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Automated DeFi position manager: strategies, order executors and fee policies behind upgradeable proxies

Odyssey Finance: control-plane safety record

1 indexed control-plane surface for Odyssey Finance, pinned to a canonical Ethereum block and compared with what the protocol documents. Contract: 0x3F6d…488D

What differs

Changed / discrepant

  • Upgrade governor: docs state a 3/5 multisig; every ProxyAdmin owner is one Safe, 2-of-4 (Ethereum and Base): PositionRegistry 0xeE156D8ea7b96a5524CcC3CF9283ab85E80E9534 (Ethereum; the contracts page lists it as PositionRegistry_Proxy for Mainnet and Base): TransparentUpgradeableProxy whose EIP-1967 admin … observed vs 'Control of upgrades and emergency actions rests with a designated **governor**, currently managed through a secure multi-signature wallet **(3/5)**.' documented
    Show the full onchain evidence

    PositionRegistry 0xeE156D8ea7b96a5524CcC3CF9283ab85E80E9534 (Ethereum; the contracts page lists it as PositionRegistry_Proxy for Mainnet and Base): TransparentUpgradeableProxy whose EIP-1967 admin slot = 0x3F6da0A118B3A0ddfdbaB4690cC96b2cF73B488D, the PositionRegistry_ProxyAdmin the page lists (OZ 5 ProxyAdmin, verified on Sourcify, exact match; upgradeAndCall onlyOwner). owner() of that ProxyAdmin and of the five other *_ProxyAdmin contracts the page lists (ApyTieredFeePolicy_1000_5_5_ProxyAdmin, ApyTieredFeePolicy_600_5_5_ProxyAdmin, PerformanceFeePolicy_1000_5_5_ProxyAdmin, PerformanceFeePolicy_600_5_5_ProxyAdmin, ProtocolTieredFeePolicy_5_5_ProxyAdmin) = 0xd44A3e93A256c445F17a12f35A0ffEf975ec6817; PositionRegistry's own owner() = the same Safe (its verified source makes addStrategy, addKeeper, removeKeeper, updateFeePolicy, updateImplementation, updateIsActive, updateFeeCollector, updateSwapAggregator, addCalldataToWhitelist and removeCalldataFromWhitelist onlyOwner; updateIsActive is the documented emergency restriction). Every upgrade and emergency controller read for this record is that one Safe: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 4; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module; its owners have no code (keys). On Base, at the Sprint Base pin, the same addresses read the same way: the registry's admin slot is the same ProxyAdmin (runtime code identical to the Ethereum one), all six ProxyAdmins and the registry are owned by 0xd44A3e93A256c445F17a12f35A0ffEf975ec6817, a Safe there too: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 4; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. The protocol page names no address; this record binds its statement about the governor to the one Safe all listed controllers resolve to. The docs state the governor is a 3/5 multi-signature wallet; on chain 2 signatures of 4 owners execute an upgrade or an emergency restriction, with no timelock in the path. This record does not allege any misuse of these powers.

    Show the full documented text

    'Control of upgrades and emergency actions rests with a designated **governor**, currently managed through a secure multi-signature wallet **(3/5)**.' (docs.odyssey.finance/architecture/protocol.md); '## Mainnet' (docs.odyssey.finance/resources/contracts.md)

Protocol maintainer and fixed this gap? Get it re-verified on mainnet in 24h

Control-plane scorecard

Upgradeability: Not determinedTimelock floor: Not determinedSigner quorum: Not determinedEmergency / freeze scope: Not determinedDocs-vs-chain parity: Weak

Delta Docs and chain differ

Aligned means the docs are accurate, not that the protocol is low-risk. The rosette rates the controls themselves.
Upgradeability
Not determined · Upgradeable; the delay gating the upgrade path is not in the published recordsEvidence: odyssey-finance-governor-safe-2-of-4-vs-3-of-5-s37: PositionRegistry 0xeE156D8ea7b96a5524CcC3CF9283ab85E80E9534 (Ethereum; the contracts page lists it as PositionRegistry_Proxy for Mainnet and Base) …
Timelock floor
Not determined · No enforced admin delay in the published records
Signer quorum
Not determined · No signer quorum in the published records
Emergency / freeze scope
Not determined · No pause / freeze authority in the published records
Docs-vs-chain parity
Weak · Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)

Each slice is derived only from the pinned records on this page and their controller facts (/api/v1/scorecards.json). A hollow slice is not determined by the published evidence (never a guess); docs-vs-chain parity is uncompared for RPC-observed protocols. How to read it.

