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Canonical Bridge (sidechain checkpoints) (Ethereum)

Polygon Bridge: control-plane safety record

3 indexed control-plane surfaces for Polygon Bridge, each pinned to a canonical Ethereum block and compared with what the protocol documents. Contracts: 0x424b…19C4, 0xA0c6…7C77, 0xFa7D…b74c

What differs

Changed / discrepant

  • Custom ChildERC20 mapping Safe: 4-of-13 (docs: 4/8): Polygon custom ChildERC20 mapping Safe 0x424bDE99FCfB68c5a1218fd3215caFfD031f19C4 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of 13 owners; observed vs '4/8 Multisig 0x424bDE99FCfB68c5a1218fd3215caFfD031f19C4' (docs.polygon.technology/pos/reference/commit-chain-multisigs) documented
    Show the full onchain evidence

    Polygon custom ChildERC20 mapping Safe 0x424bDE99FCfB68c5a1218fd3215caFfD031f19C4 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of 13 owners; the multisig page lists it as a 4/8 Multisig.

  • RootChainManager + predicates: upgrades via a 0 s timelock run by the 5-of-9 Safe: Polygon RootChainManagerProxy 0xA0c68C638235ee32657e8f720a23ceC1bFc77C77, ERC20PredicateProxy 0x40ec5B33f54e0E8A33A975908C5BA1c14e5BbbDf and EtherPredicateProxy … observed vs 'The existing multisigs do not have the capability to censor transactions, including bridge transactions.' documented
    Show the full onchain evidence

    Polygon RootChainManagerProxy 0xA0c68C638235ee32657e8f720a23ceC1bFc77C77, ERC20PredicateProxy 0x40ec5B33f54e0E8A33A975908C5BA1c14e5BbbDf and EtherPredicateProxy 0x8484Ef722627bf18ca5Ae6BcF031c23E6e922B30 (Ethereum): proxyOwner() = TimelockController 0xCaf0aa768A3AE1297DF20072419Db8Bb8b5C8cEf on all three; its getMinDelay() = 0 at this pin and already 0 at Pacta's Sprint 26 pin #26,438,867 (record polygon-bridge-safe-threshold-s26): not a change since that pin. The 5-of-9 Safe 0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c holds PROPOSER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE on that timelock and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE directly on the three bridge contracts. The documentation does disclose that multisigs control contract upgrades; no censorship incident is alleged.

    Show the full documented text

    'The existing multisigs do not have the capability to censor transactions, including bridge transactions.' (docs.polygon.technology/pos/reference/commit-chain-multisigs)

Matched

  • Polygon Bridge multisig: 5-of-9 Safe, as documented: matches the documentation

Protocol maintainer and fixed this gap? Get it re-verified on mainnet in 24h

Control-plane scorecard

Upgradeability: Not determinedTimelock floor: Not determinedSigner quorum: StrongEmergency / freeze scope: Not determinedDocs-vs-chain parity: Weak

Delta Docs and chain differ

Aligned means the docs are accurate, not that the protocol is low-risk. The rosette rates the controls themselves.
Upgradeability
Not determined · Upgrade path not in the published records
Timelock floor
Not determined · No enforced admin delay in the published records
Signer quorum
Strong · Lowest controlling quorum: 4-of-13Evidence: controller fact: Safe getThreshold()
Emergency / freeze scope
Not determined · No pause / freeze authority in the published records
Docs-vs-chain parity
Weak · Documentation differs from the chain (parameter delta)

Each slice is derived only from the pinned records on this page and their controller facts (/api/v1/scorecards.json). A hollow slice is not determined by the published evidence (never a guess); docs-vs-chain parity is uncompared for RPC-observed protocols. How to read it.

Check it live (free)

The pre-flight API re-reads the controller, proxy and capabilities of one contract at the latest block. No key, no wallet. The score rates that single contract, not the whole protocol.

cURL
curl -s "https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight?chain=ethereum&address=0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c"
Python (requests)
import requests
r = requests.get("https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/check/preflight",
                 params={"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c"})
print(r.json()["verdict"])
MCP tool call · https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/mcp
pacta_check_preflight({"chain": "ethereum", "address": "0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c"})

Provenance · research credit

Reported by @random-solver through the Pacta Wave 2 pool (PR #104, fixture bounties/wave-2/ethereum-polygon-pos-bridge.json), merged under the Apache-2.0 commercial grant and paid $1.00 USDC (tx 0xa0f8…62b0); credited on polygon-bridge-rootchainmanager-zero-delay-upgrade-s30. Pacta then re-read every value below on two independent RPCs at its own Sprint pin and compared it with the documentation; the classifications and the Base EAS attestation are Pacta's. See the leaderboard.

Polygon Bridge multisig: 5-of-9 Safe, as documented

Status
Aligned
Target
Polygon Bridge Safe 0xFa7D…b74c · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,438,867 · Etherscan · sprint 26
Block hash
0x6c477521…3458ff
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0x6692…3a08

Observed onchain. Polygon Bridge Safe 0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 5 of getOwners() = 9 owners (Safe v1.4.1).

