slice is derived only from the pinned records on this page and their controller facts (/api/v1/scorecards.json). A hollow slice is not determined by the published evidence (never a guess); docs-vs-chain parity is uncompared for RPC-observed protocols. How to read it.

Check it live (free)

The pre-flight API re-reads the controller, proxy and capabilities of one contract at the latest block. No key, no wallet. The score rates that single contract, not the whole protocol.

cURL
curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum&address=0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7"
Python (requests)
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
                 params={"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])
MCP tool call · https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp
pacta_check_preflight({"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7"})

Provenance · research credit

First reported by @givemehat through the Pacta Wave 1 bounty (Slot #4, PR #32), merged under the Apache-2.0 grant and paid $25.00 USDC (tx 0x0043…ddb8). Pacta then re-read every value below on two independent RPCs at its own Sprint pin and compared it with the documentation; the classifications and the Base EAS attestation are Pacta's. See the leaderboard.

Reported by @farmmer938-lgtm through the Pacta Wave 2 pool (PR #69, fixture bounties/wave-2/ethereum-inverse-firm-borrowcontroller.json), merged under the Apache-2.0 commercial grant and paid $1.00 USDC (tx 0xac02…dbc7); credited on inverse-finance-firm-borrowcontroller-staleness-s28. Pacta then re-read every value below on two independent RPCs at its own Sprint pin and compared it with the documentation; the classifications and the Base EAS attestation are Pacta's. See the leaderboard.

Reported by @VB-Blue through the Pacta Wave 2 pool (PR #99, fixture bounties/wave-2/ethereum-inverse-firm-policy-safe-post-pin.json), merged under the Apache-2.0 commercial grant and paid $1.00 USDC (tx 0x57f6…87a9); credited on inverse-firm-policy-safe-3of6-s30. Pacta then re-read every value below on two independent RPCs at its own Sprint pin and compared it with the documentation; the classifications and the Base EAS attestation are Pacta's. See the leaderboard.

Policy Committee Safe Quorum & GovernorMills Timelock

Status
Delta
Target
Policy Committee Safe 0x4b6c…F1B7 · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,399,876 · Etherscan · sprint 1
Block hash
0x8bf896b8…bcde8a
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0x3404…3058

Observed onchain. GovernorMills (0xBeCCB6bb0aa4ab551966A7E4B97cec74bb359Bf6) guardian() wrapper (0x941c2699eC7E55a50Bde030d8E1e70649839259D) references Policy Committee Safe (0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7) with getThreshold() = 4, getOwners().length = 7 (4-of-7 Gnosis Safe); GovernorMills.timelock() (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h).

Documented. Working-groups governance documentation lists 5-of-9 Policy Committee multisig.

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 \
  "getThreshold()" \
  --block 26399876 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26399876 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0x8bf896b892683ff3267b88b367ab015a70cf5caf53542eb405f4f648f6bcde8a

BorrowController stalenessThreshold 0-sentinel — queued 48h fix for sDOLA market

Status
Protective
Target
FiRM BorrowController 0x01EC…4ce8 · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,406,106 · Etherscan · sprint 14
Block hash
0xcb24dfb0…086ecf
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0x8965…e5b8

Observed onchain. Timelock (0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B) delay() = 172800s (48h), and the Timelock is BorrowController.operator(). stalenessThreshold(sDOLA market 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d) = 0, which disables the oracle staleness check (isPriceStale returns false when the threshold is 0). A queued Timelock transaction (queuedTransactions = true) sets it to 86500s at eta 1794633827 (2026-11-14 05:23:47 UTC), which enables the check (protective).

Documented. Verified BorrowController source (Sourcify exact_match): 'if(marketStalenessThreshold == 0) return false;'.