Check it live (free)

The pre-flight API re-reads the controller, proxy and capabilities of one contract at the latest block. No key, no wallet. The score rates that single contract, not the whole protocol.

cURL
curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum&address=0x3F6da0A118B3A0ddfdbaB4690cC96b2cF73B488D"
Python (requests)
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
                 params={"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0x3F6da0A118B3A0ddfdbaB4690cC96b2cF73B488D"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])
MCP tool call · https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp
pacta_check_preflight({"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0x3F6da0A118B3A0ddfdbaB4690cC96b2cF73B488D"})

Upgrade governor: docs state a 3/5 multisig; every ProxyAdmin owner is one Safe, 2-of-4 (Ethereum and Base)

Status
Delta
Target
PositionRegistry ProxyAdmin (Ethereum) 0x3F6d…488D · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,458,556 · Etherscan · sprint 37
Block hash
0xe258bb1c…2769d2
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0xa20a…96a5

Observed onchain. PositionRegistry 0xeE156D8ea7b96a5524CcC3CF9283ab85E80E9534 (Ethereum; the contracts page lists it as PositionRegistry_Proxy for Mainnet and Base): TransparentUpgradeableProxy whose EIP-1967 admin slot = 0x3F6da0A118B3A0ddfdbaB4690cC96b2cF73B488D, the PositionRegistry_ProxyAdmin the page lists (OZ 5 ProxyAdmin, verified on Sourcify, exact match; upgradeAndCall onlyOwner). owner() of that ProxyAdmin and of the five other *_ProxyAdmin contracts the page lists (ApyTieredFeePolicy_1000_5_5_ProxyAdmin, ApyTieredFeePolicy_600_5_5_ProxyAdmin, PerformanceFeePolicy_1000_5_5_ProxyAdmin, PerformanceFeePolicy_600_5_5_ProxyAdmin, ProtocolTieredFeePolicy_5_5_ProxyAdmin) = 0xd44A3e93A256c445F17a12f35A0ffEf975ec6817; PositionRegistry's own owner() = the same Safe (its verified source makes addStrategy, addKeeper, removeKeeper, updateFeePolicy, updateImplementation, updateIsActive, updateFeeCollector, updateSwapAggregator, addCalldataToWhitelist and removeCalldataFromWhitelist onlyOwner; updateIsActive is the documented emergency restriction). Every upgrade and emergency controller read for this record is that one Safe: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 4; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module; its owners have no code (keys). On Base, at the Sprint Base pin, the same addresses read the same way: the registry's admin slot is the same ProxyAdmin (runtime code identical to the Ethereum one), all six ProxyAdmins and the registry are owned by 0xd44A3e93A256c445F17a12f35A0ffEf975ec6817, a Safe there too: getThreshold() = 2 of getOwners() = 4; guard slot empty; getModulesPaginated() lists no module. The protocol page names no address; this record binds its statement about the governor to the one Safe all listed controllers resolve to. The docs state the governor is a 3/5 multi-signature wallet; on chain 2 signatures of 4 owners execute an upgrade or an emergency restriction, with no timelock in the path. This record does not allege any misuse of these powers.

Documented. 'Control of upgrades and emergency actions rests with a designated **governor**, currently managed through a secure multi-signature wallet **(3/5)**.' (docs.odyssey.finance/architecture/protocol.md); '## Mainnet' (docs.odyssey.finance/resources/contracts.md)

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0x3F6da0A118B3A0ddfdbaB4690cC96b2cF73B488D \
  "owner()" \
  --block 26458556 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26458556 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0xe258bb1cbcc988e2dfdba4ba173f9f8690520dba3647cdcae18e0651822769d2

Control-plane badge: Parameter Delta

Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta

This badge is amber because at least one Base-EAS-attested surface of Odyssey Finance differs from what the protocol documents. It turns to the neutral Aligned · Base EAS shield only when the on-chain state or the documentation changes and the two match at a new finalized block, whoever requests the re-check.

Submit updated docs

Embed this badge (it updates when the status changes):

Markdown
[![Pacta Control Plane](https://pacta.wtf/badges/odyssey-finance.svg)](https://pacta.wtf/protocols/odyssey-finance/)
HTML
<a href="https://pacta.wtf/protocols/odyssey-finance/"><img src="https://pacta.wtf/badges/odyssey-finance.svg" alt="Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta" height="20"></a>

Badge: https://pacta.wtf/badges/odyssey-finance.svg · live: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/odyssey-finance.svg.

For maintainers and issuers

Fixed this gap? 24h mainnet re-verification ($99 intro)

A maintainer and an independent verifier re-check Odyssey Finance on mainnet within 24h and attest the result on Base. The fee pays for the 24-hour mainnet re-verification work, never the grade: your attestation reads Aligned when on-chain controls match the published documentation, and Delta when they do not.

Maintaining Odyssey Finance? Verify and reconcile the record

Two paths, both public. A free doc-update notice asks the maintainers to correct the documentation or the onchain parameter; anyone can send it. A Full Control-Plane Dossier ($2,500–$5,000 USDC, 24h SLA) re-reads the multisig and timelock control planes on archive RPCs and prepares an upstream docs reconciliation PR. Either way the classification changes only when the onchain state or the documentation aligns at a new finalized block.

Need procurement paperwork? Request a commercial invoice (PDF).

Read-only onchain analysis. Not investment advice. Exploit-sensitive vulnerabilities are never published here; they go through Immunefi or Cantina bounty programmes.Request a dossier (24h SLA)