Documented. '**$5/9$ Multisig** `0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c`' (docs.polygon.technology/pos/reference/commit-chain-multisigs.md)

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c \
  "getThreshold()" \
  --block 26438867 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26438867 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0x6c477521320837df8611249a255cb7142052874937cddb9fe568f685763458ff

Custom ChildERC20 mapping Safe: 4-of-13 (docs: 4/8)

Status
Delta
Target
Polygon commitchain token-mapping multisig 0x424b…19C4 · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,449,594 · Etherscan · sprint 30
Block hash
0xbe263d5b…377287
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0x06ed…ca1c

Observed onchain. Polygon custom ChildERC20 mapping Safe 0x424bDE99FCfB68c5a1218fd3215caFfD031f19C4 (Ethereum): getThreshold() = 4 of 13 owners; the multisig page lists it as a 4/8 Multisig.

Documented. '4/8 Multisig 0x424bDE99FCfB68c5a1218fd3215caFfD031f19C4' (docs.polygon.technology/pos/reference/commit-chain-multisigs)

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0x424bDE99FCfB68c5a1218fd3215caFfD031f19C4 \
  "getThreshold()" \
  --block 26449594 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26449594 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287

RootChainManager + predicates: upgrades via a 0 s timelock run by the 5-of-9 Safe

Status
Delta
Target
Polygon RootChainManagerProxy 0xA0c6…7C77 · Etherscan
Pinned block
Ethereum #26,449,594 · Etherscan · sprint 30
Block hash
0xbe263d5b…377287
Attestation
Base EAS attestation 0x06ed…ca1c

Observed onchain. Polygon RootChainManagerProxy 0xA0c68C638235ee32657e8f720a23ceC1bFc77C77, ERC20PredicateProxy 0x40ec5B33f54e0E8A33A975908C5BA1c14e5BbbDf and EtherPredicateProxy 0x8484Ef722627bf18ca5Ae6BcF031c23E6e922B30 (Ethereum): proxyOwner() = TimelockController 0xCaf0aa768A3AE1297DF20072419Db8Bb8b5C8cEf on all three; its getMinDelay() = 0 at this pin and already 0 at Pacta's Sprint 26 pin #26,438,867 (record polygon-bridge-safe-threshold-s26): not a change since that pin. The 5-of-9 Safe 0xFa7D2a996aC6350f4b56C043112Da0366a59b74c holds PROPOSER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE on that timelock and DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE directly on the three bridge contracts. The documentation does disclose that multisigs control contract upgrades; no censorship incident is alleged.

Documented. 'The existing multisigs do not have the capability to censor transactions, including bridge transactions.' (docs.polygon.technology/pos/reference/commit-chain-multisigs)

Reproduce on any archive node
cast call 0xA0c68C638235ee32657e8f720a23ceC1bFc77C77 \
  "proxyOwner()" \
  --block 26449594 --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
cast block 26449594 --field hash --rpc-url "$ETH_RPC_URL"
# expect 0xbe263d5b378dcb7c3c4e18bd8e388f0cb2dab1adacd83de2be58c9408b377287

Control-plane badge: Parameter Delta

Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta

This badge is amber because at least one Base-EAS-attested surface of Polygon Bridge differs from what the protocol documents. It turns to the neutral Aligned · Base EAS shield only when the on-chain state or the documentation changes and the two match at a new finalized block, whoever requests the re-check.

Submit updated docs

Embed this badge (it updates when the status changes):

Markdown
[![Pacta Control Plane](https://pacta.wtf/badges/polygon-bridge.svg)](https://pacta.wtf/protocols/polygon-bridge/)
HTML
<a href="https://pacta.wtf/protocols/polygon-bridge/"><img src="https://pacta.wtf/badges/polygon-bridge.svg" alt="Pacta Control Plane: Parameter Delta" height="20"></a>

Badge: https://pacta.wtf/badges/polygon-bridge.svg · live: https://pacta-x402.pacta.workers.dev/v1/badges/polygon-bridge.svg.

For maintainers and issuers

Fixed this gap? 24h mainnet re-verification ($99 intro)

A maintainer and an independent verifier re-check Polygon Bridge on mainnet within 24h and attest the result on Base. The fee pays for the 24-hour mainnet re-verification work, never the grade: your attestation reads Aligned when on-chain controls match the published documentation, and Delta when they do not.

Maintaining Polygon Bridge? Verify and reconcile the record

Two paths, both public. A free doc-update notice asks the maintainers to correct the documentation or the onchain parameter; anyone can send it. A Full Control-Plane Dossier ($2,500–$5,000 USDC, 24h SLA) re-reads the multisig and timelock control planes on archive RPCs and prepares an upstream docs reconciliation PR. Either way the classification changes only when the onchain state or the documentation aligns at a new finalized block.

Need procurement paperwork? Request a commercial invoice (PDF).

Read-only onchain analysis. Not investment advice. Exploit-sensitive vulnerabilities are never published here; they go through Immunefi or Cantina bounty programmes.Request a dossier (24h SLA)