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 \
  "stalenessThreshold(address)" 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d \
  --block 26406106 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26406106 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0xcb24dfb0b8af01dff9550fbbf6eb589b30d29b9625f41af56c188ae10d086ecf

BorrowController stalenessThreshold (sDOLA market): 86,500 s at the Sprint pin, 0 (check off) at the #26,406,106 pin

Status
Protective
Target
FiRM BorrowController 0x01EC…4ce8 · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,441,165 · Etherscan · sprint 28
Block hash
0x5182be2c…3901d9
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0x541d…5768

Observed onchain. FiRM BorrowController 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 (Ethereum): stalenessThreshold(sDOLA market 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d) = 86500s (24.03 h) at this pin. At Pacta's prior pin #26,406,106 (record inverse-firm-borrowcontroller-staleness-sentinel) it read 0, which switches the oracle staleness check off; the value read now equals the 86,500 s change that record observed queued. The docs describe a typical 1-24 hour range, not a hard maximum.

Documented. 'Every collateral market on FiRM has a maximum allowed age for price data, typically set between 1-24 hours depending on the asset's oracle characteristics.' (docs.inverse.finance/inverse-finance/inverse-finance/products/firm/firm-security-and-safety.md)

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0x01ECA33e20a4c379Bd8A5361f896A7dd2bAE4ce8 \
  "stalenessThreshold(address)" 0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d \
  --block 26441165 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26441165 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0x5182be2c61af5f48ed2ec43d3c177dedad257c4e966a7e384120829de73901d9

Policy Committee Safe: 3-of-6 (docs: 5 of 9); 4-of-7 at #26,399,876

Status
Delta
Target
Inverse Finance Policy Committee Safe 0x4b6c…F1B7 · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,449,594 · Etherscan · sprint 30
Block hash
0xbe263d5b…377287
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0x06ed…ca1c

Observed onchain. Inverse Finance Policy Committee Safe 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 3 of 6 owners at this pin. It was 4-of-7 at Pacta's surface pin #26,399,876 (record inverse-finance-firm-policy-safe) and already 3-of-6 at #26,406,106 and at the protocol's latest pin #26,441,165: the change falls between #26,399,876 and #26,406,106, not after #26,441,165.

Documented. '| **Policy Committee** | 5 of 9 | Governance guardian role (can cancel proposals), manages reward rate policies, operates as BondsManager |' (docs.inverse.finance/inverse-finance/inverse-finance/governance/governance-overview.md)

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0x4b6c63E6a94ef26E2dF60b89372db2d8e211F1B7 \
  "getThreshold()" \
  --block 26449594 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26449594 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287

Control-plane badge: Parameter Delta

Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta

This badge is amber because at least one Base-EAS-attested surface of Inverse Finance (FiRM) differs from what the protocol documents. It turns to the neutral Aligned · Base EAS shield only when the on-chain state or the documentation changes and the two match at a new finalized block, whoever requests the re-check.

Submit updated docs

Embed this badge (it updates when the status changes):

Markdown
[![Pacta Control Plane](https://pacta.wtf/badges/inverse-finance-firm.svg)](https://pacta.wtf/protocols/inverse-finance-firm/)
HTML
<a href="https://pacta.wtf/protocols/inverse-finance-firm/"><img src="https://pacta.wtf/badges/inverse-finance-firm.svg" alt="Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta" height="20"></a>

Badge: https://pacta.wtf/badges/inverse-finance-firm.svg · live: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/inverse-finance-firm.svg.

For maintainers and issuers

Fixed this gap? 24h mainnet re-verification ($99 intro)

A maintainer and an independent verifier re-check Inverse Finance (FiRM) on mainnet within 24h and attest the result on Base. The fee pays for the 24-hour mainnet re-verification work, never the grade: your attestation reads Aligned when on-chain controls match the published documentation, and Delta when they do not.

Maintaining Inverse Finance (FiRM)? Verify and reconcile the record

Two paths, both public. A free doc-update notice asks the maintainers to correct the documentation or the onchain parameter; anyone can send it. A Full Control-Plane Dossier ($2,500–$5,000 USDC, 24h SLA) re-reads the multisig and timelock control planes on archive RPCs and prepares an upstream docs reconciliation PR. Either way the classification changes only when the onchain state or the documentation aligns at a new finalized block.

Need procurement paperwork? Request a commercial invoice (PDF).

Read-only onchain analysis. Not investment advice. Exploit-sensitive vulnerabilities are never published here; they go through Immunefi or Cantina bounty programmes.Request a dossier (24h SLA)